Provides for the emergency relocation of court terms; repealer

* the Governor may relocate a court outside New York City to another location within "its district" (Judiciary Law §8);

* if the Governor has not acted, the presiding judge of a court of record may relocate it to another location in its "district," in which case the governor cannot appoint another location (Judiciary Law §9);

* a judge of a court of record lacking suitable accommodation may adjourn to elsewhere in its "district" (Judiciary Law §10);

* the New York City Mayor may relocate any court within the city to another location in the city (see Judiciary Law §11); and

* a County Court judge may relocate the county courthouse to another location "in the vicinity" (Judiciary Law §12).

These statutes are inadequate for 21st century threats and emergencies. First, modern threats ranging from the natural (e.g. avian flu, flood) to the manmade (e.g. terror attack) readily can paralyze a court's entire "district" (i.e. the jurisdiction for which a court presides) or otherwise make proceedings there unsafe or impractical.(1) Thus, limiting court relocations only to other places within the district could shutter courts at the very times that the public most needs courts to stay open. This concern is especially compelling for courts presiding in and for geographically compact areas ( e.g., the Appellate Division and Appellate Term in the First Department; Supreme Court in each of New York City's judicial districts and the County, City and District Courts statewide), all of which courts could be hobbled by having to remain in their "districts" despite any emergency.

Second, the fracturing of court relocation powers among so many public officials (e.g., Governor, New York City Mayor, local judges) undermines the unified and coordinated response that emergencies require. The attacks of September 11 taught New York that coordination across branches and levels of government is never more essential than during times of crisis. The 1909 statutes instead create confused and even contradictory lines of authority at times most demanding clarity and dispatch. Within the Judiciary, while current law purports to empower individual judges to relocate courts, it is the Chief Judge and Chief Administrative Judge that have the systemwide power and resources to ensure that courts function properly in a temporary location (i.e. provide security to courts and the public using them, coordinate transport of detained parties, etc.). All of these powers must be harmonized to avoid chaos under emergency conditions. Likewise, the Judiciary's interaction with other branches and levels of government must be as efficient as possible to respond properly to emergencies, but the 1909 relocation statutes predate the advent of modern disaster plans on which all levels of government rely (see generally Executive Law art 2-B). The Legislature even provided that disaster plans must provide for the continued effective operation of the civil and criminal justice systems in consultation with the Judiciary (see L. 2004, c. 42), yet the relocation statutes do not require anyone to consider those disaster plans in deciding how and where to temporarily relocate a court. The result is that emergency court relocations may conflict with the disaster plans that the executive branch would apply in those very emergencies.

Third, in the event of an emergency court relocation, the statutes make no clear provision for cost. Under current law, presumably the political subdivision for which the court presides would continue to bear the cost of continuing to provide facilities suitable and sufficient for the transaction of court business, notwithstanding the temporary relocation of that court (see Judiciary Law §39 3 ). This result, however, raises hard questions about whether and to what extent issues of court facility cost are relevant under emergency conditions that require courts to relocate. Arguably under such conditions, localities ought not bear the cost of facility relocations beyond their control, especially when the overriding considerations are the safe and quick re-establishment of effective court operations.

This measure redresses the foregoing concerns by providing for updated disaster plans, adapting to modern threats by allowing relocations beyond court "districts" as necessary, insulating localities against unfair facility costs arising from these emergency relocations, and ensuring clear lines of authority under crisis conditions. These changes will help ensure the continued effective operation of the Judiciary as an independent branch of government under emergency circumstances, and enhance proper collaboration among the branches of state government - and between state and local governments - to streamline emergency response in and for the courts and among the many state and local stakeholders intimately involved in day-to-day court operations. To these ends:

Section one repeals the anachronistic Judiciary Law sections 8-12 and inserts a new Judiciary Law section 8 to provide a modern emergency response system for New York's courts. If a court location is unsafe or impractical for the holding of a trial court, then the Governor may by order appoint another place for the temporary holding of court after consulting with the Chief Judge or his or her designee if practicable. For the Court of Appeals and for trial courts where the Governor has not acted, the relocation power would fall to the Chief Judge. For intermediate appellate courts (i.e. Appellate Division and Appellate Terms of Supreme Court), the relocation power would fall to the Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division after consulting with the Chief Judge or his or her designee. All temporary relocations must be to the most proximate place that the term of court safely and practicably can preside, and should be consistent with applicable State and local disaster preparedness plans. Also, for trial courts, temporary relocations must be after consultation with relevant local leaders (e.g., county executives or mayors) if practicable. Relocation orders would expire within 30 days but could be renewed for successive periods of 30 days each in like fashion as an original order. Regardless where a court temporarily sits, the court would continue to preside on behalf of its original jurisdiction (i.e. judicial department, judicial district, county, city, etc.) and the same substantive and procedural laws (e.g. governing venue, jury selection, papers and appeals) would apply as if the court were not relocated. If a court is relocated temporarily outside its original jurisdiction, then facility costs would not be borne by the receiving locality but instead would become State costs charged to the Office of Court Administration.

Section two adds to Judiciary Law section 211 a new subdivision five to memorialize the Chief Judge's emergency relocation powers as provided above.

Section three recognizes the continuing obligation of the State Disaster Preparedness Commission and local disaster preparedness commissions to insure that the disaster preparedness plans for which they are responsible take appropriate account of the provisions of this measure.

This measure would have no current fiscal impact on the State or any locality, and during emergencies would provide salutary fiscal benefits to localities by relieving them of court facility costs associated with emergency court relocations outside their original districts.

This measure would take effect immediately.

2008 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY : Senate 6900 (Sen. DeFrancisco) (Rules) Assembly 10616 (M. of A. Weinstein (Passed)

Footnote

(1) Neither the current statutes nor their legislative history offer any basis for a flexible reading of the word "district": the statutes can mean only that a City Court may be relocated only within the city, a County Court within the County, etc. Other statutes reinforce this meaning by requiring courts to sit in their particular jurisdictions (see e.g. Judiciary Law §190-d County Court to sit in the county ); likewise, as each District Court ordinarily may sit only within its local "district" (i.e. town), the Legislature had to make a special exception to relax this requirement (see UDCA §2410 Suffolk District Courts may sit outside district within 1,500 feet of boundary line ).