Establishes a hardship privilege for those with a suspended license where there is a necessary operation of a vehicle during the course of the licensee's employment

VTL §1193(2)(e)(7)(a) provides for the automatic license suspension at arraignment, "of any person charged with a violation of subdivision two, two-a, three or four-a of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this article who, at the time of arrest, is alleged to have had .08 of one percent or more by weight of alcohol in such driver's blood as shown by chemical analysis of blood, breath, urine or saliva, made pursuant to subdivision two or three of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article."

If a defendant, however, can establish that the automatic suspension will impose an "extreme hardship," the VTL permits a court to grant a "hardship privilege" (VTL §1193(2)(e)(7)(e)). The statute defines extreme hardship as "the inability to obtain alternative means of travel to or from the licensee's employment, or to or from necessary medical treatment for the licensee or a member of the licensee's household, or if the licensee is a matriculating student enrolled in an accredited school, college or university travel to or from such licensee's school, college or university if such travel is necessary for the completion of the educational degree or certificate.

Significantly, the statute "does not encompass within its definition inconvenience to the defendant or any consideration of whether the defendant is required, as a condition' of employment, to operate vehicles as a properly licensed driver" (People v Correa, 168 Misc 2d 309 Crim Ct, NY County 1996 , see also People v Henderson, NYLJ, Oct. 24,2006 at 24 col 3). In Correa, the defendant was a New York City firefighter who was required to maintain a valid driver's license for his employment, even though he did not drive any emergency vehicles during the work day. In Henderson, the defendant's employment duties required him to drive to and from various job sites on a daily basis. In both cases, the respective courts held that the statute did not authorize the court to grant a limited license for the defendant to drive while at work even though holding a valid license was necessary for their employment. In cases such as these defendants risk loss of their employment before their cases can be adjudicated.

The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles does have the power to issue a conditional license that allows a defendant to drive during work hours (see VTL § 1196(a)(2)). But the Commissioner can only grant the conditional license after the defendant's license has been suspended for 30 days (see VTL § 1193(2)(e)(7)(d)). We believe that a court should have the authority to grant a hardship privilege in appropriate cases to allow a defendant to use a non-commercial vehicle where required for the defendant's employment. This measure does not allow the court to preempt the decision of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, but instead provides the court with the authority to bridge the gap until the defendant can apply to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for a conditional license. Significantly, the measure provides that the hardship privilege will terminate when the defendant is able to apply for a conditional license from the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.

This measure, which would have no meaningful fiscal impact on the State, would take effect 30 days after it shall have become a law.

2008 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY : None. New proposal.