Relates to leaving the scene of an incident without reporting after injury was caused to another person

BILL NUMBER:S7590

Title of bill

An act to amend the vehicle and traffic law, in relation to leaving the scene of an incident without reporting after injury was caused to another person

This is one in a series of measures being introduced at the request of the Chief Administrative Judge upon the recommendation of her Advisory Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure.

This measure would amend the Vehicle and Traffic Law to substitute the term "bodily injury" for "physical injury" in the crime of leaving the scene of an incident without reporting.

The crime of leaving the scene of an incident without reporting under VTL §600(2)(a) requires, among other things, that "personal injury" be caused to another person due to an incident involving a motor vehicle operated by a defendant. "Personal injury," however, is not defined in the statute and some courts have looked to the Penal Law for a definition. Although the Penal Law does not define "personal injury," it does provide that "'physical injury'" means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain" (PL, § 10.00(9)). This definition has been the subject of considerable analysis, and it is clear that not all injury rises to the level of "physical injury" (see Matter of Phillip A., 49 NY2d 198 (1980) (injury from a petty slap in the face, or a moderate shove or kick, without more, is insufficient); People v McDowell, 28 NY2d 373 (1971) (black eye without more is insufficient); People v Jimenez, 55 NY2d 895 (1982) (one centimeter cut without some indication of substantial pain insufficient)). Consequently, to the extent that courts consider the term "personal injury" under the Vehicle and Traffic Law to mean "physical injury," prosecutors must demonstrate more than that simple bodily injury occurred to a person as a result of a motor vehicle incident to support a prosecution for leaving the scene of an incident without reporting.

At least one court, however, has rejected any effort to substitute the Penal Law definition of "physical injury" for the term "personal injury" in VTL crimes (see e.g., People v Bogomolsky, 14 Misc 3d 26 (App Term, 2d Dept 2006)). In Bogomolsky, the court distinguished the two terms and suggested that "personal injury" is a lesser standard than "physical injury," but cited to no case or statute that would provide a more clear definition.

We believe that the duty of a citizen to stop and provide identifying information when involved in a motor vehicle accident should not hinge on the degree of injury a person has suffered as a result of the accident. If a driver knows or has reason to know that any level of injury has occurred as a result of a motor vehicle accident, the

duty to provide information seems manifest and significant. The statute should make that plain. This measure substitutes the term "bodily injury" for "personal injury" in order to clarify that any injury is adequate to trigger a duty to stop and identify. The term "bodily injury" is frequently used in civil cases and we believe its use is less likely to confuse courts and parties.

This measure, which would have no meaningful fiscal impact on the State, would take effect immediately.

Legislative history

None. New proposal.