Relates to processes, warrants and other mandates of city courts outside the city of New York

Ratified by the People over 50 years ago, the 1961 version of Article VI of the Constitution contemplated a collection of City Courts outside New York City that mainly were small, part-time and somewhat peripheral to the administration of justice in New York State. At that time, City Courts were funded by localities, their dockets were relatively small, and procedures trended toward relative informality. Consistent with these dynamics, the 1961 version of Article VI limited City Court service of process to the county or adjoining county; the Uniform City Court Act (L. 1964, c. 497) thereafter reflected these service limitations.

Today's City Courts increasingly are full-time, high-docket, sophisticated and integral parts of our Judiciary. Their costs are paid by the State in like fashion as Supreme and County Courts (see Judiciary Law § 39; L. 1977, c. 966), and their judges increasingly preside in core County and Family Court parts that otherwise would lack sufficient coverage (see NY Const, art VI, § 26(j)(2)). City Court dockets have mushroomed: City Courts bear the full brunt of civil and criminal quality-of-life calendars affecting New York's communities, economy and civic life. City Courts routinely operate dedicated Parts for Domestic Violence and Drug Treatment, as well as over full calendars of consumer credit and housing cases. As such, today's City Courts occupy fundamentally different positions than in 1961, and their effective operation is more vital than ever to the vitality of New York's civil and criminal justice systems.

Given these modem realities, and recognizing that today's New Yorkers routinely travel and transact commerce between counties, the 1961 Constitution's restraints on service of City Court process are anachronistic at best. Whatever justification there may have been for geographical service distinctions between City Courts and District Courts (the functional equivalent of City Courts in Nassau and Suffolk Counties), no valid justification exists today given the position of City Courts in New York's 21st century court system. There is no basis consistent with the administration of justice to single out today's City Courts as the only State-paid courts that lack statewide service of process.

This restriction also impairs efficiency in numerous ways with no benefit. On the criminal side, disallowing City Court service beyond the county or adjacent county either frustrates process on a criminal defendant (UCCA § 2005) or requires a second court to endorse the City Court's process - requiring taxpayers to subsidize double work (see e.g. CPL 120.70(2)(b)). On the civil side, geographic limits on City Court service can force City Court cases to be re-commenced in Supreme or County Court, which constitutionally enjoy statewide service - a result that violates public policy favoring local access to justice and the lower costs of proceeding in local courts. This anachronism also impedes City Court powers in relation to routine disclosure (UCCA § 1101), subpoenas (UCCA § 1201), enforcement (UCCA § 1508) and punishment of contempt (UCCA § 1509), all of which stop abruptly at a county line. Rather than encourage the expediency of adjudication in City Court, these outdated restraints encourage the opposite result and undermine the administration of justice by rewarding adverse parties' efforts to evade service.

To redress these unnecessary complexities, this measure would empower the Legislature to authorize statewide service of City Court process. If approved by the Legislature and the voters, and then implemented with appropriate legislation, this measure would promote efficiency and effectiveness in the courts, with correspondingly reduced costs for both private litigants and the justice system.

Legislative history

None. New proposal.