Public Hearing on Rebuilding After "Sandy"

1 BEFORE THE NEW YORK STATE SENATE

STANDING COMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND 2 GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

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PUBLIC HEARING 4

ON REBUILDING AFTER "SANDY" 5

------------------------------------------------------ 6 7 Legislative & Executive Chamber

Nassau County Office Building 8 1550 Franklin Avenue

Mineola, New York 11501 9

January 17, 2013 10 11:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. 11 12 13 PRESIDING: 14 Senator Carl L. Marcellino

Chair 15 16 17 SENATE MEMBERS PRESENT: 18 Senator Jack M. Martins 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1

SPEAKERS:PAGE QUESTIONS 2

Edward Mangano 8 15 3 County Executive

County of Nassau, New York 4

Samuel Chu 16 22 5 Director of Operations

County of Suffolk, New York 6

Lewis Dubuque 37 50 7 Executive Vice President

New York State Builders Association 8

John Bachenski 37 50 9 NYC Director of Marketing and

Technical Services 10 International Masonry Institute 11 Todd Stewart 37 50

2013 President 12 New York State Builders Association 13 Elizabeth Sheargold 66 88

Associate Director 14 Columbia Center for Climate Change Law 15 James Rausse, AICP 66 88

President 16 American Planning Association,

Metro New York Chapter 17

Michael Levine 66 88 18 VP for Intergovernmental Affairs

American Planning Association, 19 Metro New York Chapter 20 James Ammerman, Ph.D. 102 130

Director 21 New York Sea Grant 22 Jay Tanski 102 130

Coastal Processes Specialist 23 New York Sea Grant 24 Nate Woiwode 102 130

Policy Advisor, Marine & Coastal Team 25 The Nature Conservancy on Long Island 1

SPEAKERS:PAGE QUESTIONS 2

Douglas Hill 102 130 3 Consulting Engineer & Adjunct Lecturer

Stony Brook University 4

Jack Schnirman 154 175 5 City Manager

City of Long Beach, New York 6

Joseph Madigan 185 191 7 Assistant Superintendent of Buildings,

Floodplain Manager, 8 and Mitigation Coordinator

City of Freeport, New York 9 10 11 ---oOo--- 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 SENATOR MARCELLINO: [Unintelligible], that 2 you understand that, just to let everybody know. 3 I'd like to call the meeting of the -- oh, 4 you ready? 5 We'll wait. 6 UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Jack's not ready yet, sir. 7 SENATOR MARCELLINO: We'll call the meeting 8 of the Senate Investigations Committee and 9 Government Operations to order. 10 If we could all rise for Pledge of 11 Allegiance. 12 I pledge allegiance to the flag of the 13 United States of America, and to the Republic for 14 which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, 15 with liberty and justice for all. 16 Thank you. 17 I'm Senator Carl Marcellino, and I chair the 18 Committee on Investigations and Government 19 Operations for the New York State Senate. 20 The purpose of this particular hearing is to 21 consider possible infrastructure and construction 22 improvements, zoning changes, beach protection, 23 with rebuilding, in the aftermath of 24 "Superstorm Sandy," to prevent the structure 25 destruction from the next storm. 1 The hearing, hopefully, will begin with 2 discussion of all the changes our state needs to 3 make, and consider, as we rebuild after 4 "Superstorm Sandy," and prepare for the next one, 5 because there will be a next one. 6 We're early in the winter, early in the 7 season, and the next one could be tomorrow, or the 8 next day, or the next week. We don't know. 9 Hopefully, we get lucky and they all bypass 10 us, but you can't count on that, so we have to 11 prepare, going forward. 12 I'm joined today by my colleague 13 Senator Jack Martins, from the neighboring Senate 14 district to the west. And, others of my 15 colleagues may drop in from time to time, and/or 16 have sent representatives to observe. All will 17 get copies of the report. 18 Just by way of quick background: 19 On October 29th of last year, 20 "Superstorm Sandy" hit Long Island and New York City 21 with winds over 60 miles an hour. The storm blew 22 down trees, power lines, and caused significant 23 coastal flooding, resulting in 305,000 housing 24 units destroyed and damaged. 25 The damage from "Sandy" revealed serious 1 flaws in the protection, placement, and 2 construction of our infrastructure. 3 New York State and its municipalities need to 4 discuss where we place infrastructure, our 5 construction techniques, and the future evolution 6 of our communities. 7 Low-lying sewage treatment plants were 8 flooded by the storm surge, resulting in hundreds 9 of millions of gallons of raw sewage floating into 10 New York State waters. 11 It is estimated that the State will need to 12 spend $1.1 billion on repairs. 13 Appropriate planning needs to take place to 14 prevent future damage from flooding and overflows. 15 Coastal municipalities will consider -- since 16 we're an island, and we're all coastal 17 municipalities -- will consider beach-reconstruction 18 projects, including sea wall or dune building, or 19 nourishing beaches with additional sand. 20 Some have suggested that these projects 21 should have serious discussions on limiting 22 development close to the shore; where we build, how 23 we build. 24 As the Governor said in the State of the 25 State, Mother Nature has a tendency to revisit 1 areas she considers hers. And when she 2 comes, she lets us know she's there, just to 3 give us a reminder that this is hers, and we're 4 only tenants, and short-term tenants at that. 5 We need to learn the lesson from "Sandy," and 6 we need to learn the lesson from the old nursery 7 rhyme, "The Three Little Pigs": Mother Nature 8 will continue to huff and puff, and we need to 9 rebuild like the third little pig, to make sure that 10 we survive all of the huffing and puffing of the 11 next storm. 12 With that, Senator Martins, if you have any 13 opening statement? 14 SENATOR MARTINS: Thank you. 15 There are lessons to be learned from the 16 aftermath of this storm. Certainly, we have an 17 opportunity to learn those lessons. 18 We paid a heavy price, as a region, to have 19 learned those lessons. 20 The ability now to take those and do 21 something with it: make some changes, harden our 22 system, prepare for the next storm. 23 As Senator Marcellino said, there will be a 24 next storm. It may be tomorrow, it may be 25 20, 30 years from now, but there will be another 1 storm, and we should be prepared, given what we have 2 learned from this storm. 3 Looking forward to the testimony today. 4 Thank you. 5 SENATOR MARCELLINO: We've introduced -- 6 we've invited many speakers to come and give us 7 solid testimony, each with certain expertise in 8 various areas of construction, reconstruction, and 9 so forth. 10 Our first speaker, who I believe has done 11 yeoman's work in leading the recovery for 12 Nassau County, working with the county executive in 13 Suffolk County, and nearby municipalities, like 14 Mayor Bloomberg in the city of New York and 15 Governor Cuomo in the state of New York, and that's 16 our county executive, Ed Mangano, of Nassau County. 17 Ed, you're to be congratulated on your 18 particular efforts, your personal efforts, and the 19 efforts of your staff, because your people work 20 hard, and worked long hours. 21 And I heard, in all the phone conversations 22 that we've had, not one complaint -- "not one 23 complaint" -- that calling Nassau County was a waste 24 of time; that we couldn't get information; or, we 25 couldn't get help. 1 We never heard that coming from Nassau 2 County. 3 We certainly couldn't say the same for LIPA, 4 and the utilities, but we certainly did not get 5 complaints about how the counties; frankly, either 6 county, handled the situation, and worked hard to 7 protect our citizenry. 8 So, again, I thank you for coming, and I 9 thank you for what you did for our constituents and 10 our citizens in Nassau County, and I look forward 11 to your testimony. 12 EDWARD MANGANO: Thank you, Senator, and 13 Chairman. 14 And, Senator Marcellino, Senator Martins, 15 members of the New York State Investigations and 16 Government Operations Committee, I thank you for 17 the opportunity to address you this morning on 18 behalf of Nassau County's 1.3 million residents. 19 I would also like to thank New York State, 20 Governor Cuomo; certainly, Senators Marcellino and 21 Martins, and our Assembly, for your partnership with 22 response and recovery efforts following 23 "Hurricane Sandy." Truly worked together as a team 24 to assist our residents. 25 Clearly, "Superstorm Sandy" dwarfed our 1 region, affecting the lives of nearly every 2 resident. In fact, in excess of 70,000 homes and 3 businesses were damaged, flooded, and many were 4 completely destroyed in Nassau County. 5 Critical infrastructure, including our power 6 utility, wastewater treatment plants in Bay Park 7 and Long Beach, hospitals, schools, 8 nursing homes, police precincts, roadways, 9 waterways, beach front, and traffic lights, all 10 suffered destruction. 11 Today we focus on recovery and rebuilding. 12 Your partnership in the rebuilding process will 13 assist Nassau County in addressing the following 14 areas: Home restoration, business-recovery 15 assistance, critical infrastructure restoration, and 16 environmental restoration. 17 Each of the aforementioned areas of need 18 require cooperation among county, state, federal, 19 and local municipalities. 20 Home-rebuilding issues in Nassau County 21 include: 22 Assisting non-insured and underinsured 23 residents in the rebuilding process; 24 Launching mold-mitigation programs to make 25 certain that the homes are rebuilt safely, with 1 health in mind, and do not become sick homes in the 2 future; 3 And, certainly, smart rebuilding analysis, 4 which you touched upon on your remarks, and that 5 includes raising homes where appropriate. 6 And we are engaged in discussion, with both 7 state, county, and federal teams, on whether 8 certain areas should be rebuilt at all. 9 Now, with the advent of the funding coming 10 through, passing Congress, and now with an 11 optimistic eye that it will pass the Senate and 12 signed into law, we'll have the great opportunity to 13 work with the State, and anticipate programming to 14 meet these needs, and build smarter, stronger, to 15 avoid this extent of devastation should we be faced 16 with another natural disaster, which I understand, 17 and know, and I commend you for, is your goal of 18 this Committee. 19 Small businesses require assistance too, and 20 they require assistance beyond the traditional 21 Small Business Association loan in order to fully 22 address small-business restoration. 23 In this area, we've met with many businesses. 24 A common plea and concern is that, 25 post "Hurricane Irene," that superstorm, many of our 1 coastal businesses availed themselves of the 2 Small Business Loan program. They took on that loan 3 to rebuild, they now have that debt, and they find 4 it economically challenging, if not completely 5 non-viable, to take on yet another small-business 6 loan to repair their business and return the 7 communities to the face they once were before 8 "Hurricane Sandy." 9 So this is a particular area we will need to 10 work on and address, and requires additional 11 programming. We're engaged, obviously, in 12 conversations with State and federal officials. 13 In addition, critical infrastructure 14 restoration and hardening is absolutely necessary in 15 order to protect the public's health, safety, and 16 welfare. 17 Nassau County is working, again, in 18 cooperative effort with the State DEC and the 19 federal EPA, engineers and experts alike, in 20 developing a regional solution to harden such 21 critical infrastructure. 22 As you know, when you touched on, the Bay 23 Park and Long Beach wastewater treatment plants 24 protect nearly 600,000 of the 1.3 million 25 residents here in Nassau County. And they also 1 serve critical infrastructures: hospitals, 2 schools, police precincts. 3 So it's absolutely necessary we proceed on a 4 path that hardens our infrastructure and 5 protects the public from future natural 6 disasters. 7 And, of course, environmental restoration, 8 beach restoration, dune restoration, and waterway 9 cleanup programs are necessary to return our 10 environment to pre-"Sandy" conditions and continue 11 our restoration efforts. 12 I want to thank you for your kind 13 consideration and thoughtful partnership assisting 14 residents in rebuilding their homes and 15 businesses, hardening our critical infrastructure, 16 and restoring our environment through cooperative 17 programming. 18 I am completely honored, and I want to 19 compliment the Senators here, and the leadership 20 that they've shown, in creating an environment where 21 the State, the county, the towns, and local 22 municipalities have been working very closely 23 together, to understand, develop, study, and then 24 launch, the most thoughtful, efficient, 25 reconstruction and rebuilding plans that are 1 possible. 2 And that is an important task that we have, 3 and it is one that I am totally encouraged that 4 everyone is taking very seriously. 5 We've had the wonderful opportunity, worked 6 very closely with our partners in Suffolk County. 7 We continue to look at Long Island as a 8 region, and look forward to continuing to work 9 together, and program the dollars that come 10 available, to protect the health, safety, welfare of 11 our residents, protect our critical 12 infrastructure, and certainly restore our 13 environment. 14 With that, we're available for any questions 15 that you may have. 16 And I just want to, before I close, thank 17 Senator Marcellino and his remarks for recognizing 18 the teamwork of our employees here in the county 19 of Nassau. They really performed above and beyond 20 any expectation. They did not complain; they were 21 there, working. Many of them working two and three 22 shifts in a row, just to make certain they were 23 available for our residents, and working closely 24 with all of the municipalities. 25 And they deserve the greatest recognition and 1 respect, all of those, and the employer of the 2 County, that stepped up to help our citizens. 3 With that, I'll close my remarks. 4 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Thank you, 5 Mr. Mangano. 6 I would also add to that, that we'd like to 7 thank all of the workers from both counties, and 8 the LIPA crews. 9 I might have my problems with the LIPA 10 administration and how they handled the situation; 11 but, certainly, the working crews on the street, 12 doing their jobs, doing the repairs, did yeoman's 13 work. 14 I see that going down to the village level, 15 in their crews and their were people that were out 16 doing the thing in both counties. Everybody was -- 17 was doing a great job of helping each other. 18 I think this storm showed some of the best in 19 our citizenry, and the best in our governmental 20 operations. 21 The working together that you and 22 County Executive Bellone forged as a -- the regional 23 approach, I think is a good idea. It's the best 24 thing. 25 I certainly commend you, especially both of 1 your comments at the LIA breakfast recently, where 2 you both reaffirmed that regional approach. I think 3 that's the way to go. 4 We are one people on this island, and we have 5 to stand together, and make sure that we don't, you 6 know, cut each other off to try to compete for 7 things. Instead, working together, we get more, and 8 we get more done. 9 We have representatives, Mr. Samuel Chu, 10 director of operations for the county of Suffolk. 11 If you would like to make some comments; 12 and if you would, sir. 13 Thank you, Ed. 14 SAMUEL CHU: First, I would like to thank 15 Senators Marcellino and Martins, and the entire 16 Committee, for this opportunity to address this 17 Committee, and provide you with information that 18 will assist you in responding to the needs resulting 19 from the impact of "Superstorm Sandy," on behalf of 20 the -- County Executive Bellone, as well as the 21 residents of Suffolk County. 22 And while they're on their way out, I want to 23 echo the sentiment of the -- County Executive 24 Mangano. It really has been a good experience 25 working with them in a difficult time. You know, 1 not having to worry about going across county lines, 2 and being able to work on a regional basis to solve 3 problems. 4 To address the issues that this Committee 5 is raising today, and to provide you with insight 6 into the situation of Suffolk County, I would like 7 to bring to your attention the following: 8 Our barrier beaches, including Fire Island, 9 provide critical protection, as you all know, not 10 just to the beaches themselves, but to tens of 11 thousands of homes on the mainland. They are as 12 critical to protecting Suffolk County as the levies 13 are to New Orleans that we heard so much about 14 post "Hurricane Katrina." 15 During "Sandy," and the nor'easters and 16 storms afterward, breaches at these beaches, 17 including at Smith's Point, Old Inlet, and Cupsogue, 18 have led to significant mainland flooding in 19 communities, including Lindenhurst, Amityville, and 20 Mastic Beach. 21 "Sandy" left, but the Atlantic Ocean 22 continues to be a threat to these communities. 23 And anyone who had the opportunity to 24 experience these new inlets can tell you, it was a 25 very -- a very astonishing thing to witness as a 1 south shore resident. 2 Initial efforts by the U.S. Army Corps of 3 Engineers, after "Sandy," to repair breaches and 4 washovers, included renourishment of approximately 5 9 feet of sand in some of these affected areas, 6 where previously stood about 15 feet of sand. 7 While the federal government has authorized 8 in excess of $20 million to repair the beaches in 9 Suffolk County, and as part of that authorization 10 included, our beach-erosion control, and hurricane 11 protection, from Fire Island to Montauk Point, 12 navigation and shore protection through the dredging 13 of Fire Island Inlet, with placement of dredged sand 14 on Gilgo Beach and westerly beaches, as well as the 15 construction of the Asharoken sea wall. 16 And although this money has been authorized, 17 none of these projects have commenced due to the 18 inability to secure that funding. 19 The funding of these projects will provide 20 some immediate and long-term protection of the 21 mainland. 22 County Executive Bellone, working with 23 Governor Cuomo, helped to initiate the Fire Island 24 Debris-Removal Task Force, with county, town, and 25 village personnel, along with the Army Corps of 1 Engineers, FEMA, the National Park Service, 2 New York State OEM, and, as well as other multiple 3 state agencies. 4 And we want to thank those agencies for their 5 support throughout the recovery. 6 The re-removal will be the first step, and 7 it's still continuing, in the overall mission of 8 long-term restoration of Fire Island. To date, 9 almost 1,500 Fire Island residents have provided 10 rights of entry to their town or village so the 11 Army Corps cleanup project may begin. 12 All of these municipalities and agencies are 13 collaborating on this effort because it is a shared 14 recovery. 15 If this Committee could take steps to make 16 sure such efforts in the future are easier, such 17 as, making intermunicipal agreements more 18 streamlined during an emergency, it could expedite 19 the recovery efforts in the future. 20 While Suffolk County did not suffer the same 21 degree of infrastructure damage due to "Sandy," as 22 did our neighbors to the west and other 23 jurisdictions, some of the damage to bulkheads 24 in Suffolk County, and to our beaches, were so 25 severe, that should a similar or even lesser storm 1 strike -- as mentioned by Senator Marcellino, which 2 we see as an inevitability -- strike before this 3 damage is fixed, the conversation we have for next 4 time might be much different because we remain 5 extremely vulnerable. 6 We continue to wait for updated guidelines 7 from both the New York State Office of Emergency 8 Management and FEMA on best practices for 9 construction and reconstruction in Suffolk County 10 flood zones in response to "Sandy," as well as 11 working with local partners that have expertise, to 12 help make recommendations ourselves. 13 These guidelines may suggest a combination 14 of: 15 Structural elevation in areas that have 16 experienced repeat flooding or are vulnerable to it, 17 or strategic elevation of heating and electrical 18 systems -- 19 Which I think everybody became all too 20 familiar with, creates an extreme vulnerability 21 for these shoreline houses. 22 -- from basements to perhaps ground level, 23 or even higher; 24 Acquiring destroyed properties and keeping 25 some zones free from residential constructions, as 1 mentioned by County Executive Mangano, considering 2 some places that shouldn't be [unintelligible] 3 altogether; 4 And fortifying infrastructure, like water and 5 sewer facilities, and utilities, beyond existing 6 standards that prepare them for subsequent events. 7 While we would agree that these would be 8 reasonable guidelines -- while we agree that these 9 would be reasonable guidelines and standards, and 10 know that, under the Stafford Act, much of this will 11 be funded by the federal government, it will be 12 local homeowners, communities, and municipalities 13 themselves that make final decisions on how to move 14 forward. 15 So, our regional approach to rebuilding must 16 be considered, and a uniform adoption across 17 municipalities and jurisdictions must be 18 encouraged, to prevent devastation, as seen by the 19 impact after "Superstorm Sandy". 20 Many of these municipalities now are under an 21 enormous strain. More than 25 structures in 22 Suffolk County were damaged by "Sandy." Local 23 building departments are now faced with the task 24 of accepting thousands of building-permit 25 applications, conducting thousands of inspections, 1 and ensuring that thousands of residential repairs 2 are performed safely and as quickly as possible, in 3 accordance with local codes and laws. 4 During this time, they will be asked to 5 review and consider new guidelines. They'll help 6 protect against future disasters, and all the 7 while, residents who have been displaced from 8 their homes will be running out of federal 9 rental-assistance dollars, which we have all been 10 reading about the last couple of days, that we're 11 all trying to prepare for. 12 The clock is ticking, and anything this 13 Committee can propose to assist municipalities with 14 the herculean effort of recovery before us could 15 play a critical role, and we certainly thank your 16 engagement in this. 17 Thank you very much. 18 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Thank you. 19 Senator Martins, do you have any questions? 20 SENATOR MARTINS: Thank you, I appreciate the 21 comments. 22 I was struck by, you know, some of the issues 23 that we have, very similar in Suffolk to the 24 issues we have in Nassau County. 25 I happen to believe that, the fact that we 1 have our local governments, and we have our first 2 responders that oftentimes are tied to our local 3 governments, was one of the strengths we had after 4 the storm; the ability to respond as quickly as they 5 did, and to handle local issues as quickly as they 6 did, was remarkable. 7 Everyone -- no one trained for this; everyone 8 was prepared for it, on a local level. And their 9 ability to coordinate was also admirable. 10 But, how do we now coordinate on the 11 post-"Sandy" necessary changes, for example, to 12 zoning? 13 How do we address the needs, for example, and 14 I've heard the county executive mention, and you 15 mentioned, that we have to elevate structures, or 16 potentially elevate structures, in certain 17 areas? 18 Does the County -- or, is the County prepared 19 to take the lead on that, in terms of coordinating 20 local zoning issues that are predominantly town and 21 village issues, and require them to change their 22 local zoning codes, for a mandatory or a suggested 23 revision to those zoning codes, to require the 24 elevation in certain areas? 25 How do you see that coordination taking 1 place? 2 SAMUEL CHU: Well, you know, cooperative 3 coordination is already taking place. I have to 4 certainly commend, in addition to the governmental 5 agencies that have been mentioned here, so many 6 different organizations, such as industry 7 organizations. 8 I see on the agenda here, there's a 9 representative from New York State Builders 10 Association; or, our own Long Island Builders 11 Institute, as well as other organizations, and our 12 local labor unions, you know, really stepped up 13 throughout the crisis, to give guidance on immediate 14 questions, and the things that faced us in the -- in 15 the most -- just getting through the crisis. 16 I would suggest that, many of those same 17 organizations, there's so much industry expertise. 18 And on a regional level, I think that, on 19 Long Island, we can be particularly proud, and I've 20 had the experience over the years of dealing with 21 so many folks from Long Island, that are industry 22 leaders here, but that are also national voices 23 because of the level of expertise that they have. 24 So that coordination has already begun, when 25 faced with, you know, immediate crises. And it's 1 already began to go forward, on the planning level, 2 to come up with longer-term solutions. 3 I know my -- my inbox is full with many 4 suggestions. You know, I probably -- you know, 5 many of us probably don't even have the time to give 6 them -- especially those who were elected or work 7 for, you know, government agencies, to give them all 8 the time that they deserve, but that suggests that 9 we do need to coordinate. 10 And I -- we are already starting to do that 11 through the local, through, I know, I -- the 12 Suffolk County Planning Commission is beginning to 13 coordinate those agencies and that expertise. 14 I can't -- and I know there's probably 15 efforts as well from the regional planning 16 councils. 17 So, I suggest that it's already taking place, 18 and will probably become more concrete over the 19 next -- you know, even the next several days, and 20 weeks. 21 SENATOR MARTINS: If you had to pick three 22 priorities, for the region, for Suffolk County, 23 right now, where the State can assist in meeting 24 those priorities, what would they be? 25 SAMUEL CHU: Well, you suggested, 1 Senator Martins, that, you know, the local 2 municipalities did come together, and they were -- 3 certainly, a lot of the efforts were impressive. 4 And there will be local capacity to -- I think to 5 make suggestions as to what should be done. 6 Certainly, the State can assist us in helping 7 to -- which they have, you know, and the State's 8 been very on top of it -- helping us secure funding, 9 of course. 10 You know, the projects that we mentioned, I 11 mean, the thing that leaves us most vulnerable 12 after the storm, you know, are the impacts that 13 our barrier beaches have experienced. 14 There's no doubt, that if we don't take 15 steps, and we don't follow a process through, in a 16 very expeditious manner, which includes, not just 17 understanding the planning and the projects that 18 need to be performed, but also securing the funding. 19 You know, we know -- we know that's a 20 two-part process, right, figuring out what we got to 21 do, and then figuring out how -- the money that we 22 need -- getting the money that we need to get it 23 done. 24 So anything the State can do to help to speed 25 along that process, will be greatly appreciated. 1 The State has purview, also, under a lot of 2 the things we discussed. 3 From the planning level, we will certainly be 4 in a position, locally, to make a lot of 5 suggestions. 6 They're -- the local -- ultimately, the local 7 municipalities do have purview over their own -- 8 their own codes, and how they enforce them, but, 9 many of those codes are adopted from other agencies 10 that are written and coordinated by, you know, from 11 New York -- the state level. 12 So, I think that's another adding, you know, 13 programmatic guidance and coordination on some of 14 those guidelines, I think, would be extremely 15 helpful. 16 And, a third one? 17 I think the State has taken a lead, to some 18 extent, but, you know, we're still experiencing 19 quite a degree of lag in getting -- people are 20 waiting right now. And the contractors that I'm 21 particularly speaking to on the street, you know, we 22 saw a lot of -- we saw a lot of building activity -- 23 residential building activity immediately following 24 the storm, because people were able to get, and to 25 FEMA's credit, they were able to get checks to 1 people rather quickly for individual assistance. 2 And, some people had means on their own to pay. 3 But I think that we're -- now, a lot of 4 contractors are telling me there's a lag because so 5 many people are waiting for insurance checks. 6 And we're faced with a crunch right now, 7 where we know that there's -- you know, the FEMA 8 deadline is approaching quickly for -- I think, 9 within the next couple of days, for the 10 temporary-housing assistance. 11 So to the extent that -- and, you know, we 12 work with Nassau County and the State and FEMA, to 13 put together the STEP program, you know, which was, 14 you know, a success for what it was, but people need 15 long-term solutions. And if they're not getting the 16 money, to get -- to rebuild their homes, and 17 rebuild their lives, that's -- you know, we're 18 leaving a lot of people vulnerable, to either having 19 to consider leaving, or just having a really 20 inconvenient, you know, life -- being 21 inconvenienced, and having a great hardship for some 22 time to come, both financial and lifestyle loss. 23 SENATOR MARTINS: You know, the goal, post 24 storm, was always, and is always, getting people, as 25 quickly as we can, back to some level of normalcy. 1 And you're absolutely right; if there's a 2 theme that we've heard, time and again, it is, the 3 lag, the drag, that is the response by an insurance 4 company. Maybe even, obviously, we've been seeing 5 the efforts on the federal level, and the need to 6 secure the funding. 7 But, for the individual homeowner, the lag 8 that is, the claim, the claim process, and then 9 actually receipt, and being able to cash/process 10 that check, and then get the work done. 11 You know, even today, we're 11 weeks post 12 storm. And, for anyone who hasn't had the 13 opportunity to visit, or hasn't gone south of 14 Montauk Highway, or south of Sunrise Highway, to 15 actually see the extent of the damage that's still 16 there today, I encourage you to do so, because it is 17 remarkable that, literally, 10 miles from here, 18 there are people who still live without heat, 19 electricity, not because they don't want to, 20 obviously, but because they're waiting for an 21 insurance check to come through so that they can 22 actually make those repairs. 23 So, your point is well taken. 24 Thank you, Mr. Chu. 25 SAMUEL CHU: Thank you. 1 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Just one point. 2 You mentioned this business about the 3 insurance. And I've been hearing about the fact 4 that many of the checks that have been issued were 5 made out to the mortgage holder, the owner of the 6 house, and, you know, if there was more than one 7 owner, different -- they're having problems 8 cashing the checks. 9 Are you finding that as a problem? 10 SAMUEL CHU: I've heard some anecdotal 11 reference. I couldn't speak to the breadth of that 12 issue. 13 I know certain insurance companies have 14 policies for multiple signatories on a check for 15 endorsement. 16 Again, I've heard anecdotal, but I couldn't 17 speak to how widespread of an issue it is. 18 Certainly, we've heard quite a bit about -- 19 more about problems getting even just adjustors to 20 the house. 21 And then, from that time, you know, we've 22 heard other stories about, you know, the claims. 23 You know, the typical claims process, you 24 know, that just can take a long time or be 25 cumbersome for some people. 1 But I've heard there's an issue, but I 2 couldn't speak to how deep of an issue it is. 3 And to Senator Martins' previous point: 4 I'm a Lindenhurst native. And to go, to walk 5 through or drive through the neighborhoods that, 6 you know, you rode your bicycle down as a kid, and 7 just see, you know, people's contents of their 8 home on the curb. And, you know, it's really -- 9 it's hard to fathom, you know. 10 SENATOR MARCELLINO: The difficulty, and both 11 Jack and I were recently in Freeport and -- 12 What was it? 13 SENATOR MARTINS: Oceanside. 14 SENATOR MARCELLINO: -- Oceanside, 15 Island Park, and the village of Freeport, we saw 16 some of the devastation that still exists down 17 there. We saw street after street after street, 18 where, in many cases, there was an indication of 19 effort or an indication of work being done on a 20 house, to get it fixed; or a condo group, or an 21 apartment building, or a store front, or whatever. 22 But, many, absolutely nothing was going on. 23 They were just shells. 24 And in discussions with the mayor of 25 Freeport, he was telling us that there were just 1 shells of the house because the people just don't 2 have the money to go down and to rebuild, beyond 3 stripping the house down to try to get the mold out 4 of there. And there's a huge amount of that. 5 But, that -- that, I think, we have to take a 6 look at that, and touch base with the Department of 7 Financial Services, and see how -- see what rules 8 and regulations we might have to promulgate in the 9 state to move the process a lot quicker in -- and 10 the resolution of some of these claims. It can't 11 take weeks and weeks and weeks, and people -- as 12 Senator Martins said, people are living without 13 heat, and electricity, just because they -- the 14 house has not been fully processed yet, not declared 15 safe for occupancy. There's a lot of problems that 16 are existing down there. 17 One last question, relative to the barrier 18 islands: It's my understanding that there were 19 two, possibly three, breaches to Fire Island? 20 What's the status of that? 21 SAMUEL CHU: There were. I think that -- 22 Ed, was it -- there was four -- there was 23 three, and then there was a -- one that was kind 24 of -- 25 You know, there was three. And there was one 1 that was -- I remember, at the first, there was 2 four, but there was one that wasn't considered a 3 full breach. 4 But, there was three -- three that we're 5 dealing with. 6 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Are they filled, are 7 they restored, or, what? 8 SAMUEL CHU: Ed, do you know the status of 9 what -- two of them? 10 Two of them, filled. 11 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Two of them? 12 And as we approach, what is your -- what is 13 the potential, what is the concept, to do -- are we 14 going to leave them open? Are we gonna fill them 15 up? 16 Because these barrier islands are the 17 barrier that prevent surge on the mainland. That's 18 the whole idea here. 19 SAMUEL CHU: No, again, we think it's -- to 20 the point they've been restored, I mean, we still 21 have significant -- again, someone who grew up on 22 the shore community, going down to the beaches, as 23 you saw, besides the inlets that have been restored, 24 we certainly need to restore the -- to the -- the 25 rest of the restoration. 1 You know, restoration of the dunes is also 2 critical, because that's what is gonna to protect us 3 from this becoming a worse problem than it already 4 is. 5 But, again, you know, all of these -- all of 6 these are -- take significant amount of resources, 7 financial resources, to do. Certainly, more than, 8 you know, the counties, and certainly the local 9 municipalities, are going to be able to have in 10 already cash-strapped times, to be able to perform 11 this themselves. 12 So I think the issue is, I think everyone 13 needs and -- knows what needs to be done to restore 14 these barrier beaches, but funding is the issue. 15 I'm hoping that, again, even release of 16 some -- even if appropriations for some of the 17 previously authorized projects, or at least that 18 would be helpful. And I'm hopeful -- I hope we can 19 be hopeful, that in the recent -- the recent funding 20 that passed through the House, will be able to come 21 and satisfy some of these -- some of these issues -- 22 remediation for some -- for this issue. 23 SENATOR MARCELLINO: I noticed that in -- on 24 the north shore, especially around the village of 25 Asharoken, which is in my district, those dunes 1 where the sea grass was in, and was solidified and 2 held the dunes, even after "Irene," those dunes 3 survived "Sandy." 4 Those dunes that were just simply plowed back 5 in and recreated, didn't survive very well. And 6 even after the tropical storm that followed "Sandy," 7 that nor'easter that came in, washed out again. 8 That's a problem. 9 Are we doing anything? 10 Are we looking at any way of, beyond just 11 merely pushing sand back? 12 Because pushing sand back is not going to 13 last. 14 Is there any means of construction, or some 15 kind of hardening of those dunes, so that they don't 16 get blown away so easily? 17 SAMUEL CHU: Again, certainly, when we're -- 18 this is a situation where, when we're in government, 19 we have to know limits of our expertise. 20 Certainly, my -- I do not have expertise in 21 knowing what the proper way to approach it is. 22 But I know that, from our planning 23 departments to our local municipalities, all know 24 that the beaches well, just as you know the issues 25 in your particular community in Asharoken. 1 So, I don't have a specific answer to that, 2 but I can assure -- I can assure you, that if the 3 money were available, the plan would be there to 4 make sure it's done properly, to help. 5 SENATOR MARCELLINO: So the money that you're 6 looking for, though, is in this Senate Bill that's 7 gonna pass the Senate at this point in time; is that 8 right? 9 The New York State -- the U.S. Senate? 10 SAMUEL CHU: That is true. 11 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Much of that 12 construction? 13 SAMUEL CHU: Yeah, through the House, I think 14 that's the -- you know -- 15 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Well, the House passed 16 their bill. The Senate's not going to react it to 17 because it was a different bill than they originally 18 passed. 19 Thank you very much. I appreciate your 20 testimony. 21 And, regards to County Executive Bellone. 22 SAMUEL CHU: Thank you, Senators. 23 Again, thank you once again for -- for your 24 efforts and your leadership on helping us recover. 25 SENATOR MARCELLINO: We'll keep it up. 1 Thank you very much. 2 The next group to testify is: 3 Todd Stewart; 4 And, Lew Dubuque, executive vice president, 5 and president, of the New York State Builders; 6 Association; 7 And, John -- if I mispronounce the name -- 8 John Bachenski, design professional, New York City 9 Director of International Masonry Institute. 10 Guys, if you could come on up. 11 I apologize for having only two 12 microphones, but there are cutbacks at the state 13 level too. 14 TODD STEWART: I got the right seat, then. 15 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Whoever wishes to start. 16 LEWIS DUBUQUE: Okay. 17 Thank you, Chairman Marcellino and 18 Senator Martins, for providing this opportunity to 19 discuss this important matter with all of you today. 20 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Would you please 21 identify yourself. 22 LEWIS DUBUQUE: My name is Lewis Dubuque, and 23 I'm the executive vice president of the New York 24 State Builders Association. 25 The New York State Builders Association is a 1 not-for-profit trade association of 16 local 2 affiliates across the state; our largest one being 3 the Long Island Builders Institute, which 4 Mr. Chu just mentioned, who has been heavily 5 involved in the recovery process from the beginning 6 here. 7 NYSBA represents 2,500 single- and 8 multi-family builders, remodelers, developers, and 9 associate-member firms. These member firms 10 perform over 5 billion in single- and multi-family 11 residential construction annually, and employ over 12 250,000 New Yorkers. 13 Several of our local home-builder 14 associations are located in the area -- areas that 15 were affected by "Superstorm Sandy." 16 And on behalf of all of us at NYSBA, I would 17 like to express our heartfelt sympathies to the 18 victims of "Sandy," and our gratitude to the first 19 responders who performed so admirably under 20 difficult circumstances. 21 New York has the largest concentration of 22 vulnerable valuable property on the east coast, 23 outside of Florida. 24 "Superstorm Sandy" requires a review of our 25 building codes and systems to ensure that New York 1 is prepared for future catastrophic weather 2 events. 3 It is important to gain an understanding of 4 the types and causes of the property damage 5 sustained by our built environment and supporting 6 infrastructure to intelligently address mitigation 7 measures, including potential code changes. 8 There are obviously different approaches to 9 deal with flooding versus wind-storm damages. 10 Property damage may be found to be more 11 extensive among older buildings which were not 12 constructed under the more stringent codes which are 13 enforceable for new construction or on substantial 14 rehabilitation. 15 Residential building-code provisions evolve 16 with new design and construction requirements, 17 which often are the result of new construction 18 products or system innovations. 19 Many homeowners in the affected storm areas 20 are discovering significant coverage gaps when 21 flood and other insurance coverages are tallied 22 up. 23 For families who want to rebuild or 24 rehabilitate their damaged homes, an essential 25 catalyst would be a real-property tax-abatement 1 program provided by the impacted municipalities. 2 This program would be targeted exclusively to 3 one- to three-family homes damaged by "Sandy" 4 which are either being reconstructed or undergoing 5 major rehabilitation. 6 Many of the residences destroy or damaged by 7 "Sandy" will be subject to more stringent 8 building-code requirements on rebuilding or 9 rehabilitation, so a tax abatement is appropriate to 10 assist homeowners in meeting these additional 11 costs, particularly because of the shortfall in 12 insurance coverage as experienced by many 13 homeowners. 14 Under this proposed tax-abatement program, a 15 decreasing property-tax exemption would be available 16 to owner-occupants of newly constructed or 17 substantially reconstructed one- to three-family 18 residences damaged by "Sandy." This program will 19 encourage middle-class families to remain in their 20 neighborhoods, and either rebuild or restore 21 existing housing. 22 The tight housing market in New York City and 23 Long Island does not have the affordable housing 24 inventory available to permit families to easily 25 relocate. This proposed tax-abatement program would 1 have a minimal cost impact on a municipality because 2 the program is only temporary. 3 Without assistance, many homes may remain 4 in the damaged state. 5 The tax-abatement program would not only help 6 storm victims, but also increase economic activity 7 in the residential construction industry which 8 remains in the doldrums in New York State. 9 Multi-family residential rental buildings 10 were also damaged by "Superstorm Sandy". Many were 11 flooded with damage to their boilers and heating 12 systems. 13 Multi-family buildings covered by rent 14 regulations are not able to access major capital 15 improvement (MCI) rent increases for 16 improvements without DHCR processing a waiver 17 request to exempt the storm-damaged improvements 18 from the applicable useful-life schedule. 19 An owner cannot recover for the improvement 20 without MCI approval. DHCR should provide a blanket 21 waiver to multi-family buildings for the 22 useful-life schedule where damage was caused by 23 "Sandy." 24 The action relieves DHCR of a substantial 25 paperwork burden, and would enable an owner to 1 undertake "Sandy"-related repairs immediately. 2 There is no reason for delay, as a waiver is 3 necessarily -- is a necessary predicate for a major 4 capital repair. 5 The State should also consider the benefits 6 of establishing a hurricane-damaged mitigation 7 program. This program would help New York 8 homeowners to identify and make improvements to 9 strengthen their residences against hurricanes. 10 Many New York homeowners want to 11 storm-harden their residences after "Sandy." These 12 homeowners are searching for solid recommendations 13 from a reliable source, and are concerned about 14 home-improvement scams, where scammers are preying 15 upon uninformed homeowners. 16 The Department of State website has a 17 notification about the situation. 18 A home-hardening program could be molded -- 19 excuse me, modeled after the "My Safe Florida Home" 20 program. A home-hardening program would benefit 21 home retrofit inspections of one- and two-family 22 residences in the "Sandy" strike zone, to determine 23 recommended mitigation measures, and whether 24 potential insurance discounts are available for 25 implementation of such measures. 1 By connecting a homeowner with a legitimate 2 inspector, it would enable a homeowner to make an 3 informed decision on what actions to take to 4 eliminate the future risk of property damage because 5 of flooding, wind, and other hurricane-related 6 damage. 7 If there were sufficient financial resources, 8 the program could also provide grants for 9 low-income homeowners to undertake recommended 10 storm-hardening measures. Any zoning or other 11 development changes contemplated as a consequence 12 of hurricane -- "Superstorm Sandy" should be done in 13 the context of a comprehensive plan. 14 Zoning changes to revise coastal zoning to 15 limit building in areas vulnerable to flooding 16 should only be done in the context of a 17 comprehensive plan for a municipality. 18 Without a comprehensive plan -- plan 19 approach, there is no assurance that a balance will 20 be struck in the community's response. 21 Consideration should be given to increased 22 density in areas equipped to accommodate smart 23 growth. 24 Clearly, there is a necessity to evaluate 25 both infrastructure and land-use policies in the 1 context of increased severity of weather events. 2 "Sandy" should not, however, be used as a 3 predicate to claim climate change -- to make climate 4 change a component of SEQRA review, or as a 5 rationale to expand the State's regulatory authority 6 over freshwater wetlands. 7 As currently applied, SEQRA results in 8 significant cost and project delays, and to expand 9 its scope so that residential development would be 10 subject to climate-change review would only 11 exacerbate the situation. 12 Similarly, to argue for expansion of 13 freshwater-wetland regulatory authority based on 14 tidal flooding does not justify any such action. 15 DEC, under existing law, has the authority to 16 regulate freshwater wetlands less than 17 12.4 acres which are determined to be unusual 18 local and -- of usual and local importance. 19 In addition, the Army Corps of Engineers' has 20 jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, Section 404, 21 without regard to acreage limits. 22 Storm-hardening should be the focus, to limit 23 the property damage from future weather-related 24 events. 25 "Sandy" should not be used to expand 1 unrelated regulatory authority. 2 Senator Marcellino and Senator Martins, 3 thank you for your time today. 4 SENATOR MARCELLINO: You want to proceed? 5 JOHN BACHENSKI: Oh, great. 6 SENATOR MARCELLINO: We'll ask questions at 7 the end, when we've heard all of the testimony. 8 JOHN BACHENSKI: Thank you. 9 Good morning, Chairman Marcellino, Senators, 10 and guests. 11 My name is John Bachenski, and I am the 12 director of marketing and technical services for the 13 International Masonry Institute in New York City. 14 The area I oversee consists of 15 New York City and the outer boroughs, Long Island, 16 and New Jersey. 17 I received a BA in architecture from 18 Temple University. 19 I'm a member of AIA, New York City. 20 I'm also a member of the Building Enclosure 21 Council, AIA, in New York City. 22 I've been involved with the masonry industry 23 for the last 20 years. 24 And, thank you this opportunity to address 25 the Committee today regarding construction and 1 building in the wake of "Hurricane Sandy." 2 "Hurricane Sandy" has devastated our shore 3 communities, from Montauk to the Rockaways, to 4 lower Manhattan, Staten Island, and New Jersey. 5 This tragic event has forced us to rethink 6 how we rebuild residential, commercial, health-care, 7 and governmental -- government structures in 8 flood-prone areas. 9 As the Governor has painfully noted, 100-year 10 superstorms now seem to be happening every other 11 year. 12 In response, we need to establish policy 13 guidelines here, that can be implemented through 14 the building codes in shore communities, that 15 address this new reality. 16 Our codes and standards around the state must 17 be improved to, literally, meet the rising tide. 18 We need to rebuild our communities with 19 sustainable, long-lasting structures designed to 20 more rigorous standards, and incorporate and rely on 21 green renewable materials that are resistant to 22 flood and wind. 23 The policy challenges we face in rebuilding 24 are complicated but not insurmountable. 25 Masonry products and systems, like brick, 1 block, stone, are some of the oldest, most durable, 2 and most resilient building materials in human 3 history, and should be an essential part of the 4 solution to the challenges we face in rebuilding 5 post "Sandy." 6 For a variety of reasons, strategic use of 7 masonry products will ensure that what we build 8 today will last for generations. 9 We are currently working with engineers and 10 architects to develop masonry solutions that adapt 11 construction methods used in other parts of the 12 U.S. prone to hurricanes to our local environment on 13 Long Island, Staten Island, Manhattan, and 14 New Jersey. 15 Our goal is not only to build to last, but to 16 provide safe, sustainable solutions that we hope can 17 present a repeat of the devastation "Sandy" left 18 along our shoreline. 19 According to the Army Corps of Engineers 20 and FEMA, flood-resistant building materials can 21 withstand direct contact with flood waters for at 22 least 72 hours without being significantly 23 damaged. 24 "Significant damage" means any damage that 25 requires more low-cost cosmetic repair, such as 1 powerwashing and painting. 2 Simply put, masonry is the premier choice in 3 flood-resistant -- as a flood-resistant material. 4 Masonry can be used for walls, floors, and 5 other parts of the building that are below the flood 6 level, and as such, should be utilized to some 7 extent in every major construction sector. 8 Masonry is naturally resistant to mold, and 9 can be easily powerwashed and disinfected, once 10 contaminated, when -- and the flood waters recede. 11 Properly designed and implemented masonry 12 systems can limit the volume of demolition and 13 debris as a result of natural disasters, and bring 14 buildings and communities back to life more 15 quickly and efficiently. 16 Schools, institutional, and government 17 buildings: 18 These buildings commonly serve as 19 evacuation sites for citizens fleeing 20 life-threatening conditions in their own homes. 21 In addition, they serve as staging facilities in 22 repair and recovery efforts. 23 As such, these structures must be built to 24 endure more serious weather conditions, along with 25 the strength to resist fire, bombs, bullets, 1 et cetera. 2 In flood-prone areas, load-bearing masonry 3 materials should be used, and considered, for 4 these structures. 5 Health-care facilities and nursing homes: 6 These buildings house vulnerable 7 populations, and emergency evacuation can create 8 its own serious dangers for these residents. 9 Like schools and government buildings, 10 these buildings need to be built to endure the 11 most serious weather conditions, and have the 12 strength to resist fire, bombs, et cetera. 13 Again, properly designed and implemented, 14 masonry systems are a logical choice for these 15 structures. 16 Retail and commercial: 17 Buildings up to two stories should use 18 masonry as a primary structure. Properly designed 19 and implemented, masonry systems provide 20 mold-resistant and durability that can help bring 21 businesses back quickly by avoiding the necessity of 22 large-scale demolition and debris. 23 Multi-family residential buildings: 24 In addition to masonry's resilience in 25 flooding, which I have already discussed at length, 1 the damage created by rising water can be reduced by 2 constructing the interior walls on the first two 3 floors with masonry. 4 Compartmentalization design applied to 5 masonry buildings can also decrease the risk of 6 fire spread when fire systems are compromised. 7 Closing: 8 Using structural masonry systems, masonry 9 walls and other masonry materials create strong, 10 fire- and mold-resistant building material. 11 Masonry has one of the highest life-cycle 12 costs available today. 13 If we are serious about minimizing flood 14 damage, using a masonry solution is the solution. 15 And, finally, the materials that are used 16 on masonry are all locally made. 17 If we want to bring manufacturing back to 18 Long Island, then supporting the local 19 manufacturers on -- and using CMU, will also help 20 in that matter. 21 Thank you. 22 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Thank you. 23 Go ahead. 24 SENATOR MARTINS: Thank you for that. 25 Mr. Dubuque, you mentioned tax abatements. 1 LEWIS DUBUQUE: Right. 2 SENATOR MARTINS: Now, one of the concerns I 3 have, when it comes to tax abatements, and 4 communities, and we'll take Freeport as an example: 5 Let's say Freeport has 15,000 homes, and 6 7,500 of those homes have been devastated and, 7 essentially, are in need of extensive rebuild. 8 If we abate the taxes on 7,500 of those 9 homeowners, aren't we merely putting the burden of 10 that tax burden on the other 7,500 homeowners in 11 Freeport, until those people rebuild? 12 LEWIS DUBUQUE: I guess for -- I mean, what 13 we're looking at was a short-term solution, to get 14 the process -- 15 SENATOR MARTINS: I don't disagree. 16 And, so, I just -- 17 LEWIS DUBUQUE: That is an issue that 18 would -- I believe would come up, yes. 19 SENATOR MARTINS: And, so, you know, I'm a 20 big believer in the social contract. You know, when 21 one part of society is hurting, everyone else should 22 chip in to help. 23 LEWIS DUBUQUE: Right. 24 SENATOR MARTINS: And, so, I appreciate your 25 suggestion. I just think that, perhaps, we need to 1 look at a way that the State can, perhaps, come in 2 and put a Band-Aid there, temporarily -- 3 LEWIS DUBUQUE: Exactly. 4 SENATOR MARTINS: -- while we allow people to 5 rebuild, because merely giving them a tax abatement, 6 without allowing for another funding source, is 7 going to shift that tax burden, from those who are 8 affected, to those who are still affected in the 9 community but just weren't affected as much. And, 10 their taxes may go up as much as 50 percent as a 11 result of those others having gone down 12 significantly. And we have to be very careful about 13 that. 14 I do appreciate the comment, but I think we 15 need to contextualize that as well. 16 But, I did appreciate the insight. Thank 17 you. 18 LEWIS DUBUQUE: Okay. 19 SENATOR MARCELLINO: The building codes 20 that were discussed by both of you, should the state 21 building codes be amended to require the kind of 22 construction you talked about? 23 I had a recent meeting with a friend of mine, 24 who was the majority leader of the Puerto Rican 25 Senate, and it was subsequent to "Sandy," it was 1 after "Sandy." 2 So you don't get a misunderstanding, the 3 meeting wasn't in Puerto Rico, it was in Austin, 4 Texas. 5 I wish it was in Puerto Rico. 6 But his comment was: I don't think we would 7 ever allow the kind of construction that you guys in 8 the states allow on the water, because, down here 9 in Puerto Rico, it would simply be blown away by 10 just about every tropical storm that comes in on a 11 regular basis on the islands. 12 Should we be requiring, should we be looking 13 at, specific regions of our state, where different 14 zoning requirements and different construction 15 techniques are employed? 16 LEWIS DUBUQUE: I think that's something that 17 needs to be discussed. 18 I mean -- 19 Do you want to -- 20 TODD STEWART: I can talk -- speak to that. 21 My name is Todd Stewart. I'm the president 22 of New York State Builders this year. 23 Some of the buildings that were affected in 24 this storm were built, how many years ago, 50, 60, 25 70 years? 1 So, throughout the years, we've been 2 improving our codes in reaction, in part, to some of 3 these events that take place. 4 Right now, our current New York State code 5 follows the International Code Council's 6 recommendations. They have a code that they review 7 every three years, I believe, and New York State 8 also follows that. And we look at the current ICC 9 codes, and then we apply them to New York State. 10 So, we're already doing that. We're already 11 looking at wind speeds and flood levels, and 12 things like that, as we go through and review these 13 codes, every year, every three years, whatever the 14 cycle may be. 15 So, we're already doing that. 16 JOHN BACHENSKI: If I could add something? 17 You know, we have case studies south of us in 18 hurricane-prone states, and they already have 19 building codes enacted that we can actually look at, 20 and incorporate into what we're doing. 21 And, I think that would be a wise decision to 22 look at those codes. 23 I was with an engineer yesterday, calling 24 on -- no, the last three days, I should say, I was 25 calling on engineers in New York -- in New Jersey. 1 And I would say, 30 percent of their business now is 2 "Sandy"-related. And, they are all scratching their 3 heads on where to go, as far as lifting 4 buildings up, piling systems. They're all 5 asking us for how to go about and make decisions on 6 building. 7 One of the gentlemen I talked to actually 8 survived "Hurricane Hugo." He's an engineer from 9 South Carolina. And he again said that they would 10 never rebuild like they do up -- we do up here, as 11 they do in South Carolina after "Hugo." 12 So, we have great examples south of us. I 13 think we should take advantage of those. 14 SENATOR MARCELLINO: My question actually 15 becomes: Those services that are reviewed every few 16 years, what's the norm? 17 Should "Sandy" be the new norm for 18 reconstruction? 19 TODD STEWART: I think I'll leave that and 20 let the engineers answer that question. 21 They study the -- they study the wind speed, 22 they study the 100-year storm cycle. 23 SENATOR MARCELLINO: I'm just looking at my 24 own house, which is a frame house built in the 25 '50s, probably the early '50s, still in 1 reasonable repair. Not as good as I would like, but 2 reasonable repair. 3 But it's got a shingle roof, it's a framed 4 house, it's got lathe on it, it's got plaster 5 walls. Things like that. 6 We have a basement. 7 You can't put a basement on a water, I mean, 8 every place where there was a basement. If the 9 utilities were in the basement, they're gone. 10 We saw that in lower Manhattan, and we see 11 that in Freeport, and we see that in Long Beach. We 12 see that everywhere. 13 What are we going to do with -- and, again, 14 framed houses; lift it up, literally, and moved off 15 their foundations. 16 So, now, if they're in a flood zone, subject 17 to, or grandfathered in, because of the construction 18 techniques wouldn't survive today's new 19 construction techniques, but now the house is 20 lifted off its foundation and moved. Or, it's more 21 than 50 percent damaged, because a tree took half 22 the house out. 23 FEMA, I think, gives you $31,000 on a 24 house, max. Then you have your own insurance to 25 worry about, and other things. 1 What do you do with that house if you're a 2 homeowner? 3 It's now subject to new rules, which may 4 mean raising it up two, three, four, six feet. 5 Can you do that? 6 I don't think most people can afford 7 something like that. 8 TODD STEWART: Well, that's why we have an 9 insurance policy that works for you. And a lot of 10 the insurance policies now have riders that will 11 cover for new code construction. 12 I know I do, in my home. 13 They'll give you over and above the 14 replacement cost because the replacement cost will 15 be more due to the new codes. 16 As far as basements go, that's a local 17 thing. Everybody knows their flood zones. 18 You're right, you absolutely cannot build a 19 basement if you're going down below sea level or 20 below a water table. So that kind of thing should 21 be addressed in the local municipality, as related 22 to the building codes. 23 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Well, we had a situation 24 in the town of Oyster Bay, where people wanted to 25 put a carousel on the beach in Teddy Roosevelt Park, 1 until they realized that the carousel would be about 2 four feet under water when the tide came in, so that 3 that plan was immediately scrapped. 4 That's the issue; a lot of people don't think 5 about, or don't realize, the flood-zone situation. 6 Many homeowners who had flood insurance, 7 because it was required if they had a mortgage, once 8 they lost -- once three finished off their mortgage, 9 or paid it off, dropped the flood insurance. 10 So, they're now in a pickle, literally. 11 They're not going get paid. They're not going to 12 get that. Many don't know about the riders that 13 you're talking about. 14 So -- but my concern now is, you mentioned, 15 and I agree with you, construction techniques. 16 And my friend from Puerto Rico would say the 17 same thing. 18 They require concrete/cement-block 19 construction. You can't build a wood house, a 20 wood-frame house, there. You can't use shingled 21 roofs, because they wouldn't last. 22 So they require certain types of 23 construction. Can be made to look very lovely, 24 there's no lack of beauty there, but it's a 25 different kind of construction, and probably much 1 more expensive than the typical frame house that 2 we're used to seeing going up with plywood walls, 3 literally, filled in. 4 So -- 5 TODD STEWART: One more thing, if I may? 6 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Go right ahead. 7 TODD STEWART: I'd just like to mention, our 8 colleagues at the Long Island Builders Institute 9 have the expertise. They have builders and 10 associates and engineers that are trained in all 11 of this. 12 They're a huge resource. Please call on them 13 for information. 14 And the other thing that they're doing, is 15 working on training mold-remediation professionals, 16 so that when people move back into their homes, 17 they can be assured that the mediation has been done 18 correctly. 19 So they're in the process, just this week 20 coming up, with training. 21 How many did they say? 22 LEWIS DUBUQUE: 300. 23 TODD STEWART: 300 professionals in mold 24 remediation. 25 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Well, my concern is, in 1 the initial construction, or reconstruction, of the 2 house, that you use materials that are mold, if 3 not -- you know, that are least mold-resistent in 4 many ways, because that little bugger gets in 5 everywhere it can, and can immediately destroy a 6 home and make it inhabitable -- uninhabitable 7 immediately, within hours. 8 So, we have a serious problem. 9 Again, you know -- 10 Go ahead, Jack. 11 SENATOR MARTINS: Thank you. 12 Mr. Bachenski -- 13 JOHN BACHENSKI: Yes? 14 SENATOR MARTINS: -- if I heard your 15 testimony correctly, what you're suggesting is, that 16 once you determine what the elevation is, or the 17 flood elevation is, for a particular area, you build 18 masonry up beyond that point, and that perhaps frame 19 above that. 20 But, at least to that point, you create a 21 hardened system, a foundation, that will -- that 22 will be resistant to future storms and protect, 23 you know, that home. 24 Is that right? 25 JOHN BACHENSKI: Right. You have to think, 1 you know, it's not a cookie-cutter approach, because 2 we have to figure out how far that structure is, in 3 relation to the coast; because, obviously, if it's 4 is near the coast, the storm surge, and the water 5 pressure, it's going to put a lot of pressure on 6 that building. 7 I think a lot of our damage was back bay and 8 rising floods, and not so much wind damage or wave 9 action in those back bays. 10 So rising that structure up would just be a 11 smart thing to do. 12 I mean, we're -- you know, being with the 13 Masonry Institute, we would love everything masonry. 14 SENATOR MARTINS: Yes, I get that. 15 [Laughter.] 16 JOHN BACHENSKI: But -- 17 SENATOR MARTINS: There are two options; 18 right? 19 JOHN BACHENSKI: Right. 20 SENATOR MARTINS: You could build it in 21 masonry, and elevate it, by constructing a masonry 22 foundation, or base, and elevating the structure? 23 JOHN BACHENSKI: Correct. 24 SENATOR MARTINS: Or driving piles, and 25 constructing the structure on top of these piles 1 so it's well grounded and, again, elevated? 2 JOHN BACHENSKI: Correct, in relations to how 3 close it is to the coast, and what zone it falls 4 under, under FEMA. 5 So, you would not put a load-bearing 6 structure right next to the water, because the water 7 pressure would probably destroy that building. 8 It would make sense, some type of pile 9 system. 10 And as you go back from the shore, and you're 11 closer to the back bay, you're not so much worried 12 about that pressure from waves. 13 There is still water pressure, but, the first 14 two floors in hospitals, housing, just -- it just 15 makes sense. 16 SENATOR MARTINS: It just makes sense, I 17 understand. 18 Perhaps a question for you, I'd just love 19 your thoughts about it: 20 One of the issues that is recurring, both, 21 when we visited southern Queens, and when we visited 22 southern Nassau, and we speak to people in the 23 community, it's this issue of mold, and the concern 24 that's out there that people may not necessarily be 25 aware of it. 1 Local municipalities, and mostly our zoning 2 or building codes, do not address mold as a factor. 3 And when these structures are rebuilt, sealed 4 up, and resold, as many of them are being right now, 5 that there isn't necessarily anyone in charge of 6 checking for that, and that the mold will be in the 7 home, and we're dealing with an environmental issue 8 that may be put off until somebody new buys that 9 house and then has to deal with it. 10 How should we, as a state, deal with that? 11 Should there be a component of the state 12 building code that requires, as part of the 13 process, that there is an inspection for mold in 14 situations such as this, before a certificate of 15 completion or certificate of occupancy is issued? 16 Should that be part of a new process when we 17 deal with flood-remediation zones, to avoid the 18 unsuspecting homeowner or the unsuspecting purchaser 19 of a new home? 20 How do we deal with it? 21 What do you suggest? 22 JOHN BACHENSKI: I'll pass that one to my 23 fellow panel, since masonry doesn't really 24 concern -- isn't concerned with mold. 25 SENATOR MARTINS: Another plug. 1 TODD STEWART: Do you want to take that one? 2 LEWIS DUBUQUE: Unless you have a specific 3 answer. 4 TODD STEWART: I don't. 5 I know that there's probably some answers 6 from the realtors, because there's disclosure 7 issues. 8 Mold requires repeated water, and a 9 wet-and-dry cycle, and it requires something to 10 feed on. 11 And, so, I think we can be fairly certain 12 that one -- 13 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Like plaster board. 14 TODD STEWART: Correct. 15 SENATOR MARCELLINO: It loves that stuff. 16 TODD STEWART: It loves that stuff. 17 Right, that's what I mean. Masonry is not a 18 food source for it; but, plaster is, insulation is, 19 it can be. 20 So I think, as we go through the building 21 process, and our inspectors -- our building 22 inspectors, our local building officials, are 23 inspecting these processes that we do to close 24 these homes up, I think once they're -- they can 25 be fairly certain that once -- if we're keeping the 1 bulk water out, the mold is not -- it can't come 2 back. It has -- it needs water to come back. 3 So, as long as we're sealing the structures 4 up, and the building officials are verifying that, 5 as they do now, you know, once you kill it, it can't 6 come back unless it has a food source and water. 7 So, I think we're doing that now through our 8 building officials. 9 SENATOR MARTINS: My concern is that there's 10 no requirement that, I'm aware of, in code that 11 requires you to actually look for that, and 12 identify it, measure it, and ensure that it's being 13 addressed. 14 And -- 15 TODD STEWART: I would have to check -- 16 SENATOR MARTINS: -- to the extent that there 17 isn't, you know, I would assume that there's 18 something that we should be doing proactively there, 19 because I -- people tend to cut corners where they 20 can. 21 And if there's someone who's struggling right 22 now to rebuild, and may have given up on a coastal 23 community and wants to move, the last thing we 24 want to see is somebody boarding up a house, or 25 putting up sheetrock, painting, selling, and not 1 having addressed it, because the local building 2 inspector doesn't necessarily have a requirement to 3 look for that. 4 That's what I was getting at. 5 SENATOR MARCELLINO: The other factor of 6 life, is that mold form spores. 7 When the conditions are ideal for growth, 8 it goes into spore form. 9 We found spores in the Pharaohs' tombs. 10 So, it can last in spore form for, literally, 11 thousands of years, and come back when 12 conditions turn right. 13 So, it's something that you got to get rid of 14 initially, and get rid of it completely; otherwise 15 it can, and will, come back. 16 Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you for your 17 time. 18 (The speakers all say "Thank you.") 19 SENATOR MARCELLINO: The next panel to come 20 up is: 21 Elizabeth Sheargold, associate director of 22 Columbia Center for Climate Change Law; 23 James Rausse -- and I apologize again if I 24 mispronounced the name -- AICP, president, 25 American Planning Association, Metro New York 1 Chapter; 2 Along with, Michael Levine, for whom I do not 3 have a title. 4 SENATOR MARTINS: Michael, good to see you. 5 Just to identify, title at the town? 6 Planning director? 7 MICHAEL LEVINE: Title at the town is 8 commissioner of planning. 9 But for this purpose, I'm actually speaking 10 for American Planning Association. 11 SENATOR MARTINS: Very well. Thank you. 12 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Whoever wants to speak 13 first, please. 14 ELIZABETH SHEARGOLD: Thank you, 15 Chairman Marcellino, and Senator Martins, for this 16 opportunity. 17 My name the Elizabeth Sheargold. I'm the 18 associate director of the Center for Climate Change 19 Law at Columbia University. 20 What our center does is develop legal 21 tools, to enable policymakers and practitioners 22 to address climate change, and in the wake of 23 "Hurricane Sandy," we recognize the need to 24 incorporate adaptation considerations into 25 New York's planning and regulations. 1 I'm here today to urge your Committee to view 2 rebuilding after "Hurricane Sandy" as a larger 3 opportunity to build resilient communities 4 throughout New York, and to create adaptation 5 strategies that will protect New York into the 6 future. 7 As "Hurricane Sandy" demonstrated, we must 8 expect more frequent and intense climate events from 9 now on; and as was -- as Chairman Marcellino noted 10 in his remarks. 11 Infrastructure in neighborhoods that have 12 historically been safe from extreme weather events 13 cannot be assumed to be safe from future events. 14 According to the New York State ClimAID 15 report, due to sea level rise alone, what was 16 previously known as a 100-year flood is now likely 17 to be a 25-year flood by the end of the century. 18 We cannot change what the climate will look 19 like, but we can change the way we respond to future 20 weather events; and more importantly, we can be 21 better prepared for those events. 22 I have three general comments I would like 23 to make for the Committee, and then four 24 recommendations on actions that the New York State 25 Legislature could consider in its strategy for 1 building a more resilient state. 2 The first general comment I would like to 3 make, is that we had a tendency, when planning and 4 rebuilding, to only be concerned with the last great 5 disaster, and to plan for that. 6 In our view, "Hurricane Sandy," despite its 7 colorful title as a "superstorm," was certainly not 8 the worst-case scenario for New York State. 9 It was a Category 1 hurricane when it hit 10 New York. 11 A Category 3 hurricane, combined with high 12 tides, would have been far worse. 13 "Hurricane Sandy" was also not a 100-year 14 storm. There's debate as to whether it was a 15 20-year storm or a 30-year storm, but it was not the 16 worst-case scenario. 17 So New York cannot just build protections 18 against "Hurricane Sandy"; it needs to build 19 protections against something more severe. 20 Second, New York also needs protection 21 against other kinds of extreme weather events. 22 Hurricanes are not the only threat facing the state. 23 Two other entirely plausible events are: 24 Extreme precipitation, that would cause 25 massive flooding; 1 Or, protracted heat waves with temperatures 2 exceeding 100 degrees for weeks on end. 3 The New York City Panel on Climate Change 4 projects that by mid-century, New York City's 5 average temperature will rise by 3 to 5 degrees 6 Fahrenheit, and that sea levels could rise by more 7 than 2 feet. 8 Although hurricanes cause significant 9 economic damage and tragic loss of life, heat events 10 are the real killer in the United States. 11 Between 1970 and 2004, there were close to 12 4,000 deaths due to heat events in this country, 13 and less than 300 were caused by hurricanes. 14 New York should not only look at rebuilding 15 communities to be resilient to hurricanes, but also 16 to heat events and floods. 17 My third general comment, is that New York 18 must take a long-term approach to adaptation. 19 As we've heard from the panelists before 20 me, many of the buildings that were damaged by 21 "Hurricane Sandy" were built 50, 60, 70 years ago. 22 We need to be looking at that sort of time 23 frame when we consider rebuilding. 24 How long do we expect new subway lines that 25 we're currently constructing to last? 1 We need to plan for adaptation that far in 2 advance, to the extent possible. 3 What is our plan if a sea-wall barrier is no 4 long effective after 50 years? 5 We need to be thinking longer term, for 6 100 years. 7 While the cause of action is not always 8 obvious, the Center for Climate Change Law has four 9 recommendations for this Committee on how to make 10 New York more resilient. 11 The first of these recommendations, is to 12 adapt infrastructure, particularly existing 13 infrastructure. 14 Rather than focus solely on improving the 15 response to disasters, we need to focus on 16 building infrastructure that will prevent another 17 disaster. 18 Using existing legislative authorities, 19 New York State can require agencies and companies to 20 develop long-term adaptation plans that evaluate 21 the risks posed by climate change to the 22 infrastructure. 23 Certainly, adapting infrastructure is 24 expensive, but according to the Global Facility for 25 Disaster Reduction and Response, one dollar of 1 prevention today can avoid as much as four dollars 2 of post-disaster expense. 3 In the long run, this will save money, and 4 build a better future for New York. 5 To give a concrete example of this strategy: 6 In December, our center and several other 7 groups petitioned the New York Public Service 8 Commission to require utility companies to prepare 9 and implement comprehensive hazard-mitigation 10 plans that consider the anticipated future 11 climate, and what is necessary to ensure that their 12 infrastructure is better prepared to deal with those 13 events. 14 And a copy of that petition was provided 15 along with the written copy of my testimony, for the 16 Committee's consideration. 17 Our second recommendation, is to incorporate 18 adaptation efforts into existing planning 19 requirements. 20 State and city agencies already conduct a 21 wide variety of planning projects, and rather than 22 create new or burdensome planning processes, 23 adaptation should be integrated into existing 24 processes. 25 Some obvious areas for inclusion are: 1 waterfront revitalization plans; 2 community-development projects; zoning-law 3 reforms; building codes; coastal-area permitting 4 regulations; stormwater-management projects; the 5 State has a mitigation plan; and environmental 6 impact and review processes, such as that through 7 SEQRA. 8 In their environmental impact statements, 9 agencies should -- could be required to consider, 10 not only how their actions will affect the 11 environment, but also how the changing environment 12 may affect their building, and how that building can 13 be resilient to future climate events. 14 The decision-making for governmental funding 15 and permitting of all facilities should reflect the 16 expected sea levels and climatic conditions at the 17 end of a useful life of the facility, not just the 18 beginning. Only in that way can we know that what 19 we are building, and rebuilding now, will probably 20 last. 21 Our third recommendation, is to implement the 22 other recommendations that have been made by 23 existing plans and task forces that considered 24 these issues prior to "Hurricane Sandy." 25 Several task forces, commissions, 1 committees, and panels have made recommendations 2 on how New York State and New York City should adapt 3 to climate change. Many, and most of these, have 4 yet to be implemented. 5 For example: The Sea-Level Rise Task Force 6 created by the Legislature in 2007 issued a report 7 in 2010 with numerous recommendations for how state 8 legislation could be modified to incorporate 9 adaptation planning into ongoing efforts. 10 These recommendations have yet to be 11 implemented. 12 Similarly, the New York City Panel on Climate 13 Change issued a reported in 2010, with an entire 14 chapter dedicated to the assessment of laws and 15 regulations that could be revised to address 16 climate-change planning. 17 Most recently, the 2000 -- the New York State 18 2100 Commission released its report on how to build 19 resilience in New York. 20 There is no shortage of studies or 21 recommendations on these issues. 22 What we need now is action and 23 implementation. 24 Our final recommendation, is to have a 25 conversation now about how we would respond to 1 future disasters, and to set accurate expectations 2 for communities that are rebuilding in vulnerable 3 areas, particularly coastal areas. 4 How safe are these communities? 5 What will we do with [sic] these 6 neighborhoods are destroyed by storm surge again? 7 How many tax dollars does the State want to 8 invest in public works in vulnerable areas? 9 And, is there a point where we would draw the 10 line and say we would not rebuild a certain area and 11 adopt a policy of retreat? 12 Having the conversation now about how we plan 13 to respond to future disasters, allows communities 14 to make informed decisions, and ensures the best 15 allocation of resources throughout the state. 16 As Governor Cuomo recognized in his State of 17 the State Address, in certain cases, designating an 18 area to use as parkland rather than for 19 residential or commercial structures may protect 20 the community from destruction. 21 The Recreate New York Home Buyout Program 22 that's been suggested is one element of this, but 23 there needs to be a much larger conversation about 24 whether we need to relocate away from certain 25 vulnerable areas. 1 In closing, I would like to thank the 2 Committee again for holding this hearing, and for 3 inviting us to provide our testimony. 4 I would like to urge the Committee to take 5 action now. 6 Adaptation efforts, whether building a sea 7 wall or relocating a community, will take time, and 8 as Hurricanes "Irene" and "Sandy" have illustrated, 9 we have no time to lose in making New York safe. 10 Thank you for your time. 11 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Thank you. 12 I just would like to put a commercial in. 13 Thank you for mentioning the Sea-Level Rise 14 Task Force. 15 In 2007, that was legislation that 16 Assemblyman Sweeney and I sponsored. 17 And you're right, the report was issued in 18 2010; promptly put on a shelf and ignored. 19 We're hoping that a report done from this 20 hearing will receive a better end. 21 But, thank you for your testimony. 22 JAMES RAUSSE: Chairman Marcellino, 23 Senator Martins, my name is James Rausse. I'm 24 president of the American Planning Association, 25 New York Metro Chapter. 1 On behalf of the Metro Chapter, we thank you 2 for giving us the opportunity to comment on shaping 3 how New York State rebuilds, and recovers from 4 the devastating toll "Superstorm Sandy" took on our 5 communities, and in developing a strategy on how to 6 prevent such devastation from happening again. 7 Joining me today is Michael Levine, from the 8 town of North Hempstead, who's our vice president 9 for intergovernmental affairs. 10 First, I'm going to give a background of the 11 organization and our efforts, and then I will go 12 into comments and recommendations on how we should 13 rebuild, and -- 14 SENATOR MARCELLINO: If we could limit the 15 background on the organization. 16 JAMES RAUSSE: Absolutely. 17 SENATOR MARCELLINO: We respect your 18 credentials, that's why you're here. 19 JAMES RAUSSE: Sure. 20 SENATOR MARCELLINO: I'm more interested in 21 your recommendations. 22 Thank you. 23 JAMES RAUSSE: Absolutely. 24 The Metro Chapter is a professional 25 educational-advocacy organization, representing 1 approximately 1,400 planners and policymakers in 2 14 counties in New York metro area and New York 3 State. We're part of a 40,000 member national 4 organization. 5 To date, we -- in terms of our efforts 6 post "Sandy," we have been working with various 7 groups throughout Queens, Brooklyn, and Long Island, 8 including doing a business-recovery strategy in the 9 Rockaways, with the Rockaway Development 10 Revitalization Corporation. 11 We've reached out to local leaders and staff 12 in Long Island, from Long Beach to East Hampton and 13 Montauk, and we've been working in Coney Island and 14 Sheepshead Bay, in the most devastated areas of 15 Brooklyn. 16 We are also preparing to host half-day panel 17 workshops in the coming months, and, plan on sending 18 a series of pro bono disaster experts into affected 19 communities over the next two years, in partnership 20 with the National Disaster Preparedness Training 21 Center, the Dutch Embassy, other professional 22 organizations, and government entities. 23 In terms of our particular points: 24 First is: Where is it appropriate to rebuild 25 versus retreat? 1 Following a catastrophic loss, there is often 2 a determination to rebuild exactly what once stood 3 as a sign of strength and resiliency, and almost an 4 air of defiance; however, it is not always in the 5 best interests to reconstruct exactly what we had. 6 From hillside homes in California that are 7 vulnerable to recurring mudslides, to the 8 waterfront houses of Fire Island, certain forces 9 of nature are unstoppable. Add to that, the nearly 10 universal projections that sea levels will 11 steadily rise, and future storm surges are a 12 certainty. 13 We cannot continue to expend state and 14 federal resources to backstop private investment 15 decisions for what is, inevitably, a temporary 16 period. 17 Reevaluation of the National Flood Insurance 18 Program should be undertaken to discourage, not 19 indemnify, those who take a risk of building in 20 flood-prone areas. 21 The State might consider establishing a fund 22 to buy out property owners in areas that should 23 not be rebuilt. Though expensive, this may prove 24 less costly over time than continually rebuilding 25 areas that are damaged or destroyed. 1 Incorporating resiliency into zoning codes: 2 This is a crucial issue that the chapter 3 feels is of utmost importance. 4 Communities who participate in the 5 National Flood Insurance Program are already 6 required to adopt FEMA's floodplain regulations, but 7 often, this is a separate chapter not integrated 8 into the zoning ordinance, nor is floodplain 9 development part of a comprehensive strategy. 10 Instead, floodplain regulations tend to focus 11 on the development and protection of individual 12 sites. 13 While it is not likely, nor necessary, that 14 municipalities will cede zoning authority to state 15 agencies, model floodplain overlay districts can 16 be developed with incentives for their 17 implementation. 18 Such overlay districts could address such 19 topics as: lowest floor grade; elevating critical 20 equipment and infrastructure; flood walls and 21 gates for private properties; sacrificial 22 floors, such as below-grade and partially 23 below-grade parking levels; and for larger 24 properties, relief from height and setback limits 25 on the "high ground" part of the property; in order 1 to shift development from the floodplain portion. 2 Establishing jurisdictional guidelines: 3 The definition of "community" is a delicate 4 issue and needs to be defined up front. 5 We recommend identifying municipal 6 jurisdictions with coastal zone codes that would 7 help differentiate the damages amongst the 8 municipalities. 9 There are questions as to the State's 10 jurisdictional approach to New York City, which 11 already has an established power structure regarding 12 disaster recovery that spreads out across multiple 13 agencies, and whether working solely at a county or 14 municipal level outside of New York City is the 15 soundest approach. 16 Furthermore, power has been consolidated in 17 the Mayor's Office in New York City, under the 18 Housing Recovery Unit, which has been moving at a 19 rapid pace in terms of assessment and a plan of 20 action. 21 We recommend that multi-jurisdictional 22 regions with similar populations and geography 23 are created, to develop a comprehensive strategy 24 that addresses the needs of like communities. 25 This gives the State an opportunity to pool 1 and consolidate resources as corresponding issues 2 arise between jurisdictions. 3 This also is an issue to consider with power 4 entities and facilities, many of which lie in 5 separate jurisdictions from the affected areas. 6 Where, and how, should the shoreline be 7 hardened? 8 A trend over the last two decades in many 9 coastal communities is to soften shorelines, 10 relying less on flood walls and bulkheading, and 11 more on wetland plantings, with the emphasis on 12 habitat restoration and the dispassion of wave 13 energy. 14 However, this approach may have to be 15 reevaluated, as the storm surge penetrated several 16 hundred feet inland of areas without adequate 17 shoreline protection. 18 The addition of flood walls, however, is a 19 double-edged sword, as communities beyond the 20 protected area zone become even more vulnerable. 21 A clear example is, in Louisiana, where new 22 flood barriers were erected at the aftermath of 23 "Katrina," served New Orleans well during 24 "Hurricane Isaac" in August 2012. However, the 25 downstream community of Plaquemines Parish was 1 nearly devastated by the diverted waters. 2 The decision to render certain areas 3 sacrificial for the benefit of others is extremely 4 difficult under any circumstances, much less in an 5 area that has strong, often competing local 6 government interests. 7 Do we consider floodgates in 8 New York Harbor or along the East River and Hudson 9 tunnels? 10 London was famously constructed the 11 Thames Barrier in the 1970s, as have Rotterdam and 12 other low-lying areas around the world. 13 In the months since the storm, serious 14 discussions are taking place as to the practicality 15 and cost benefit of closing off New York Harbor in 16 the event of a tidal surge. 17 If not a full-scale walling-off of 18 New York Harbor, then retrofitting vehicular and 19 subway tunnels with floodgates should be a 20 priority. 21 Though, similarly to flood walls, if 22 constructed, will floodgates sacrifice other 23 communities from diverted water flow? 24 Is it practical to elevate underground 25 utility vaults? 1 Unlike Long Island and the New Jersey 2 suburbs, most of New York City does not have 3 overhead power lines that cause thousands of 4 outages when taken down by falling tree limbs or 5 cracked poles. 6 However, subsurface infrastructure proved to 7 be just as vulnerable to damage from flood waters. 8 Dozens of major buildings in lower 9 Manhattan have critical mechanical rooms in the 10 basement. These, and many public-utility 11 installations, may now have to be elevated to an 12 upper floor or an elevation 20 feet above the sea 13 wall. 14 This potentially has a -- has a potentially 15 enormous cost burden. 16 Furthermore, is the cost fully borne on the 17 property owner, or does the State consider 18 assistance in retrofitting existing building 19 systems? 20 Consideration should also be given in 21 changing regulations and building codes to address 22 this with new construction. 23 In flood-prone areas, can we afford to bury 24 power lines? 25 Consideration should still be given to 1 burying lines in areas less vulnerable to 2 flooding. 3 While it is unlikely that lines run through 4 residential backyards will ever be buried, lines 5 that run along the main roads can be. 6 It would have to be a piecemeal, gradual 7 effort, but lines could be buried whenever a road 8 is scheduled for full-depth reconstruction. 9 Ensuring that a main -- that main streets 10 remain powered can be critical to maintaining access 11 to food and supplies in case of a prolonged 12 neighborhood outage. 13 For municipalities with compromised 14 resources, the cost in constructing a new submerged 15 energy infrastructure may be too much to bear, and 16 should be supported by the State. 17 Should New York require backup generators at 18 gas stations? 19 The idea was floated after a number of 20 service stations had a supply of fuel but could not 21 operate their pumps. 22 Cost estimates run about $30,000 each, which 23 is, arguably, a minimal sum for operators. 24 One option to consider are grants or 25 low-interest loans to businesses for purchasing. 1 Allocating funding sources: 2 It is critical that New York State identify 3 its own funding sources to assist communities in a 4 comprehensive manner. 5 FEMA funding only goes so far, and lasts so 6 long. 7 Also, it does not address infrastructure 8 unique to the region, such as the high prevalence of 9 multi-family rental housing. 10 This will require interagency coordination 11 with a regional focus, which is needed, as 12 municipalities have obstacles with staff resources 13 and in this still-difficult economy. 14 As previously mentioned, many municipalities 15 have similar geography and infrastructure; thus, 16 making it strategic and efficient to utilize funding 17 in an inclusive fashion. 18 It's also important to consider time frames, 19 if new taxes or fees will be required, and to 20 identify if funding will be ongoing or through a 21 static RFP. 22 Community involvement: 23 We strongly recommend the collaborative 24 approach with affected communities. Local 25 municipalities and neighborhoods know best what 1 their community needs are. 2 Any established body addressing recovery and 3 resiliency must establish an implementable 4 participation framework to assure that affected 5 communities are involved in every step of the 6 process. 7 Finally, sustainability: 8 The chapter recognizes that the only way to 9 rebuild is to rebuild sustainably. 10 Sustainability and green development are now 11 considered mainstream concepts that have become 12 significantly less expensive over the last decade. 13 Sustainable concepts address neighborhood 14 pattern design, as well as green infrastructure and 15 buildings, by creating resilient communities with 16 an economically sound long-term approach. 17 Redesigning in such a way is not only a sound 18 planning principle, it assures more efficient 19 maintenance of facilities and infrastructure, and 20 complements the natural environment. 21 On behalf of my members, I would like 22 again -- I would again like to thank the New York 23 State Senate for the chance to testify on 24 post-"Sandy" strategy. We thank you for your 25 leadership. 1 And, we're available to answer any and all 2 questions or comments. 3 Thank you. 4 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Again, thank you for 5 your attendance. 6 Some questions that I -- Senator Martins had 7 to leave. He has a -- he's actually late already 8 for a prior commitment. He'll be -- but he again 9 wished to thank -- asked me to thank you for your 10 testimony, and prior speakers for their testimony 11 as well. 12 JAMES RAUSSE: We thank him. 13 SENATOR MARCELLINO: A report will be issued 14 from the Committee, and copies of your statements 15 will be part of that report. 16 I had mentioned from the beginning, but this 17 is being videoed -- videotaped, and the tape will be 18 available, and on our website -- the New York State 19 Senate website, the website for the Investigations 20 Committee, and my own personal Senate -- 21 Fifth Senate District website. 22 So, if anybody wants to see this again, or 23 didn't get a chance to see it. 24 It's also being broadcast live, as we speak, 25 on the New York State Senate website. 1 So, we're all famous at this point in time. 2 Let me just ask this; I've asked it earlier, 3 and I think I know the answer, but let me hear it 4 from all of you: 5 The -- should "Sandy" be the new norm for 6 rebuilding and reconstruction? 7 I mean, it seems to have been the one that 8 has superceded or overwhelmed all other standards 9 that have existed prior to it. 10 Should it be the new minimum in 11 reconstruction of building codes and the like? 12 JAMES RAUSSE: For our coastal communities, 13 we feel it should. 14 What has been done in New York City, as we 15 had suggested, is the consideration of overlay 16 districts for coastal communities. 17 In New York City, there has been overlay 18 districts created, in terms of development and 19 growth, in our more outlying areas, just in terms 20 of, you know, protecting contextual communities from 21 overbuilding and density. 22 And a similar strategy could be made for 23 coastal communities that are based on the new 24 floodplain maps, that would require certain 25 strategies, such as, having an elevated concrete 1 base, and the piles that were mentioned before; a 2 sloping front yard, which will -- which when we 3 toured Arverne, toured the Rockaways, Arverne was 4 the least affected community of the Rockaways 5 because of the way the town homes were designed by 6 Briarwood and Beechwood, and that had a sloping -- a 7 gently sloping, front yard to the town homes on 8 top of a short concrete base. And, it seemed -- it 9 looked seemless from the sidewalk, but it -- from 10 other homes, but it wound up having minimal damage. 11 So incorporating strategies like that, 12 particularly in the coastal communities, we think it 13 is crucial and key. 14 SENATOR MARCELLINO: When rebuilding on or 15 near the water, can we rebuild -- are there 16 strategies we could use to rebuild on the water, or 17 should we just ban it? 18 JAMES RAUSSE: I think we have to look at -- 19 we have to look at communities from a regional 20 approach. 21 When we were suggesting that 22 multi-jurisdictional regions are created, it's 23 looking at area -- try to understand areas that 24 have like geography, such as the Rockaways, 25 Atlantic Beach, and Long Beach, and Fire Island, 1 which would be different than the north shore and 2 Port Jeff and Glen Cove, and consider, based on 3 that, what's doable, and, you know, implementing the 4 new building and zoning strategies. 5 But some communities will have to completely 6 reassess on how close they have to build to the 7 water; and, particularly, how high they build sand 8 dunes. 9 We think, in addition to the flood walls 10 that we had discussed, building sand dunes at a 11 proper level and the proper width are critical, and 12 that may sacrifice some of the housing that was 13 previously there. 14 Also, it's just -- in considering rebuilding 15 communities, because some communities are just 16 simply historic, so we don't want to completely wipe 17 away the history there. Some communities are over 18 100 years old, on our shores. 19 That in considering that, we need to look 20 at -- look at the building codes and, potentially, 21 building -- consider stronger building codes if 22 they're going to rebuild, such as the piles of 23 concrete barriers, and just different roof types, 24 which, you know, happen in the southern 25 United States, and in Delta regions throughout the 1 world. 2 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Well, I'm thinking, 3 specifically, if you got an area like Freeport. 4 I grew up in the Rockaways, on the Long Beach 5 area, but I'm very familiar with those areas. 6 But, Freeport, the so-called "nautical mile," 7 Guy Lombardo Avenue, or Boulevard, whatever it is, 8 the water, at some points on Merrick Road, were 9 six feet deep. It was under six ---Merrick Road was 10 six feet under water. The water reached 11 Sunrise Highland, which was significantly further 12 north of Merrick Road. It's not a short walk, it's 13 a good distance. 14 So there was a huge surge that came in over 15 there. 16 When I toured that area, and Long Beach is 17 even worse, the devastation is heavy there. 18 Rebuilding is going to have to occur tremendously, 19 and at great cost. 20 The village mayors are very concerned that 21 it won't occur at all, because the people will not 22 be able to rebuild and then they just abandon their 23 places; or sell to speculators that, you know, a 24 nickel on the dollar, or something like that, which 25 is being offered now by some individuals, that may 1 just reconstruct and develop some types of shanty 2 towns, where you would have nothing but rentals 3 and no private ownership. 4 Needless to say, these villages don't like 5 that, don't want to see that, and neither does 6 anybody else, but, it's a possibility. 7 Should we do like areas of Florida, where 8 there are, literally, painted in the streets, 9 lines that indicate, if you live below this point, 10 you evacuate. You must evacuate. If you don't, 11 you're on your own. 12 Should we mark areas like that off, and 13 [unintelligible], and say: Look, you got to do 14 this. Raise the standards to whatever we have to 15 do. 16 But then put certain requirements in: 17 That you must leave. There's no ifs, 18 ands, or buts about it. It's is not voluntary. 19 And if you choose not to, don't expect help 20 until after the storm, because we're not going to 21 come and get you. 22 And they don't. 23 I think there's legislation in Florida that 24 says, if the wind is over 50 mile an hour, they will 25 not send responders out to get you. 1 If you're stupid enough to stay below that 2 point or in that area, you're stuck. You're gonna 3 have to go on your own. And if the storm resides 4 and you're still there, then they'll consider 5 sending people out to get you, because they're not 6 going to risk somebody's life for you. 7 Do we do things like that here? 8 JAMES RAUSSE: I believe -- I believe it's 9 necessary. It depends on the strength of the 10 enforcement statute to get people out. 11 As we saw in New Jersey, in Atlantic City, 12 and surrounding towns, the municipalities defied the 13 governor's orders? And, yes, they got a 14 tongue-lashing publicly from them, but there really 15 wasn't any type of enforcement or any type of 16 penalties for -- 17 SENATOR MARCELLINO: I was [unintelligible] 18 Long Beach. 19 JAMES RAUSSE: Yes. 20 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Many people just 21 wouldn't leave. 22 JAMES RAUSSE: Yes, I've had -- I have 23 friends who owned a house, who realized, when they 24 saw the water coming up their street, it was time to 25 leave. 1 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Which, in many cases, 2 was too late to leave. 3 JAMES RAUSSE: Exactly. Exactly. 4 They were able to get out, but many of their 5 neighbors were not. 6 I think having that type of enforcement 7 strategy is an additional way that is -- it's a low 8 cost -- you know, low-cost approach, comparatively, 9 but must be done, in addition to the resiliency 10 strategies that we were suggesting, in terms of 11 building -- requiring homeowners to build and 12 property owners to build at a higher level, whether 13 it's a -- requiring a first-floor garage, and the 14 living space starting on the second floor, a 15 building that concrete base. 16 In addition to landscaping approaches, 17 whether it's with front yards or with dunes. 18 We believe that the dune infrastructure is 19 going to be a critical element in redeveloping, and 20 that may require the State or municipalities or the 21 county to take -- you know, take over and buy out 22 certain properties, just to build that 23 infrastructure, just so it can absorb the surge a 24 little better. 25 SENATOR MARCELLINO: I'm concerned also that 1 the utilities, sewage-treatment facilities, 2 Long Beach, it -- it shut down immediately, and the 3 overflow ended up in the streets. 4 Same thing happened in Freeport and other 5 areas. 6 Gasoline was shortaged on the island, because 7 you couldn't get to the refineries and you couldn't 8 get to the pumping stations. And, not only couldn't 9 you get the stuff to it, but once you did, you found 10 out that their pipes were corrupted by salt-water 11 intrusion, and they had to be cleansed before they 12 could start pumping gasoline. So we had a -- as the 13 Governor referred to it, a couple of days where we 14 couldn't get gasoline. 15 We also had a lot of gasoline in the ground 16 that couldn't get pumped out, because they didn't 17 have generation. 18 Do we require generation? 19 JAMES RAUSSE: I think we should. 20 It may not be as costly as -- as a primary 21 system, but definitely having some type of elevated 22 backup generation with the infrastructure, that can 23 get just, you know, basic emergency energy out to 24 towns, just so the basic recovery can occur, I 25 think would help in the municipalities and entities, 1 in the long run, recover, and not be as affected, 2 because a lot of the problems were that, emergency 3 personnel could not get to places, they could not, 4 you know, run certain things. 5 And, if there's an opportunity, even if it's 6 just a very short temporary type of backup 7 generation, if it's in a protected environment, it 8 will definitely help in the immediate recovery 9 efforts, which will -- will affect -- you know, 10 definitely, positively affect what the long-term 11 recovery needs would be. 12 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Do we limit the height 13 of trees? 14 JAMES RAUSSE: Trees? Trees are a testy 15 issue. 16 I don't know, Michael, do you want to address 17 that? 18 MICHAEL LEVINE: Well, no, I think -- I think 19 nature will decide how tall a tree goes, but -- 20 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Yeah, they might, but we 21 have on Long Island, as you well know, in 22 North Hempstead and Oyster Bay, and those areas, we 23 have huge trees. 24 We love our tree, they're beautiful. They 25 extend high -- high up in the air, but they fall 1 down when the wind blows too long. 2 MICHAEL LEVINE: Well, we -- what we should 3 do is more care is put into the selection of 4 species. 5 Where is it appropriate to have a deep-rooted 6 tree? 7 Where is a shallow-rooted tree? 8 What type of trees interfere with 9 underground utilities? 10 What type interfere with overhead power 11 lines? 12 And, right or setback distances from utility 13 installations. 14 Now, it's impossible to say no trees should 15 ever have a branch that overhangs a wire, obviously. 16 But, again, selection of species is very 17 important. 18 Maintenance schedules for utility crews. 19 You can -- although it's very difficult to 20 enforce, you can have a regulation; it says the 21 homeowner is responsible for keeping the trees 22 pruned back. 23 Now, it's unlikely that you're going to send 24 an inspector into everybody's backyard, but it 25 does -- and for this kind of liability, if a wire 1 comes down, and a homeowner had a burden to keep 2 the -- an obligation to keep the tree pruned back, 3 and didn't. 4 SENATOR MARCELLINO: You know, in my -- well, 5 we do have waterfront in the Fifth Senate District 6 that's mostly north shore, and that coastal region 7 was not impacted like the south shore regions were 8 and the coast. They didn't take the same type of 9 impact. We were heavily damaged by trees falling 10 on homes, and causing all kinds of problems, 11 taking lines with them, destroying transformers, 12 and the like. 13 So my concern now is, if you have a deep 14 root, and a high water table, that root's only going 15 to go down to the water table. And if the water 16 table is close to the surface, that deep-root 17 species might not be as effective as you think. 18 So I think you're right, it's got to be 19 carefully selected, and we have to take a look at 20 that. 21 Because I'm getting calls now from people who 22 are saying: My neighbor has a tree, it's leaning 23 towards me, but he won't trim it. You have to make 24 him cut it down. 25 We've had several calls like that on it. 1 And needless to say, other than talking to a 2 person, we obviously have no power to go in there 3 and order somebody to cut his tree down. 4 In some cases they're doing it because they 5 realize it could fall open their house too. 6 So that's being done, you know, all over the 7 island in that case. 8 But, you know, we see many communities where 9 these lovely trees were the cause of much of the 10 damage that certain communities felt, and certain 11 communities had. 12 But you're right, that all has to be taken 13 into consideration. 14 One other point. 15 The Governor has proposed having a 16 gasoline-storage facility; keeping an emergency 17 supply. The State keeping an emergency supply of 18 gasoline. 19 I don't know that you can do that in one 20 location in a state like New York. 21 Should there be one on Long Island? 22 MICHAEL LEVINE: Well, the problem with this 23 storm, there was an adequate supply. There was a 24 breakdown in the distribution system. 25 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Yeah, that's true. 1 But he's talking, still, should we have an 2 ability to store our own gasoline in emergencies? 3 Like the federal government stores oil 4 and -- in facilities just in case, and it needs it 5 in case of wartime and emergencies, should we, as a 6 state, have a gasoline facility? 7 MICHAEL LEVINE: It certainly does make a lot 8 of sense, with the caution that, if there -- but, 9 still, if there's a breakdown in the distribution 10 system, or a lack of power to pump, then you can 11 have the supply and still not be able to get it to 12 the end user. 13 But just as a concept, sure, to have a 14 gasoline supply on the island, so that at least the 15 step in the chain, where the barges have to come 16 into the harbor, is not impacted if the harbor is 17 closed. 18 That would get you one step closer to having 19 an adequate supply. 20 JAMES RAUSSE: Yeah, I echo what Michael said 21 in terms of that. It would be a good idea to have 22 it, but, you know, the distribution system is key. 23 Do we depend on -- completely on building an 24 infrastructure -- a hardy infrastructure of pipes 25 that can get this? Or, do we have a fleet of 1 trucks that are kept at -- that are ready at a 2 moment's notice, to bring -- bring the fuel out to 3 areas, to distribute the gasoline. 4 So, I think that the distribution system 5 is -- 6 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Well, at the very least, 7 to emergency services, municipalities, where you 8 need a workforce -- to get out an emergency 9 workforce that has to be powered to get on the 10 streets for tree removal, debris removal, and things 11 like that, until you can restore, you know, a normal 12 flow in your normal power supply. 13 Thank you very much, appreciate your 14 testimony. 15 And, we appreciate your written comments. 16 Much of it will be in the report. And we will hope 17 that -- we will pass this on to the Governor, and 18 the municipalities and all of the elected officials 19 will receive copies of this report. 20 Thank you for your testimony. 21 ELIZABETH SHEARGOLD: Thank you. 22 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Our next group will be: 23 James Ammerman, Jay Tanski, Nate Woiwode, and 24 Douglas Hill. 25 Gentlemen, does that buzz have to stay? 1 [Audio interference occurring.] 2 UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Just until the 3 [unintelligible]. 4 SENATOR MARCELLINO: That's going to be as 5 long as the presentation goes? 6 [Audio interference stops.] 7 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Okay. 8 And who wishes to start? And would you 9 please identify yourselves when you give your -- 10 JAMES AMMERMAN: I'll start. 11 I'm James Ammerman, director of New York Sea 12 Grant, headquartered at Stony Brook University. 13 I want to thank you, Senator Marcellino, for 14 the invitation to testify today. 15 And I also have with me, Jay Tanski, our 16 coastal processes specialist, who is really the 17 expert in this area. 18 New York Sea Grant is a statewide network of 19 integrated coastal research and education and 20 extension services which helps to promote and 21 protect the state's marine and Great Lakes 22 resources. 23 We're a university-based program. We support 24 university-based research, combining scientific 25 rigor with practical application, and rapid 1 practical application, I should add. 2 Since 1971, when we started in New York, we 3 have provided over $120 million for coastal research 4 education and outreach, and we're part of a national 5 network of 33 sea-grant programs found in every 6 coastal state which receives federal funding from 7 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 8 in -- and the Department of Commerce, as well as the 9 State of New York. 10 So, we've been involved with 11 coastal-hazards issues for a long time, but we've 12 been doubled-down on this since "Hurricane Sandy," 13 so I want to briefly summarize some of these 14 activities. 15 We've provided long-term research support 16 to -- on coastal hazards and related issues, 17 including to the Storm Surge Research Group at 18 Stony Brook University. 19 We've given out rapid-response small research 20 grants in response to "Hurricane Sandy" to 21 university faculty, and we're continuing to do that. 22 Our long-term extension efforts, both on 23 Long Island and in the Great Lakes communities, 24 include storm hazard -- hazards and related 25 concerns. 1 Additionally, as the -- in the wake of 2 "Sandy," three of our Long Island extension 3 specialists, including Jay, are working closely 4 with communities, coastal businesses, and other 5 stakeholders. 6 In particular, Jay has been working with 7 issues of coastal hazards on Long Island, 8 south shore, and in particular, since the 1980s, 9 and as -- university have acknowledged as one of the 10 regional experts. 11 We continually provide the best 12 scientifically-based information on important 13 coastal issues to a variety of stakeholders, 14 including lawmakers, and this has become obviously 15 even more important following "Sandy." 16 The challenges in the wake of 17 "Superstorm Sandy": 18 "Sandy" has amply demonstrated the 19 vulnerability of our coastal environments. If we 20 weren't aware of it before, we certainly are now. 21 I'm familiar with what Louisiana went through 22 after "Katrina," and it's perhaps not quite as bad, 23 but it's very dramatic impacts, obviously. 24 The magnitude -- but the magnitude of coastal 25 development and the resulting storm damage in this 1 area requires that, in the future, we rebuild 2 differently and more efficiently. 3 We can't just repeat what we've done in the 4 past, and this requires the best available and most 5 current quantitative scientific information, and its 6 prompt distribution, in order to do that kind of 7 rebuilding. 8 So, coastal-hazard problems, obviously, are 9 not new. 10 I have in front of me, a stack of reports 11 dating back to the 1980s, relating to coastal 12 hazards on Long Island, New York State, breach 13 impacts; a variety of reports, virtually all of 14 which New York Sea Grant, and, particularly, 15 Jay Tanski, has been involved in. 16 I won't go through the details, they're 17 listed in my testimony, but I will highlight, in 18 particular, the latest one in the wake of the storm, 19 the 2100 Commission, which New York Sea Grant 20 participated in as part of the SUNY experts team. 21 And, so, I want to -- want to talk about 22 specific issues in coastal hazards raised by these 23 reports, particularly the 2100 Commission that 24 Sea Grant is already involved with. 25 A 1996 report on shoreline erosion, I believe 1 it was a governor's task force, following that 2 report, New York Sea Grant designed something called 3 "The Atlantic Coast of New York Monitoring Program" 4 for the shoreline on south shore, and it was 5 conducted with the collaboration of both the 6 New York State Department of State and the U.S. Army 7 Corps of Engineers. 8 However, this monitoring program was 9 discontinued in 2004, so no data is available since 10 then. 11 This program clearly needs to be reinstated. 12 The 2001 report says that, "The State should 13 monitor the impact of the Fire Island wilderness 14 breach on the barrier island, the bay, and the 15 mainland to determine whether or not to close the 16 breach in the near future." 17 New York Sea Grant, in late November, funded 18 the Stony Brook researcher to monitor the physical 19 oceanographic impacts of this breach. 20 And he was able to get equipment out there by 21 early December, when other agencies and groups were 22 not able to facilitate such research. 23 And, we are also currently entertaining a 24 proposal to look at additional biological impacts. 25 Our 2001 report on breach impacts that 1 New York Sea Grant did in the past, remains the 2 authoritative report on biological impacts of 3 barrier-island breaches in this region. 4 The 2100 Commission also encouraged the use 5 of green and natural infrastructure, including 6 providing incentives for creation of soft shorelines 7 and wetlands, and including building living 8 shorelines and new wetlands. 9 Jay is leading a workshop in the next few 10 months on living shorelines and related methods, and 11 this should provide additional information about how 12 these methods might be applied. 13 In addition, the report encourages further 14 development of probabilistic hazards and risk 15 mapping, which includes forecasts of climate change 16 and allows communities to better visualize the 17 risks. 18 New York Sea Grant has previously supported 19 researchers who can address these issues, including 20 some at Stony Brook, who could address issues about 21 storms like "Sandy"; whether it is really an every 22 20-year storm, 100-year storm, or whatever. 23 We need better information on that so 24 communities can be better prepared. 25 And part of the 2100 Commission also talks 1 about a resilience strategy for New York Harbor, and 2 suggests conducting a comprehensive storm-surge 3 barrier system for New York Harbor. 4 We funded the original modeling research that 5 showed such storm-surge barriers of floodgates to be 6 feasible. 7 Finally, I want to mention a couple other 8 recommendations of the commission. 9 Of course, we suggested restoring damaged 10 dunes, beaches, and barrier islands; repair and 11 strengthen critical hard infrastructure; repair and 12 protect wastewater infrastructure; and repair 13 important recreational facilities. 14 Well, of course, all of those things depend 15 on the local environment, and the type of use; so, 16 they require specific technical information on the 17 best way to do all those things. 18 We can't just go back and do it the way we 19 did before. 20 So, New York Sea Grant has an important role 21 in providing this up-to date scientific information 22 in a reasonable form, that can be quickly brought to 23 the people who need the information. 24 I thank you for your time. 25 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Thank you. 1 Okay? 2 NATE WOIWODE: Thank you, 3 Chairman Marcellino, for the opportunity to testify 4 before you today. 5 My name is Nate Woiwode. I'm a policy 6 advisory for The Nature Conservancy on Long Island. 7 And before I get into my testimony, I want to 8 thank you for your leadership on sea-level rise. 9 Both Jay and I spent a significant amount of 10 time as part of that task force, and the conservancy 11 shares your hope that the effort today, and similar 12 efforts, will not find the same fate. 13 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Now, that report is 14 going to be incorporated as part of the report of 15 this Committee -- 16 NATE WOIWODE: Excellent. 17 SENATOR MARCELLINO: -- and that goes out 18 again. 19 So we're going to redo, and reuse, those 20 recommendations that we feel are still applicable, 21 and still should be considered. 22 NATE WOIWODE: Well, to the degree that we 23 can be helpful in that, please don't hesitate to 24 ask. 25 SENATOR MARCELLINO: We will. 1 NATE WOIWODE: Our climate is changing. This 2 is no longer for debate. 3 You've heard today, and as you mentioned in 4 the beginning, that we have every reason to believe 5 that the type of extreme weather we've witnessed 6 here in New York repeatedly over the last two years, 7 with "Hurricane Irene," "Tropical Storm Lee," and 8 then "Superstorm Sandy," being the primary examples, 9 will become more and more common. 10 The conservancy was involved in a recent 11 paper that was published in the "Natural Hazards 12 Journal," that looked at what the impacts of a 13 similar storm to the 1938 hurricane would be, given 14 sea-level rise -- a moderate level of sea-level rise 15 by 2080. 16 And what we found, was that you'd see a 17 47 percent increase in the number of people 18 affected, and a 73 percent increase in the amount of 19 property impacted. 20 And that's before you account for any 21 population increase, or any of the other expected 22 changes to the region, being Long Island, in the 23 near future. 24 So, even as we work to recover from the 25 disastrous consequences of "Sandy," the time has 1 come to ensure that New York is more resilient, that 2 our communities are made safer, and before it is too 3 late, we must also address the causes of climate 4 change to avoid the worst of the projected impacts. 5 The devastation that followed the recent 6 storms resulted, in large part, from choices we made 7 in the past about where we build, what we build, and 8 how we build. 9 We have the opportunity right now to make new 10 choices, smart choices, that realistically recognize 11 and address vulnerabilities and risk, and that 12 ensure our communities are resilient and safe in the 13 future. 14 As this Committee has recognized, every 15 decision about rebuilding today is also a decision 16 about preparing for the next storm. 17 And, we want make sure that those two 18 thoughts are not separated. 19 Every decision, every action that we take 20 now, is, in fact, preparation for the next major 21 event. 22 The Nature Conservancy has long been 23 concerned with the pace of global climate change and 24 the impacts that this environmental crisis will have 25 on our natural resources and human communities. 1 As we work to address the causes of climate 2 change, we are also engaging with governments, 3 corporations, conservation partners, and other 4 stakeholders to reduce risks to communities. 5 We know that natural infrastructure can help 6 secure food, water, and safety for people in the 7 face of impacts from our changing climate, and have 8 been applying proven conservation methods and 9 testing new approaches to make the natural systems 10 we all rely on more resilient to climate change. 11 For example, around the world, the 12 conservancy is examining how conservation solutions 13 can address coastal threats. 14 Right here in New York, we've developed the 15 Coastal Resilience Tool for the Long Island and 16 New York City areas. 17 This web-based tool, which can be accessed by 18 all at www.coastalresilience.org, is a 19 decision-support tool that can be used to ensure 20 future development and redevelopment is sited and 21 designed in a way that protects people and valuable 22 public and private investments. 23 We have also developed the Climate Wizard, 24 which enables technical and non-technical audiences 25 alike to access leading climate-change information 1 and visualize the impacts anywhere on earth. 2 First generation of this web-based program 3 allows the user to choose a state or country and, 4 both, assess how climate has changed over time, and 5 to project what future changes are predicted to 6 occur in a given area. 7 Providing transparent and accessible tools 8 based in science, two decision-makers in the public 9 is one of our highest priorities. 10 We strongly believe that our policy solutions 11 and funding decisions must be informed by scientific 12 information so that our investments are protected 13 from future impacts, and provide the most benefit to 14 the public. 15 What we have learned through our work to 16 develop and build on climate science, is that we are 17 not doomed to a future of extreme weather-related 18 catastrophes. 19 There are immediate steps we can take to 20 reduce disaster risks, and first among those is 21 taking advantage of our natural defenses. 22 Among the many benefits of natural systems, 23 including reefs, wetlands, floodplains, and dunes, 24 is that they serve to reduce risk and mitigate 25 against weather-related disasters. 1 It is paramount that we work to protect and 2 conserve these systems so that they are intact and 3 able to provide important benefits to people, as 4 well as to continue to act as part of functional and 5 valuable ecosystems. 6 These benefits, and the risks associated with 7 degradation of resources that can protect -- the 8 degradation of resources that can protect us is the 9 focus of the 2012 World Risk report, led by the 10 Alliance for Development Works, United Nations 11 University, and The Nature Conservancy. 12 As Dr. Ammerman referenced, a report released 13 just a few days ago by the 2100 Commission similarly 14 recognizes the value of natural infrastructure. 15 Very significantly, the report recognizes 16 that infrastructure includes not just manmade 17 things, like roads and bridges, but also the natural 18 systems that both protect our communities and 19 provide many important co-benefits. 20 Just as we have to protect our vulnerable 21 roads and bridges, we also have to protect our 22 vulnerable wetlands, floodplains, dunes, and river 23 systems. 24 And just as we have to invest in our roads 25 and bridges, we also have to invest in our natural 1 systems and other green infrastructure. 2 And one of the previous gentlemen who was 3 testifying, talked about Arverne, in the Rockaways, 4 and I also was able to visit Arverne. 5 While the design of the community certainly 6 had an effect, there was also an intentionality 7 about designing the community with a dune system in 8 front. 9 And, so, as they were looking at how to make 10 sure that their community was better protected, they 11 were looking to incorporate natural infrastructure, 12 as well as design standards, that helped reduce the 13 impact of flooding. 14 Here in New York, there are key steps that we 15 can take to institute policies that will protect 16 valuable natural resources, public investments, and 17 people from some of the impacts of our changing 18 climate. 19 Attached to this testimony are a series of 20 principles that the conservancy has drafted to help 21 lay out how government should prioritize 22 redevelopment, and avoid rebuilding in a way that 23 creates new vulnerabilities. 24 In addition, there are legislative and 25 regulatory shortcomings that have left important 1 natural resources unprotected or inadequately 2 protected, and are allowing development to occur in 3 places that put people and investment at risk. 4 For example, our freshwater- and 5 tidal-wetland protections must be strengthened, and 6 our mapping and delineations must be updated, so we 7 can protect our hydrologic integrity, and reduce 8 loss of systems that buffer communities from 9 flooding. 10 When maps have been completed, they should be 11 released and not held for political analysis. 12 Our coastal-erosion hazard-area mapping must 13 be updated, and our standards for permissible 14 development and redevelopment in the coastal zones 15 of New York must be amended, and our riparian 16 floodplain should be better protected through the 17 use of appropriately sized buffers, and updated 18 floodplain maps that are be integrated into planning 19 and permitting decisions. 20 While some of these changes will need to take 21 place at the local and regional levels, state and 22 federal funding and policies can assist localities 23 and stakeholders in driving important change. 24 We have a attached a preliminary list of laws 25 and regulations that could be amended, to better 1 protect New Yorkers from future extreme weather, and 2 ensure that natural systems are prioritized as part 3 of efforts to reduce risk. 4 One of the key steps in that is -- or, one of 5 the key roles that the State can play in that, is 6 providing the most scientifically accurate and 7 up-to-date information to localities, with guidance, 8 as to how to go about decision-making. 9 Along those lines, one of the immediate 10 policy steps that should be taken, is the adoption 11 of the sea-level rise projections by the State, and 12 the inclusion of those projections into various 13 planning and permitting laws, to ensure that the 14 most up-to-date science is being used as coastal 15 communities make development decisions. 16 Sea-level rise is not only widely recognized 17 and accepted, but our -- global and local 18 projections are being regularly updated and 19 published. 20 For coastal communities, these projections 21 should have significant impact on decisions, 22 including siting of public and private facilities; 23 yet, our laws governing coastal permitting and 24 planning do not account for this new, readily 25 available scientific information. 1 Accordingly, an excellent starting place for 2 New York State, as we work to reduce future 3 vulnerability and risk to our planning and other 4 government decision-making, would be the adoption of 5 sea-level rise projections, and the integration of 6 those projections into key laws that govern local 7 decision-making. 8 As development is, by and large, controlled 9 by the localities, this level have guidance will 10 ensure all have the information to protect their 11 citizens from climate risk, and protect public 12 investments from, literally, washing away. 13 Thank you again for the opportunity to 14 testify before you today on potential actions to 15 mitigate manmade factors which contribute to extreme 16 weather events, and should influence the rebuilding 17 effort in the wake of "Superstorm Sandy." 18 The Nature Conservancy is committed to 19 continuing our collaboration with local, state, and 20 federal officials, conservation partners, 21 corporations, and other stakeholders, to inform 22 policy with science, and ensure that we are using 23 natural systems to protect our communities. 24 We look forward to working with the Committee 25 to this end, and we would welcome follow-up 1 questions today, or in the future, on any of the 2 materials we have presented. 3 Thank you. 4 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Thank you. 5 Go ahead. 6 [Audio interference occurring.] 7 DOUGLAS HILL: I had thought that PowerPoint 8 would make this easier, but if there is going to be 9 that buzz, I'll just read my remarks instead. 10 SENATOR MARCELLINO: If you could summarize 11 it, because I believe we have a copy of them. 12 DOUGLAS HILL: Summarize? 13 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Yeah, it would help. 14 DOUGLAS HILL: Okay, I'll -- 15 SENATOR MARCELLINO: If you want to use the 16 PowerPoint, we'll live with the buzz. 17 DOUGLAS HILL: Okay, thank you. 18 And thank you for the invitation. 19 Can you hear? 20 I'm Douglas Hill. I'm a consulting engineer 21 licensed to practice in New York State, and I'm an 22 adjunct lecturer in the School of Marine and 23 Atmospheric Sciences at Stony Brook. 24 The title of my comments is 25 "The New York/New Jersey metropolitan region needs 1 its own IPET." 2 "IPET"? What's that? 3 It's the "Interagency Performance Evaluation 4 Task Force," which was established after "Katrina" 5 by the Corps of Engineers. 6 [PowerPoint presentation begins.] 7 IPET consists -- ran from 2005 to 2008, and 8 it cost more than $25 million. 9 It involved 150 experts, 150 supporting 10 personnel, 8 public agencies, 23 private-sector 11 firms, 25 universities; and it had an ongoing review 12 by The National Academy of Engineering, the National 13 Research Council, and by the American Society of 14 Civil Engineers. 15 So if New Orleans had and IPET, why shouldn't 16 New York? 17 That's basically my question. 18 What the IPET found out, is that the 19 New Orleans so-called "hurricane-protection system" 20 was a system in name only. 21 It was originally designed in 1985. 22 In 2005, when "Katrina" occurred, it was 23 incomplete. 24 One of the discoveries was, that transitions 25 between one form of protection and another form of 1 protection created vulnerabilities. 2 And I'll show you a picture of that in a 3 minute. 4 The whole water-resources development process 5 is faulty, according to this report; 6 Of course, we're a continuing deterrent to 7 doing what needed to be done; 8 There was a piecemeal allocation of resources 9 between the federal, state, and local governments; 10 There were different local and federal 11 priorities, some of which had to be resolved in 12 court; 13 And, normal step-by-step construction 14 procedures are also at fault, according to IPET. 15 Here's a picture of such a transition between 16 two types of protection, and I feature this because 17 it has to do with local protection planning. 18 I mean, here's a caveat about being careful 19 in local protection planning. 20 A few other additional findings from IPET 21 were: 22 That there was no evidence of significantly 23 reduced surge levels and wave heights adjacent to 24 wetlands and marshes, contrary to what you just 25 heard; 1 The loss of life was correlated with the 2 poor, the elderly, and the disabled; those who were 3 least likely, or least able, to evacuate; 4 70 percent of the deaths were those over 5 60 years of age; 6 And the obvious thing, the most practical 7 means to flood risk, is to keep people and property 8 out of our flood-prone areas. 9 But as the report states, that's pretty hard 10 to accomplish with our system of government. 11 So here's a comparison of "Sandy" with 12 "Katrina." 13 I mean, "Sandy" was not "Katrina"; New York 14 is not New Orleans. 15 But, "Katrina" cost $130 billion. 16 The number I've seen in the papers for 17 "Sandy" is estimated up to 80 billion, much more 18 than what Congress is voting. 19 1,300 people died in New Orleans; only 140 in 20 New York. 21 There was a successful evacuation of 22 400,000 people from New Orleans, which was regarded 23 as a major success in that whole business. 24 Mayor Bloomberg ordered 375,000 people to 25 evacuate from Zone A. 1 How many actually evacuated, I've never seen 2 published. 3 If it was anything like 375,000, I missed 4 television that night. 5 But the more important point is, that if you 6 look at more -- Zone A has to do with Category 1 7 hurricanes. 8 If you look at 2, 3, and 4, we're talking 9 about Zones A, B, and C, which is 2.3 million 10 people. 11 And according to a study done by the New York 12 City Office of Emergency Management, if you also 13 include transits, we're talking about trying to 14 evacuate 3 million people for a Hurricane 2, or 3. 15 So, potentially, New York is in much more 16 danger than New Orleans ever was. 17 So, "Katrina" had a hurricane-protection 18 system that was flawed. 19 We don't have a hurricane-protection system. 20 So a key development by IPET, was to advance 21 the science of risk analysis. 22 And here's a bunch of things that risk 23 analysis will do you: Informed policy-level 24 decisions, planning-level decisions, and so on. 25 I won't take the time on that. 1 What is "risk analysis"? 2 Well, it consists four steps. 3 First: Assess the hazard, the range, 4 character, and frequency of hurricanes and 5 nor'easters. 6 One of the questions you've asked, Senator, 7 is whether "Sandy" is the new normal? 8 What they did in IPET, was look at more than 9 100 scenarios for different possible hurricanes and 10 hurricane paths that might strike New Orleans, 11 because they lead to different patterns of surges 12 and waves striking the city. 13 There's no one standard. 14 Prior to this, the Corps of Engineers had a 15 so-called "standard Project Hurricane." And that 16 fell far short of what actually happened in 17 "Katrina." 18 And so now the educated opinion is, that 19 there should be a probabilistic range of possible 20 hazards; not just, What do we design for "Sandy"? 21 Second: Assess performance -- assistive 22 performance by modeling the reliability of the 23 hurricane-protection system to withstand storm 24 surge. 25 Well, that could be done in New Orleans 1 because they could look at all the things that 2 failed. 3 In this case, we would have to postulate what 4 these protective measures might be. 5 I would like to say to the side at this 6 point, is that I keep hearing about "resilience," 7 which makes me nervous. 8 The word "resilience" means to withstand and 9 recover. 10 If you asked the man on the street whether he 11 prefers resilience or protection, I think I know 12 what his answer would be. 13 There may be places where resilience is the 14 only option, but it doesn't seem to me it's a 15 satisfactory goal. 16 The third thing is: Assess the consequence 17 as measured by loss of life and property damage. 18 That seems to be the biggest thing that you 19 can measure. 20 It should be extended to environmental and 21 social consequences, if that can be done. 22 And, four: You should calculate risks; 23 a number. 24 That's the probability times the magnitude of 25 consequences for local areas. 1 Now, I worked on the storm-surge work at 2 Stony Brook previously, and I'm an advocate of 3 storm-surge barriers to protect New York City, and 4 they should be part of this evaluation. 5 In my opinion, they should be central to the 6 evaluation. 7 The diagram there shows you where they would 8 be located. 9 They'd be at the upper end of the East River. 10 The original study that was done at 11 Stony Brook postulated them, a barrier across the 12 narrows, and one at the mouth of the Arthur Kill 13 which separates Staten Island from New Jersey. 14 In 2009, there was a conference sponsored by 15 sections of the American Society of Civil Engineers, 16 and the New York Academy of Sciences, which I 17 chaired, in which four major engineering firms 18 presented conceptual designs of barriers at these 19 locations, and estimated what their costs were. 20 So, both, the hydrologic feasibility has been 21 established, or demonstrated, by Stony Brook, and 22 also HydroCoil; and the technical feasibility has 23 been established by the work done in that 24 conference. 25 The picture on the right is -- shows where 1 the design by ARCADIS, a Dutch firm, did the design 2 for the barrier across the narrows. 3 You can see that there, in the city of 4 [unintelligible]. 5 I mentioned that, as IPET continued, there 6 were current peer-reviews by the National Research 7 Council and by the American Society Civil Engineers, 8 each of which produced their own report. 9 Here's a few selections from what the ASCE 10 called its "calls-to-action," which were ten in 11 number. 12 Let me read these. 13 All responsible agencies in New Orleans, and 14 throughout the nation, should reevaluate their 15 policies and practices, to ensure that the 16 protection of public safety and health and welfare 17 is the top priority for the infrequent but 18 potentially devastating impacts from hurricanes and 19 flooding. 20 Quantify the risks: 21 That is, actually measure what these risks 22 may be. 23 Rethink the whole system: 24 I mean, we're looking at sort of a piecemeal 25 approach here, frankly, today. 1 "Rethink the whole system"; that means, 2 New York, Long Island, and New Jersey. 3 I mean, I heard "the region" referred to as 4 Nassau and Suffolk Counties. 5 That's not the region. The region includes 6 New York and New Jersey. 7 Put someone in charge: 8 Now there's an idea that I haven't heard 9 somewhere else. 10 Local, state and federal leaders should agree 11 to assign to a single individual, the responsibility 12 for managing critical hurricane- and 13 flood-protection systems, such as the one in the 14 New Orleans area. 15 That would be a way to overcome this 16 fragmentation that led to these gaps in the 17 New Orleans system. 18 And, finally: Place safety first. 19 So these are my recommendations. 20 New York State Legislature should support a 21 comprehensive coastal-risk analysis of the 22 metropolitan area by the Corps of Engineers, for the 23 purpose of establishing a hurricane-protection 24 system for the region. 25 The Committee's charge here, to consider 1 possible infrastructure and construction 2 improvements, zoning changes, and beach protection, 3 can be an important contribution to such regional 4 risk analysis. 5 As part of a piecemeal approach, though, not 6 so much. 7 Finally, the metropolitan region needs its 8 own IPETs, in my view. 9 Thank you. 10 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Thank you very much. I 11 appreciate your time. 12 Can we disconnect that? 13 [Audio interference stops.] 14 SENATOR MARCELLINO: I heard some very 15 interesting testimony, and I do appreciate it. 16 Again, we will incorporate many of these 17 suggestions as part of the report. 18 Your testimony will be part of the report, 19 and, clearly, if that's what we want to do, and we 20 want to institute, instigate, discussion. We want 21 to create, you know, conversation, which is sorely 22 lacking in a lot of these things. 23 Many commissions and task forces, 24 [unintelligible] commissions, you name it, have been 25 formed over the years, many of them write reports, 1 like the 2010 report on the Sea-Level Rise Task 2 Force. 3 They get done, they get printed, and they get 4 put on a shelf. And, someone looks at them, and 5 says It's going cost money? Well... 6 And we walk away, and they become forgotten, 7 until the next problem starts, and then somebody 8 goes back and starts dusting off some of the 9 documents and we begin to look at them again. 10 I don't know who might want to answer this. 11 I think I've got the idea that "Sandy," you 12 guys don't necessarily agree that "Sandy" should be 13 the new norm. 14 It's something bigger? 15 DOUGLAS HILL: That's something, but there 16 should be a spectrum of possibilities which will 17 impact different parts of the region in different 18 ways. And that those ways -- those places should be 19 designed to the worst situation that will occur 20 there. 21 JAY TANSKI: My name is Jay Tanski. I'm a 22 coastal processes specialist for New York Sea Grant. 23 I've been working on coastal erosion and flooding 24 issues in New York since 1983. 25 My present position was studying them before 1 then. 2 And I think you're asking for a question that 3 science really can't answer in terms of, Is this the 4 new norm? 5 If you look at what we've known in the past, 6 and looking at what we call the "still-water flood 7 elevations" from "Sandy," it ranges anywhere, from a 8 50-year storm, to over a 500-year storm, depending 9 on where you are. 10 I know an IT researcher just came out with a 11 paper that said he thinks it's a 700-year storm. 12 That is one of the problems. 13 This is an area of very, kind of, active 14 research now. 15 So, the managers are stuck with the problem; 16 they're dealing with a lot of uncertainty. 17 That doesn't mean you can't do anything, but 18 you have to do things that are more what they call 19 "adaptive management"; knowing that you have that 20 uncertainty, and it's going to be a while before you 21 can really narrow what that is. 22 That doesn't -- like I said, it doesn't mean 23 you can't do anything. 24 And one of the recommendations that I would 25 make, is go out and take a look. Someone should do 1 an evaluation of the damage to the individual 2 structures that you have seen, especially the worst 3 damage in the different areas, and look at, as 4 people have said before, a lot of this depends on 5 the age of the structures and what standards they 6 were built to. 7 A survey at Fire Island last week showed that 8 many of the structures that were built to kind of 9 the present-day standards, that's the 10 post-flood-insurance standards, survived very well; 11 whereas the older ones, the ones that you were 12 saying, pre-1970, did not survive well. 13 That would give you an idea of kind of a 14 basis that you could use to see if our present flood 15 standards are working. 16 And I think that's very important, because if 17 you're talking about 300,000 structures have to be 18 retrofitted, you want to make sure you do it in the 19 most efficient way possible. 20 So I think that's one thing that's very 21 important. 22 And I think the other thing important, we 23 have a lot of regulations that are good, but they're 24 not updated. 25 The FEMA flood maps were -- they were not 1 updated since the '70s, before 2007, for Nassau and 2 Suffolk County. 3 And it's the same with coastal-erosion 4 hazard-area maps; they hadn't been updated since 5 they had been done in 1980. 6 So those frequent updates, when you're 7 dealing with uncertainty, and what is going to 8 happen, is going to be crucial into making the best 9 management decisions that you can make, you know, at 10 this time. 11 So, it's not that you can't do anything in 12 uncertainty, but you have to be paying closer 13 attention to everything that's going on, and then 14 adapt your management policies as you get a better 15 idea of what's happening. 16 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Well, I gather, the 17 conversation that I'm hearing from Professor Hill 18 and yourself is almost in agreement that we need a 19 very comprehensive evaluation, going forward, not 20 necessarily using "Sandy" as the norm, but as a 21 possible contributory factor in developing the new 22 norm. 23 NATE WOIWODE: If I can speak to this as 24 well, I think where the conservancy comes down on 25 this, is that there is no one right answer for 1 everywhere. 2 And, so, I'm certainly not an expert to talk 3 about storm-surge barriers in New York Harbor. 4 What we know, is that the cost of action is 5 be going to be substantial wherever you are, and 6 that the impacts are significant across the board. 7 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Well, who should bear -- 8 let me -- who should bear the cost? 9 NATE WOIWODE: I don't know -- 10 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Should it be the private 11 sector? Should it be the public? 12 Who should bear the cost of these? 13 Because you're right, it's going to be 14 expensive. There's no doubt about it. 15 The governor of New Jersey requested 32 -- 16 $30 billion in aid for "Sandy." 17 His state budget is $32 billion. 18 In New York, we're considerably more 19 expensive than that. 20 But, still, Governor Cuomo has only requested 21 $30 billion in aid; yet -- well, he's going to get 22 only $30 billion, and he's requested $60 billion. 23 And our state budget is 132 billion. 24 So, we -- he's talking about half the state 25 budget coming from the federal government, and 1 they're giving us a hard time, because they're 2 looking at: 3 What should be immediate? 4 Where's it going to go? 5 Do we have the money? 6 How are we going to raise it? 7 What are the offsets? 8 And so forth and so on. 9 That discussion is ongoing. Money is a very 10 difficult process right now. 11 But who should bear the cost? 12 NATE WOIWODE: I would say that, from our 13 perspective, the question really is sort of 14 forward-looking: Who's going to bear the cost of 15 the decisions that we make now, when the future 16 storms hit, or future, you know, sea-level rise 17 impacts, and things like that? 18 And what we have in front of us now -- and, 19 so, you talked about your house. 20 My house was built in 1954. I'm praying that 21 it holds on a little bit longer. 22 But, the reality is, of the houses that we 23 were talking about that would be outside of any 24 storm-surge barrier, that might be built for 25 New York City down the road, we're talking about 1 houses that, if they're built today, let's say 2 they're built for 60 years, and so they're looking 3 at an entirely different world, in 60 years, in 4 terms of what the impacts are, what the flooding 5 risk is. 6 And so, while it unfortunately falls to the 7 politicians frighten to really wrestle with the 8 question of who's bearing the costs right now, I 9 think the opportunity we have, as a community, is to 10 think about: 11 How do we reduce those costs when we go 12 forward? 13 How do we make sure that risk is -- and 14 uncertainty is properly brought into the 15 decision-making? 16 SENATOR MARCELLINO: What I'm trying to get 17 at is, what level of government, or what level of -- 18 who is going to take the lead? 19 Should it be the feds? Should they take the 20 lead? 21 Should the states, 50 different states in 22 50 different regions, with 50 different sets of 23 responsibilities, should they take the leads? 24 Should it be a village? 25 Should it be a county? 1 One of the reasons that I talked about the 2 regional between the two counties, was because they 3 got together, and they worked together well in 4 handling the problems, which were pretty common to 5 both counties. 6 They both had similar problems, and they 7 dealt with them in a similar way. 8 So -- and they worked together to do it. 9 So it works. 10 NATE WOIWODE: What we have recognized, is 11 that so many of these decisions really do fall to 12 local [unintelligible] planning. 13 And, unfortunately, political boundaries do 14 not respect the impact of storms; nor do they 15 respect the way that natural systems function. 16 And, so -- 17 SENATOR MARCELLINO: [Unintelligible] they 18 exist. 19 NATE WOIWODE: And it's -- where we have come 20 down on this, is really that, the State has an 21 opportunity to provide guidance, and -- to the local 22 level, but it does then become sort of an inherently 23 local decision. 24 And what we hope to see, is if the State can 25 provide the necessary tools and information and maps 1 and incentives to the local level, to start making 2 decisions that reduce risk, and whether those 3 decisions are in the form of large gray 4 infrastructure; whether they're in the form of 5 restoring ecosystems; whether they're in the form of 6 providing citizens opportunities to get out of 7 harm's way, if they so choose. 8 I think the suite of options needs to be on 9 the table for those local communities so that 10 they're able to make the best decisions for 11 themselves, but also the most informed decisions. 12 Because they're wrestling with stuff that 13 are -- you know, they're dealing with the 14 day-to-day -- 15 SENATOR MARCELLINO: You realize, of course, 16 that -- I don't mean to interrupt you, so I'm not 17 trying to be rude, but, to move this conversation, 18 do you realize there are, literally, thousands of 19 governmental jurisdictions that you're talking 20 about? 21 If each of them were given the opportunity to 22 set a bill, or set a set of bill of particulars, 23 before state government, we would be sitting with 24 something considerably larger than the state budget. 25 So, I don't know that that's feasible, that 1 you can let each and every one of them set their own 2 requirements and their own issues independently of 3 anyone else. 4 There has to be some -- 5 NATE WOIWODE: I guess I should clarify -- 6 SENATOR MARCELLINO: -- organizing entity. 7 NATE WOIWODE: -- that wasn't what I was 8 speaking to. 9 Our sense is, that the State has an 10 opportunity to really sort of provide the guidelines 11 within which the local governments act. 12 But, our reality in this region is, that home 13 rule dictates so many of these land-use decisions. 14 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Okay, if the State 15 provides the guidelines, and that makes a lot of 16 sense, working with the federal government -- we're 17 going to have to do that, because they've got the 18 money -- again, the ultimate then decision is, 19 Who's going to pay the ultimate bill? 20 Is it going to be down at the local level; or 21 is it going to be at the top, filtering the money 22 down? 23 Because all of this is going to cost money, 24 and that's the fight we're having right now with the 25 federal government. 1 You know, in the past, the federal government 2 has come forth and paid. 3 Now you're seeing a change. 4 There's resistance to the expenses that have 5 been asked for by the states that have asked for the 6 expenses. 7 Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York have 8 issued a bill to the federal government, and said: 9 Here, you pay it. This is what we think we need. 10 This what you're talking about? 11 This is what you think we think we need to do 12 the job that we think has to be done. Pay it. 13 And the 50 states around are saying, 14 basically: Well, times are not like they were in 15 "Katrina." We don't have a bustling economy. We 16 have problems now in raising money. 17 So, we've got to rethink some of these 18 things, and they're looking at and they're asking 19 questions. 20 And some of them are pretty pointed. 21 Do we really need to do this right now? 22 Do we really need to do that? 23 What's the most immediate need that you have? 24 And they're asking questions. 25 I think we're going to see that, going 1 forward. 2 It's been over 80 days -- almost 80 days now. 3 Since that "Katrina," we got aid to them in 4 ten, and the federal government was criticized 5 harshly for waiting so long. 6 80 days, and there's hardly any criticism. 7 You know, some our Congress people have been 8 screaming and yelling, but that's about it. 9 The level of anger is not out there. 10 Yet, I walk by people who have still not the 11 ability to get into their homes, and still don't 12 have power, electricity, and heat in the middle of 13 winter. 14 So, we have concerns here. 15 But, you know, that's something that we'll 16 move forward on. 17 Should -- just to shift a little bit: 18 Should we dredge our waterways, should we 19 deepen our harbors, to have some impact on surge? 20 Would that have an impact on surge? 21 JAY TANSKI: I'll tell you of -- I don't know 22 about dredging the harbors. 23 That would be something that you could take a 24 look at. 25 But I think one of the recommendations that 1 has been floating around -- 2 SENATOR MARCELLINO: No pun intended. 3 JAY TANSKI: -- well, there's three 4 recommendations that have started, you know, going 5 back to the '89 study, and that was, one, we do have 6 to respect kind of the natural processes, in terms 7 of the sand, and how the sand moves. 8 That's very important. 9 We had a group of experts come and look at 10 the Long Island shoreline, and they said: That is 11 the first regional recommend -- recommendation you 12 have to have. 13 You cannot be blocking the sources of sand. 14 You have to let things move naturally, and 15 supplement them when you have to, if you want to 16 stop these problems. That you not stop, but control 17 them. 18 SENATOR MARCELLINO: If the bottom rises 19 because of the natural movement of sand in some of 20 the bays, and some of the natural -- the estuaries 21 fill up, the water has a tendency to spread. 22 It's got to go someplace, which usually means 23 it's in somebody's backyard or basement. 24 So, do we take a look at that? 25 Do we try to stop that? 1 I mean, we're talking about building barriers 2 to stop water from getting into tunnels and harbors, 3 and so forth. 4 Do we work on dredging, to make them deeper, 5 so that we don't have that spreading out? 6 JAY TANSKI: Well, actually, that wouldn't 7 work, because what's going to be controlling your 8 flood from coastal flooding -- this is not from 9 precipitation or anything -- is going to be what the 10 level -- what sea level is; whether it be, you know, 11 your natural -- your sea level without storms are 12 when you're dealing with storm surges. 13 There is no way you're going to deepen a 14 harbor enough to stop all of the water coming in 15 from the ocean to any significant degree. 16 I think that's one of the -- that, I think is 17 pretty well known, that you can't just deepen it if 18 you're looking at the whole ocean, which is really 19 what you're doing. 20 Even if it's the sand, the deepening that you 21 would have to do, would be prohibitive. 22 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Would you have the same 23 problems with building a barrier, though? 24 JAY TANSKI: Well, to build a barrier that he 25 is talking about, I'll let Doug address that issue. 1 I don't know there is the same thing. 2 I think you do have to build the barrier to 3 the height that you're going to be addressing, and 4 that is going to change as sea-level increases. 5 Sea level has been increasing for -- you 6 know, for 18,000 years now in the Long Island coast. 7 That's why Freeport is starting to see more 8 of those issues. 9 SENATOR MARCELLINO: No, I don't doubt the 10 fact that the levels are going to rise, and 11 sometimes they may even fall, depending upon what's 12 going on. 13 But -- I don't doubt what you're saying. 14 But the point is, if I build a wall across 15 the harbor to stop the water from coming in on the 16 surge, do I not impact the replacement of sand that 17 you talked about earlier? 18 Aren't I impacting that as well? 19 I mean, for a while there, we were putting 20 groins all over the place. 21 JAY TANSKI: That's different, yes. That is 22 different. 23 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Well, it's different, 24 but it's also, this is a barricade now. 25 So I put a barrier in front of the harbor so 1 the water can't come through. 2 It's going to stop the sand because it's 3 being carried by the water. 4 I mean, doesn't one impact the other? 5 And don't we have to know what the impact's 6 gonna be if we're going to do that? 7 JAY TANSKI: You do want to know how the -- 8 SENATOR MARCELLINO: I'm just trying to play 9 devil's advocate. 10 JAY TANSKI: No, no, but you do have to know 11 how the barrier is operating. 12 But I think what you're talking, there is 13 something else different going on here. And it gets 14 even more complicated, because the south shore 15 doesn't operate like a lot of barrier-island systems 16 that you might have heard of, especially ones down 17 south. 18 We have a lot more sand in our system than 19 those do. 20 And we have portions of Fire Island, a 21 barrier island, have not migrated in 750 to 22 1,300 years. 23 There might be erosion on the ocean side and 24 erosion on the bay side, but the barrier hasn't 25 migrated in certain areas. It has migrated in other 1 areas. 2 We have a lot of sand offshore in our system 3 that they don't have in a lot of other areas. 4 Barriers will tend to migrate back with an 5 increase in sea-level rise, depending on how fast 6 that sea-level rise is, and how much energy is put 7 into the system. 8 But most of the issues that we're dealing 9 with is the waves moving the sand along shore. And 10 when we stop that -- when you build a groin and you 11 stop that movement of sand along shore, you cause 12 erosion problems, and you cause the overwashes, and 13 you let more water in. 14 The storm-surge barrier he's talking about is 15 at the end of the sand system that we have on the 16 south shore of Long Island. 17 That's not really going to affect -- well, it 18 will affect the flow if you build a barrier from 19 Rockaway to Coney Island, because that's -- material 20 tends to move from the east to the west. 21 But, it's not -- dredging the harbor is not 22 going to decrease the flooding, either from storms 23 or from sea-level rise. 24 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Should we fill the 25 breaches that have occurred on Fire Island? 1 JAY TANSKI: That depends on what resource 2 you're looking at. 3 There is positive and negative impacts to the 4 breaches, and there's, unfortunately, a lot that's 5 not known. 6 That's why, as Dr. Ammerman said, that we, 7 very quickly, put instruments out there, to try to 8 get some real information on what type of impacts 9 these breaches cause, and how much you can handle. 10 Where the breach happens determines a lot. 11 During the 1992 storm, when we had 12 Little Pikes Inlet, you might remember at 13 West Hampton, there was a breach that was caused 14 there. 15 And that was because, again, the groins 16 blocked the sand, it allowed the breach to grow. 17 It grew enough, that it increased the tidal 18 range in the back bay, Moriches Bay, by 30 percent, 19 which indicated that it was causing flooding 20 conditions. 21 The breach -- the one breach that's still 22 open on Fire Island, which is in the wilderness 23 area, and there's some policy issues about whether 24 to close it or not, is relatively small compared to 25 the size of the bay. 1 The instruments we were able to get in there 2 quickly show that tidal range is not changing, 3 but -- 4 SENATOR MARCELLINO: What about salinity? 5 JAY TANSKI: The salinity is changing in the 6 Eastern Bay quite a bit. 7 And that can have -- even on clams, that can 8 have positive impacts. By allowing ocean water in, 9 they have better food, it might have clarity. 10 It can have negative impacts on them, because 11 it can also allow their predators in. That can slow 12 the growth rates. 13 There's got to be a balancing act. 14 And like I said, we have the best information 15 right here, but there are unknowns. 16 We can tell you the positive and negative 17 impacts someone else has to weigh. 18 Well, we want that species to do better. 19 This species is not -- 20 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Well, there's a species 21 called "homo sapien" that may own some property on 22 the Fire Island -- 23 JAY TANSKI: Right. 24 SENATOR MARCELLINO: -- that may have been 25 impacted by the ability to go from one end of the 1 island to the other. 2 JAY TANSKI: Yeah, there's all sorts of 3 expectations -- 4 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Or some parts are being 5 cut off, unless you bridge it in some way, shape, or 6 form, or, close it; one or the other. 7 JAY TANSKI: Well, I agree. 8 That's -- like I said, we're trying to get 9 the best information so people can answer as many 10 questions as possible. 11 Ultimately, some of these things come down to 12 things that are outside, kind of, the science, 13 biological, or physical world. 14 SENATOR MARCELLINO: I hear you. 15 NATE WOIWODE: Can I speak to the breach? 16 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Sure, go ahead. 17 NATE WOIWODE: I -- one of the things that I 18 think I hear underlying some of your questions, and 19 really points to the challenge in front of us, is 20 that, this region, whether or not you look at 21 Suffolk and Nassau, or whether or not you include 22 all the way to the -- Montauk to Cape Maine, there 23 is a very real coastal economy that is part of this 24 region, and the decisions that are being made right 25 now, and will be made going forward in the next 1 weeks, months, and years, are going to have an 2 impact on that. 3 So as we think about how infrastructure 4 returns to, or is rebuilt or relocated or 5 redesigned, in these impacted areas, one of the 6 other things that needs to be factored in is, How do 7 these coastal economies operate? 8 And, so, you know, Jay was giving the 9 scientific answer. 10 The conservancy, our perspective on the 11 breach, is that it should stay open as long as it 12 can. 13 And one of the key pieces to that, is that 14 there's no question that the water quality in 15 Great South Bay, from the flooding, where everything 16 that it was in someone's garage, and every septic 17 system, was pulled back into the bay. 18 That water needs to flush, so that that bay 19 can then be used, so that we start avoiding -- you 20 know, we have an opportunity to maybe reduce the 21 potential impacts of harmful algal blooms. 22 So, I raise this, not to shift the focus, but 23 simply to point out that these systems are 24 inner-linked. 25 And, that, when we talk about the need to 1 allow the sand to migrate through the system 2 appropriately, we also need to be thinking about: 3 How is the water quality of these systems? 4 Is it allowing for the fisheries and the 5 boating and the recreational use that underlies 6 that? 7 SENATOR MARCELLINO: I hear what you're 8 saying. 9 My background is marine microbiology. That's 10 what I was trained in. 11 That bay would flush normally, and naturally. 12 The flushing that you're encouraging with the 13 breaches, those are not natural flushing. 14 You're adding higher salinity waters than 15 were natural to the bay, so you're going to impact a 16 whole host of species that aren't going to be able 17 to survive in high salinity, and are creating all 18 kinds of problems that we just talked about. 19 So, it's not the natural process, so to 20 speak. You're growing to wipe out species that 21 you -- that are there now. 22 And maybe we shouldn't. 23 You know, maybe they're no longer good clam 24 beds. Maybe they're -- because of the salinity, 25 it's going to change. 1 With the natural predators that were there, 2 you're growing to upset a whole bunch of ecosystems 3 with these breaches if they're not filled in. 4 They weren't there before. 5 What evolved over time, was that that bay was 6 flushing. 7 Maybe not as quickly as it will now, with the 8 breaches present, but I don't know that you really 9 want that. 10 From a biological point of view, if you talk 11 about species to be maintained, and you want to keep 12 ecosystems, these breaches were not natural. 13 They were created by a storm, and whatever 14 was there before is going to go away, because 15 they're not going to -- it's not going to be 16 suitable -- the environment is no longer going to be 17 suitable for what's coming. 18 So I think we got to be careful when we say 19 we're going to let it happened, and leave it there. 20 And then, on the other hand, say, we're for 21 maintaining natural species and maintaining 22 ecosystems, because that breach is going to upset a 23 whole bunch of ecosystems. 24 NATE WOIWODE: From the perspective of the 25 conservancy, the process of breaching and closing, 1 and breaching and closing, we consider that a 2 natural process, the -- you know, the maintenance of 3 existing channels, and sort of permanently 4 established. 5 We recognize that the system is not pristine 6 in -- and, you know, many of the systems we work in 7 are not pristine. 8 So from our perspective, with regard to this 9 specific breach, and I think really the question 10 then becomes: 11 How do we evaluate future circumstances? 12 How do we look at what the impacts down the 13 road might be? 14 And as Jay referred to, the answer depends on 15 where everything ends up. 16 But, with regard to this specific breach, our 17 perspective, is that it should remain open as long 18 as it can. 19 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Thank you very much, 20 gentlemen. 21 Appreciate your time. Appreciate your input. 22 Our last speaker will be the city manager of 23 the city of Long Beach, Jack Schnirman. 24 Jack, you want to come on up. 25 You get the chance to pick a chair. 1 Whatever is warmest or best fit you. 2 JACK SCNIRMAN: Thank you, Senator. 3 And thank you for the invitation to testify 4 today for the Senate Investigations and Government 5 Operations Committee. 6 I'm honored, on behalf of Long Beach and 7 other affected coastal communities, to have a chance 8 to share with you our thoughts about the 9 storm-preparedness response, recovery, mitigation, 10 as well as our recommendations, going forward. 11 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Just for the record, 12 other cities -- other villages were invited. 13 Some declined, some -- and could not make it, 14 for various reasons, but are sending reports, and 15 are sending testimony, for the -- for their input to 16 the process; so we will have other input from other 17 communities. 18 JACK SCNIRMAN: Okay, very good. 19 Very good. 20 I want to begin with a thank you to you, and 21 the Committee, and to the State Senate "Sandy" Task 22 Force who has come down as well, and we've had an 23 opportunity to speak with, as well as a thank you to 24 our home-state senator, Dean Skelos, who's been 25 absolutely phenomenal in working with us, post 1 storm, and the various other officials; the 2 Governor, of course; our county executive; and the 3 other state, local, and county officials, who have 4 been so helpful during this difficult time, both in 5 providing resources, in coming to visit, and being a 6 truly integral part of our emergency response, as 7 well as our recovery. 8 Obviously, "Sandy" was a one-of-a-kind storm, 9 for Long Beach, we hope. 10 But in listening to the previous 11 conversation, we all, obviously, have to be aware of 12 the potential for, certainly, future storms, given 13 the volatility that we're seeing in weather 14 patterns. 15 To share with you a little bit about what we 16 experienced in Long Beach: 17 We had thorough preparation efforts that 18 began several days prior to the storm; 19 We instituted our response plans; 20 We delivered advanced notice to our residents 21 to evacuate, communicated in a variety of ways; 22 everything from robocalls via our Swift911 system, 23 to texts and e-mails, radio, TV, newspapers, our 24 website, and social media; 25 And we also -- and in conjunction with the 1 county, we offered -- we ordered a mandatory 2 evacuation. 3 And then the storm hit, and as has famously 4 been reported, the ocean met the bay in Long Beach, 5 resulting in catastrophic flooding. 6 A recovery effort began immediately, securing 7 assistance from all levels of government, and this 8 superstorm brought about a variety of obstacles. 9 There was a commute -- a complete 10 communications cutoff with our city. 11 In a world where we rely so much on cell 12 phone, TV, and computer for communication, we had to 13 resort to extreme alternate forms of communication. 14 Literally, police on bull horns in the 15 streets; 16 Ultimately, flyers, when we were able to get 17 back the technological capacity to produce them; 18 And large signs to deliver timely information 19 to the public. 20 As we went into the second and third day 21 after the storm, and we restored some communications 22 ability, we then began to communicate daily, or more 23 so, with our residents, via Swift911 calls, and 24 various updates, as we stated. 25 And I'd be remiss if I -- in discussing 1 emergency response if I didn't mention the heroic 2 efforts of our city first responders, our police, 3 our fire, as well as all those in uniform that came 4 to our aid in our time of need. 5 In Long Beach, we're a little bit unique, in 6 that we are the only city, I believe, in 7 New York State located entirely on a barrier island. 8 Our emergency response was successful. 9 We saw good coordination under one single 10 unified Long Beach command. 11 Variety, including a variety of agencies from 12 an incident-management team, provided through the 13 State of New York, which we are extremely grateful 14 for, that the Governor and our -- and State 15 Senator Skelos helped secure for us, to all the 16 different various agencies that showed up, again, 17 all under unified Long Beach command, we saw a 18 disciplined battle rhythm, which enabled us to 19 approach emergency response in a thoughtful, 20 methodical structured way, and we were able to 21 marshal, as I mentioned, tremendous resources and 22 assets to assist us with our emergency response and 23 recovery. 24 And, now, as we -- as we look at long-term 25 recovery, we have identified six recommendations for 1 this Committee to assist, not only Long Beach, but 2 other affected barrier communities. 3 These recommendations address both our 4 long-term needs, mitigation, and preparation for 5 future storms. 6 They are certainly not all-inclusive; 7 however, it is our belief, in Long Beach, that they 8 focus on some of the highlighted items that are 9 truly the big-ticket things that need to be 10 addressed during -- during this time. 11 So, without further ado, I will get into our 12 six recommendations. 13 Number 1: There needs to be a focus on 14 mitigation; truly protecting and hardening critical 15 infrastructure. 16 Mitigation is certainly not a new topic to 17 those of us who have been involved, including 18 yourself, in storm response right now, but we know 19 that, you know, other communities such as ours were 20 affected. 21 We have a variety of tremendous impacts that 22 we had. 23 As a barrier island, we had, due to limited 24 resources, truly aging infrastructure, and that's 25 going to need to be addressed in order to live up to 1 the mantra that we've all said of rebuilding 2 stronger, smarter, and safer. 3 One of Long Beach's major issues before, 4 during, after, the storm continues to be this aging 5 infrastructure. 6 Our sewer plant went down. 7 Our water plant went down. 8 Obviously, we, like many others, lost power. 9 Essential city buildings sustained 10 substantial damage. 11 And now, like everywhere else, you know, due 12 to the -- to good, and often heroic efforts by many, 13 all of these facilities are up and running. 14 However, in all candor, they're up and 15 running in a makeshift fashion, you know, pardon the 16 expression, with bubble gum and duct tape. 17 So we know that it's going to take a 18 tremendous amount of resources to truly address the 19 long-term fixes for these aging facilities, as well 20 as truly hardening them, and mitigating against 21 future storms. 22 We know that we have, as others do, 23 facilities along the water, along the north shore of 24 our barrier island, particularly, where there is 25 limited bulkheading at best. 1 We know that we have learned lessons, as many 2 have, that these facilities, or certainly 3 generators, have to be elevated in order to protect 4 against flooding, and catastrophic flooding. 5 And for us, we -- we experienced a variety of 6 facilities, where not only did we lose power, but 7 our backup generators, which often are the size of a 8 tractor-trailer, experienced flooding where they 9 were up to six feet in water. 10 And so, when the backup generators fail, then 11 that's a real challenge, because that's not just a 12 generator on the back of a pickup truck that, you 13 know, shows up in an hour. 14 That's a major endeavor. 15 And we're so thankful that we were able to 16 summon those resources to get additional backup 17 generators, but I think, you look at a situation 18 where we really see a challenge ahead of us, not 19 only here -- not only for us in Long Beach, but on a 20 regional level, to look at critical infrastructure 21 and harden it. 22 Secondly -- 23 Go ahead. 24 SENATOR MARCELLINO: In your definition of 25 "hardening" -- excuse the interruption -- 1 JACK SCNIRMAN: Of course. 2 SENATOR MARCELLINO: -- but in your 3 definition of "hardening," does that also include 4 moving? 5 JACK SCNIRMAN: I think that's certainly an 6 option that needs to be looked at. 7 I think that there will need to be folks that 8 look at each individual facility, how best to harden 9 it; whether it should be moved or elevated. 10 I think there's a variety of things that need 11 to be considered, and I think all options should be 12 on the table. 13 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Do you have a -- do you 14 have a -- if someone said, move your sewage 15 treatment plant, do you have another place that it 16 could be moved to, or is that just pie in the sky? 17 JACK SCNIRMAN: I think, at this point, it's 18 too early to tell. 19 We've been so focused on, you know, recovery 20 at this point, that I don't think that I yet have 21 enough data to offer a real informed recommendation 22 on that. 23 But I think it's got to be looked at very -- 24 very comprehensively. 25 And -- and in so doing, you know, we've 1 already begun to explore the potential of 2 partnerships with the County, to work together on 3 some of these things, to take a really regional 4 approach. 5 Something -- so, some things need to be 6 hardened, some things ought to be moved, some things 7 ought to be partnered up with, and some things, you 8 know, I think will need some outside expertise to 9 tell us what the best course of action will be. 10 Moving forward to the second recommendation: 11 Establishing the FEMA match. 12 It is absolutely critical that the State 13 percentage and the federal percentage match is 14 declared and delineated. 15 Now that the House of Representatives came to 16 their senses and passed the "Sandy" Relief Bill, and 17 we're all, obviously, relieved about that, really, 18 the question, going forward, is: What's the match 19 look like? 20 To give you a sense of the proportion: 21 Long Beach has, approximately, an $85 million 22 budget. 23 We saw impacts from "Hurricane Irene" of 24 approximately $2 million, which were very 25 significant for us. 1 We're looking at, for "Sandy," well over 2 $200 million. 3 It's 100 times greater. It's 2 1/2 times our 4 annual budget. 5 So if you were to take 12 1/2 percent of a 6 local match for that, that would be enough to, 7 literally, you know, put the city -- put cities like 8 Long Beach out of business. 9 And so that, obviously, is a non-starter, and 10 needs to be looked at now, going forward. 11 We see the money coming in the bill. 12 We need to identify what is the -- what's the 13 match going to be? 14 What are local municipalities, that are 15 already cash-strapped throughout the state, and that 16 have just taken a big hit in this storm, what are we 17 going to be on the hook for, financially? 18 And I would submit, on behalf of our 19 residents, that we certainly -- and our taxpayers, 20 certainly can't afford some sort of catastrophic 21 financial impact after we've already had a 22 catastrophic physical impact. 23 Moving forward to Recommendation Number 3: 24 Cutting through the red tape. 25 A really terrific precedent and template was 1 set for this earlier, by -- with cooperation between 2 the federal government and the state government. 3 Senator Schumer worked very hard to move some 4 mountains, to get money from FEMA allocated to the 5 State of New York quickly. 6 Governor Cuomo and the State Senate, and 7 others, did a terrific job in cutting through the 8 red tape, to then get it from the State, directly to 9 us, as a municipality, right away, in an expedited 10 fashion as well. 11 And for that we're tremendously grateful. 12 We saw $24 million flow into the city. 13 I know $16 million has flowed into 14 Nassau County. 15 And those have been very helpful as a 16 down payment, if you will, to help us keep the 17 lights on, as part of our recovery process. 18 And while it's just the beginning, it's very 19 helpful, as a municipality, to have that -- and 20 necessary, to have that liquid capital as you begin 21 the recovery. 22 But now as we go forward, we need to continue 23 that good work in cutting through the red tape, and 24 making sure that the funding that comes from the 25 "Sandy" bill gets where it needs to go in an 1 expedited fashion. 2 It's important that those funds are flexible, 3 and that they include economic-development funding. 4 I know that, coming through the 5 Economic Development Agency in the federal 6 government, and the Community Development Block 7 Grant Program, are ways that have been done in the 8 past, in order to make sure that they get to the 9 necessary infrastructure, as well as, businesses and 10 homeowners need to get back in their businesses and 11 homes in an expedited fashion. 12 And, so, that's critical for us. 13 And then, as we look at the long term -- or I 14 should say, I'll begin with the medium term, for a 15 city like Long Beach, it's crucial that we see those 16 resources flow into the city immediately, to shoot a 17 shot of adrenaline into the city before our summer 18 season. 19 And with many coastal communities that are 20 affected, we're also seasonal communities; and our 21 businesses, our restaurants, our hotel, all rely on 22 revenue that comes in on a seasonal basis. 23 So it's critical that we see resources now, 24 so that we can ensure a good summer season, so that 25 we can say: The restaurants are open. The beach is 1 open. Long Beach is a great place to come, as are 2 other coastal communities, to come and spend time in 3 your summer. 4 And the economy, you know -- the economy 5 thrives, or at least sustains itself locally. 6 Those jobs that are needed, you know, they're 7 there for our residents, and so on and so forth. 8 I would also include under this, our -- 9 obviously, our hospital, on a local basis, which 10 is -- which took a tremendous catastrophic impact as 11 well. 12 It's our biggest employer in the city, at 13 over 1,200 employees, and it was along the north 14 shore, with limited bulkheading. 15 And, it's going to be a major effort and 16 endeavor to get it back up and running. Only 17 limited functions are running now. 18 And those are jobs, and residents that need 19 those jobs, and that's crucial; that we, as a city, 20 need the ability to have a local facility where we 21 can run our ambulances to, as well as have that 22 major source of employment, quite frankly. 23 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Where are you taking 24 them now? 25 Where are you taking your emergency people 1 now? 2 JACK SCNIRMAN: Right now, with the help of 3 the State, who has provided ambulances to us, we 4 have additional ambulances in the city right now 5 that are running our residents outside of the city 6 to other available hospitals, whether they be south 7 Nassau, or Mercy, or so on and so forth. 8 We have additional ambulances because, 9 obviously, the turnaround time is increased if 10 you're running farther outside the city. 11 And that's, obviously, a major concern. 12 And, finally, also under the -- you know, 13 under the banner of economic development, you have 14 the longer-term piece, which is a major -- a major 15 challenge, both, on the local level, certainly on 16 the county level, but on the state level very much 17 as well, to be addressed through the ESDC, and other 18 places, which is, to take the moment when coastal 19 communities have been affected by a storm, and make 20 sure that we rebuild a smarter way, and that we 21 maximize our assets, in order to ensure that we're a 22 good place to invest, both with government assets, 23 in the sense of hardening our infrastructure, as we 24 discussed before, but it's a good place for private 25 investment as well. 1 And, so, if you look at a city look ours, we 2 are a good place to invest, and this is a good time 3 to invest, if we do, in conjunction with the State 4 and the County, the things that we all know we need 5 to do of protecting the beach, protecting the bay, 6 encouraging residents to elevate homes to FEMA 7 standards, and so on and so forth. 8 If we don't do those things, we're not a good 9 place to invest. 10 So that brings me to the fourth 11 recommendation, which is: A true office of 12 emergency management. 13 We obviously all saw the need for emergency 14 management at the time of the storm. 15 Nassau County, OEM located in Bethpage, was a 16 tremendous success. And that -- that under the 17 leadership of County Executive Mangano, worked very 18 well during the time of the emergency response. 19 But we found, on the local level, as I know 20 others did, that we truly had a lack of equipment, 21 leaving us in a precarious position during the 22 immediate phases of emergency response, that we were 23 ultimately able to rectify with assistance from 24 Nassau, OEM, and the State. 25 So we look at, you know, the State -- the 1 State really has a role, going forward, in helping 2 us, in terms of grant funding for basic OEM 3 equipment, to coordinate first responders; to make 4 sure that there's always a way to communicate and 5 coordinate amongst first responders; there's always 6 a way for good information to be sent and received. 7 Things like satellite phones, and 8 televisions, and all of that, so that when you see 9 power break down and mobile cell towers break down, 10 you don't lose the ability to coordinate in time of 11 response. 12 So, it's important that we have that -- those 13 abilities up and running. 14 Number 5: Broader communications for 15 residents. 16 We saw in the immediate aftermath of the 17 storm, when communications are down, phone lines are 18 down, there needs to be a place for folks to go. 19 The State Senate wisely invested in 211 as a 20 service. 21 And I would submit that that investment needs 22 to be continued, and perhaps increased, going 23 forward, and even better advertised. 24 As that function of a centralized place for 25 residents to call, and refer them for all of their 1 needs, a place where the phone will always be 2 answered, even when everything else is down, that is 3 absolutely -- and we saw that it was absolutely just 4 critical. 5 And a way to coordinate amongst, not only 6 levels of government, but all of those volunteer 7 agencies and social-service organizations that 8 provide things for our residents during difficult 9 times. 10 So, having that up and running is just 11 absolutely crucial. 12 And it is up and running now, but it's, 13 obviously, something to mention, to support, going 14 forward. 15 And then, finally: Cell phone service and 16 mobile cell phone towers. 17 We're obviously so dependent upon cell phone 18 technology now. 19 I know many have no land line anymore, and 20 when cell phone service goes down, the ability to -- 21 you know, to reach out and ask for help, and report 22 things, are gone. 23 We experienced a situation, where a woman's 24 mother died of natural causes in the days following 25 the storm -- 1 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Jack, we're going to 2 have to hold on one second. 3 They have to make a tape change. 4 [Pause in the proceeding.] 5 [The hearing resumed, as follows:] 6 JACK SCNIRMAN: In speaking about the 7 importance of cell phone service and mobile cell 8 phone towers, to illustrate the necessity: 9 We experienced a situation where, in the days 10 after the storm, there was an elderly woman who 11 passed away of natural causes, having nothing to do 12 with the storm. And her daughter had no way of 13 reaching anyone, in order to report the death, and 14 take all those necessary steps. 15 And, so, she said to walk about a mile and a 16 half from her home, to the mobile command center in 17 Long Beach, in order to just simply say, you know, 18 very humbly, My mother's passed, and I need some 19 help. 20 And so, you know, began a discussion about 21 the importance of mobile cell phone towers. 22 It was a heavy lift after the storm to move 23 in what's called "COWS," the mobile cell phone 24 towers from all the different carriers, to assist 25 first responders, and then, ultimately, our 1 residents, in being able to communicate with each 2 other. 3 And that's something that we can look at, 4 using all the authority of the State; I know the FCC 5 is being asked to look at this on the federal level, 6 by Senator Schumer; so that the next time there's a 7 crisis, folks are able to still get in touch with 8 each other. 9 So, those are our recommendations, you know, 10 just to give you a flavor of where we are, as a 11 representative sample, as -- of a barrier community 12 affected. 13 We're now moving into the long-term recovery 14 phase. 15 While we still do have some who are not yet 16 back in their homes, and they still have additional 17 cleaning and fixing of their homes to do, and 18 perhaps elevating of their homes, and similarly with 19 businesses, the action has obviously moved, from the 20 emergency response phase, through the recovery 21 phase. 22 And so it's moved, from our first responders, 23 to our building department. And our building 24 department, like other building departments around 25 the region, are being deluged with information 1 requests, and, How do we elevate our homes? How do 2 we get the proper permits? How do we do all those 3 things that we need to do? 4 And we're endeavoring to be as 5 resident-friendly and customer-friendly as possible 6 in expediting things for them. 7 I -- we made a variety of policy decisions to 8 do so. 9 And like other communities as well, we have 10 some major rebuilding to do. 11 We have a boardwalk to rebuild, and we've 12 begun that effort. 13 We have a beach to replenish. We need 14 additional assistance with that, from the State, as 15 well as from FEMA. 16 And, we have a beach to ultimately protect, 17 and we've begun to engage the Army Corps of 18 Engineers for that. 19 And we have a bay front to protect, and we've 20 begun to engage folks for that as well. 21 And we have, as I said, businesses that were 22 affected, and that need some assistance. 23 So, we've come a long way thus far. 24 We have a long way to go. 25 And we know that, working together, we will 1 continue -- we will be successful in long-term 2 recovery, as we have been throughout the emergency 3 response, and immediate recovery phases of the 4 response to "Sandy." 5 Thank you. 6 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Thank you. 7 And I do appreciate; I was at that task force 8 tour that we took. 9 We never got to Long Beach, but you were 10 there, you were testifying. 11 I couldn't stay for the entire thing, but I 12 saw what I saw in Freeport and Island Park, and 13 those areas. 14 Very damaging, very devastated. 15 What percentage of your properties were 16 damaged? 17 JACK SCNIRMAN: I would go so far as to say, 18 virtually, 100 percent of residents were affected by 19 the storm in some way. 20 Now, getting to the specifics of the 21 properties, it's almost impossible to say. 22 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Made unliveable? 23 JACK SCNIRMAN: Oh, small. 24 Small. 25 You're talking, short-term unliveable, 1 approximately 200 out of 10,000 homes. 2 But what that really means is: 3 Some were affected tremendously, 4 catastrophically, and that meant that they had to -- 5 you know, there has to be significant mitigation, 6 rebuilding, and elevation, muck-outs -- the whole 7 bit -- in order to get back to the home; 8 And some were, just, they needed electrical 9 work, they needed some -- you know, some work in 10 order to get back in the home. 11 So, right now, we're looking at a situation 12 where there's several hundred homes that still need 13 quite a lot of work before folks can move back in, 14 but it's certainly a small minority. 15 SENATOR MARCELLINO: And where -- I remember, 16 as I grew up in Far Rockaway, and Long Beach was 17 just across the bridge, but, we used to go to there 18 all the time, with the beach clubs, and the like. 19 Which side got the worst? 20 JACK SCNIRMAN: Ah, several -- unfortunately, 21 several sides. 22 So, the areas that were really hardest hit 23 included, the west end of Long Beach along the 24 beachfront, which, incidentally, is where I 25 personally live. 1 You saw places where there was sand as high 2 as 10 to 12 feet in the streets, several blocks into 3 the city. 4 You know, there used to be a phrase -- well, 5 there is still a phrase, where people talk about: 6 The magic and the wonder of sand in folks' shoes, 7 and that's what keeps you coming back to Long Beach 8 forever. 9 And now the running joke is, you know: We've 10 got sand in our homes. 11 So that was the west end. 12 The canal section of the city is tremendously 13 impacted as well. 14 The flooding there started over 24 hours 15 before the storm hit, and there's really a lack of 16 bulkheading there. 17 There was also a series of fires in the 18 canals during the storm, what started as car fires 19 throughout the city. 20 In some places -- in a place in the canals, 21 spread from home to home. 22 You saw a variety of homes burnt to the 23 ground. 24 And due to the heroic efforts of our 25 firefighters, though, we were able to contain those 1 fires with the first firefighters arriving, 2 literally, on a raft, to get water on the fire; 3 water that they used from the water in the streets, 4 actually. 5 And by containing those fires, they were able 6 to prevent a situation as catastrophic as what we 7 saw in Breezy Point. 8 So, you also had the canals, you know, just 9 catastrophically impacted there. 10 And then a variety of other places throughout 11 the city. 12 You saw the boardwalk, obviously, took 13 catastrophic damage, particularly on the east end of 14 the city. 15 And the flooding really comes from the bay. 16 So, we were hit all around, unfortunately. 17 The beach truly met the bay and there was 18 currents in the streets. 19 SENATOR MARCELLINO: If you had to give an 20 estimation or give a prediction, time frame, to get 21 yourself back to some kind of normalcy? 22 JACK SCNIRMAN: Well, right now, we're -- 23 right now, we're really a tale of two cities. 24 For many, they're back in their homes, the 25 businesses are open, and things are seeing a new 1 normal. 2 But for quite a few, as I mentioned, they're 3 still, you know, suffering from catastrophic 4 impacts. 5 So I think -- I think you're looking at a 6 period of months before some sort of normal-ish 7 equilibrium can be achieved in the city, and you're 8 looking at a truly long-term recovery and rebuilding 9 process throughout the city. 10 I think you'll see a variety of homes 11 throughout the city that were the one-story 12 bungalow-style homes, sometimes with a basement. 13 Ultimately, folks will decide to rebuild 14 them, or to elevate them, or to rebuild from 15 scratch. 16 So you'll see, you know, a significant amount 17 of turnover there. 18 We see a moving around of some of the 19 businesses throughout the city, which is, to some 20 extent healthy; from smaller spaces to larger 21 spaces, and larger spaces to smaller spaces. 22 And we want to encourage folks to do that, as 23 well as, really -- as a city, and working 24 regionally, really take a good look at where we are, 25 and make sure that, as we rebuild, we do so in a 1 thoughtful manner and maximize the assets that we do 2 have, and protect -- protect the residents and our 3 businesses, so that we can encourage full rebuilding 4 and aggressive investment. 5 SENATOR MARCELLINO: I'm assuming the 6 bulkheading is going to be a major problem, 7 replacement, increasing it, and so forth? 8 JACK SCNIRMAN: Yes. The bulkheading along 9 the north shore of Long Beach is a tremendous issue. 10 SENATOR MARCELLINO: What about your schools? 11 JACK SCNIRMAN: Say again? 12 SENATOR MARCELLINO: What about your schools? 13 JACK SCNIRMAN: I'm glad you brought that up. 14 We have several schools that are still closed 15 for repairs, including, West School, for example, 16 which I toured there the other day, took tremendous 17 damage. 18 And, we hope to see them up and running in 19 the near future. I know our school superintendent 20 has really done a terrific job making things move 21 quickly over there. 22 The schools were able to get up and running 23 relatively quickly after the storm. 24 And after the second storm, which we all now 25 kind of forget a little bit there, but there was 1 the -- 2 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Nor'easter. 3 JACK SCNIRMAN: -- bizarre, odd snowstorm 4 that came, you know, approximately a week after 5 "Sandy" hit, that really put us back into 6 emergency-response mode and put plows on the 7 streets, and saw, not only a mountain of sand in the 8 city, which we had been, but we now is a snow capped 9 mountain in the city, which was a very strange 10 experience. 11 But to fully answer your question: The 12 schools took significant impacts, and there are 13 several school facilities, including West School and 14 the administrative building, that are not yet open. 15 And -- 16 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Well, your high school's 17 right on the water, isn't it, on Reynolds Channel? 18 JACK SCNIRMAN: The high school is near 19 Reynolds Channel, correct. 20 Correct, that's back up and running. 21 SENATOR MARCELLINO: It's back up? 22 Are you planning, or are you looking at, any 23 changes in your zoning for building codes, 24 construction types, methodologies, material usages, 25 things like that? 1 Are you looking at any areas where you might 2 not want rebuilding to occur at all? 3 JACK SCNIRMAN: Well, we've already made one 4 zoning-code change, and I thank you for bringing 5 this up. 6 We made a zoning-code change, to cut through 7 the red tape, if you will, in order to allow folks 8 to rebuild their homes and elevate their homes to 9 FEMA standards. 10 It used to be that, if you wanted to elevate, 11 you had to go through the Zoning Board of Appeals 12 and go through that whole approval process, and, you 13 know, it's a few hurdles. 14 And, so, knowing that we wanted to encourage 15 people to do this, and to do it fast, we waived the 16 ZBA approval, unless they -- you know, unless they 17 have a truly unique situation, and the building 18 department can then trigger that still. 19 But -- so, we've already -- we've done that, 20 for starters. 21 I think we'll be looking -- to answer your 22 last question second, I don't think, at this time, 23 we see there -- we see that there's any place that 24 is not good for rebuilding within Long Beach, at 25 least. 1 And that what we saw, is that, those homes, 2 structures, facilities, that were properly built and 3 hardened and elevated and mitigated in whatever way, 4 you know, is recommended, they did great during the 5 storm. 6 Even with this storm that is -- that was the 7 330-year storm, we're told, those facilities did 8 great. 9 So, I think the lesson is, we just have to 10 encourage building properly, and it would be -- it 11 would be frustrating and foolish if we just went 12 back to the way things were. 13 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Well, that's to the 14 point; you simply can't let them rebuild simply as 15 they were -- 16 JACK SCNIRMAN: Exactly. 17 SENATOR MARCELLINO: -- because it wouldn't 18 work. 19 You're just going to have them -- you know, 20 the next storm is going to take them out again 21 anyway. 22 JACK SCNIRMAN: Right. 23 And I think as we go forward, you know, I 24 think we'll probably look at additional things, that 25 you bring up, regarding materials, and so on and so 1 forth. 2 And, you know, it's truly a -- you know, a 3 learning process for all, and an education process. 4 And we want to promote folks building, you know, 5 with the terms that we've all come to know, with -- 6 you know, resiliently, and in a sustainable fashion. 7 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Do you think the State 8 should offer flood insurance? 9 JACK SCNIRMAN: Sure. 10 [Laughter.] 11 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Somehow I thought that 12 would be the answer, but I just had to ask it 13 anyway. 14 [Laughter.] 15 JACK SCNIRMAN: I was looking for a more 16 deeper answer than that, but I don't know that I -- 17 that we really need one. 18 SENATOR MARCELLINO: There's no deeper 19 answer. 20 JACK SCNIRMAN: Yeah, exactly. 21 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Jack, thank you very 22 much for coming down. 23 I appreciate your testimony. 24 And, obviously, we're going to incorporate it 25 into there, and you will get a copy of the report. 1 JACK SCNIRMAN: Thank you so much, Senator. 2 I really appreciate the invitation and the 3 opportunity. 4 SENATOR MARCELLINO: This concludes the 5 hearing. 6 JOSEPH MADIGAN: Senator? 7 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Yeah? 8 JOSEPH MADIGAN: I'm Joe Madigan, the village 9 of Freeport. [Inaudible.] 10 SENATOR MARCELLINO: I was told you weren't 11 coming. 12 JOSEPH MADIGAN: They told me 2:30, 13 yesterday, when I got a call from my office. 14 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Come. 15 You're on the list, come. 16 JOSEPH MADIGAN: Thank you very much. 17 SENATOR MARCELLINO: No, thanks for coming. 18 JOSEPH MADIGAN: As I said, my name is 19 Joe Madigan. I'm the assistant superintendent of 20 the buildings of the village of Freeport, the 21 floodplain manager, and the mitigation coordinator. 22 As you know, the village of Freeport lies on 23 the south shore of Long Island. We're about 24 4.45 square miles. About one-third of the village 25 lies within the flood zone. 1 I have over 3,500 properties in that flood 2 zone, including businesses and residential. 3 Last year, as you know, we got hit by 4 Hurricane -- I mean, "Tropical Storm Irene," and 5 this year we got "Sandy"; "Hurricane Sandy." 6 Some of these people in the area just got 7 finished repairing their homes from the prior storm 8 from the year before. 9 We have a couple of things that we'd like to 10 recommend as far as mitigation activities. 11 We have three pump -- sewage pump stations in 12 the village of Freeport that are in the flood zone, 13 that became inoperable after the storm. They were 14 down for about a week. 15 We were probably about a day away from the 16 sewage backing up into the houses and businesses, as 17 is what happened in Island Park. 18 We also have a public-works facility. 19 It's, about, probably a half-acre square that 20 lies on Freeport Creek, which suffered significant 21 flooding. 22 We had to move over 81 vehicles, whether they 23 be payloaders, you know, backhoes, or trucks, and 24 cars. 25 One of the things we like to see to try to 1 get funded, and we've always had problems with 2 funding through FEMA on this, is bulkheading of 3 residential properties. 4 They don't consider it a mitigation activity; 5 although, they will fund in different riverine 6 areas. In the different parts of the country, they 7 will fund a sea wall or a dike or a, you know, dam 8 system. 9 We feel that they are, basically, a sea wall, 10 because the cost of repairing or replacing a 11 bulkhead is approximately $300 a linear foot, and a 12 lot of residents can't afford that. 13 At one time, we did have a bond initiative, 14 where we floated a bond, we picked out the ten worst 15 houses that had the severe bulkhead damage, and we 16 had those replaced with a bond. 17 The actual -- the bond, it was transferable. 18 It was assessed to the taxes, and you could transfer 19 it to property. 20 The problem with that, it was a public-works 21 project, so you had to build it to, basically, 22 overbuild it, where it cost so much, it wound up 23 costing about $450 a linear foot. 24 That really didn't work. 25 We're also considering raising. 1 Freeport's always been a pro-mitigation 2 community. We've elevated 26 houses in town through 3 what -- a coalition, HMGP, which has a mitigation 4 grant program with FMA, for mitigation-assistance 5 funding through the State and FEMA, in the past. 6 One of the things that I really want to talk 7 about is, ICC, which is, "increased cost 8 compliance," and substantial-damage estimates. 9 We've been working with FEMA. They've 10 trained us, in the last couple weeks, how to do 11 substantial-damage estimates. 12 And, it's their program. 13 You go out, you know, you do the values of 14 what's broken, you know, what has to be repaired, as 15 far as carpet, flooring, insulation, sheetrock, your 16 utilities, you know, your appliances, your doors, 17 your windows. 18 The way the program is written, it's almost 19 impossible not to trip a "50 percent rule" on that, 20 which makes you -- makes that homeowner available 21 for ICC funds, which is "increased cost compliance." 22 It's 50 percent damage of the structure 23 itself, minus the land value. 24 The problem, the catch to that is, is that 25 once you trip that 50 percent and we deem them a 1 "substantial damaged property," it allows them to 2 get up to $30,000 towards the mitigation projects, 3 like elevating the home and/or demolish it and 4 rebuild to the new codes, but, it costs about 5 $100,000, on average, to elevate a home. 6 Now, I've had some lively discussions this 7 past week with some FEMA representatives. And, I 8 was just down in Long Beach, they're going over some 9 of the same issues. 10 How do I tell a homeowner: You are now 11 mandated to elevate your property? 12 See, FEMA wants to come in with a workforce 13 and do substantial-damage estimates, to help us; 14 which is all fine and good, but they're going to be 15 doing it from the exterior, and they're going to be 16 using the Army Corps rule of thumb, which is, if 17 you've had two feet of water flooding level above 18 the slab, and three feet of water above a crawl 19 space, there's most likely going to be considered a 20 substantially damaged home. 21 Now, the homes, those 35 structures I've 22 mentioned, they have -- 3,500, they all received 23 anywhere from, two feet, to five or six feet of 24 water in their houses. 25 That's how impacted the village of Freeport. 1 Most of those areas are down south and they 2 were built on a marshland. 3 And, of course, they didn't have the codes in 4 place years ago like they do today. 5 Now, there is a disconnect in the system, 6 where, where does the homeowner get the extra money, 7 between the thirty and the hundred thousand dollars 8 to elevate that property? 9 Now, FEMA's answer is, you go to the SBA. 10 Most of those -- not to say most. 11 A lot of these people are getting denied 12 loans by the SBA. 13 So what do I tell these people? 14 You know, they want to come in and help us do 15 these substantial-damage estimates, which is great. 16 You know, I understand the concept, and I 17 understand -- I'd love to elevate every one of these 18 structures, but how do I tell a homeowner: You are 19 now mandated to elevate your building? 20 And then they tell us, if they don't do it, 21 that we have to go after them legally. 22 If we don't, they could suspend us from the 23 NFIP (National Flood Insurance Program). 24 We are a Class 7 in the Community Rating 25 System, which is a credit system, where everybody in 1 the village in the flood zone gets a 15 percent 2 reduction on their flood insurance. 3 It's 5 percent, working from 10, up; which is 4 one of the tops in the country. 5 Years ago, we were a project-impact 6 community, which is a model community that was given 7 for -- to eight communities in each state, because 8 of our pro-mitigation activities. 9 But what do I tell these people? 10 Where am I going to tell them to get the 11 extra $70,000? 12 There has to be some type of funding to get 13 them closer to that $100,000. 14 SENATOR MARCELLINO: How many of these people 15 have private insurance? 16 JOSEPH MADIGAN: Probably all of them, unless 17 they don't have mortgage. 18 There were some people who didn't -- that 19 didn't renew, thinking the flood after "Irene" was 20 not going to -- and they're mostly elderly people 21 that did that, who didn't renew their flood 22 insurance. 23 But, the flood insurance is going to give you 24 a max of two fifty, but what's happening is, they're 25 telling us we shouldn't be issuing permits to them 1 to rebuild their homes if they're going to be 2 substantially damaged. 3 Yet, by the time the HMGP money comes out, 4 it's going to be well over a year. 5 That money, we're still waiting on 6 applications from Irene. 7 So there's that gap there. 8 What do I tell these people they're gonna do? 9 And there has to be some type of an 10 additional funding source for them. 11 SENATOR MARCELLINO: If you're waiting for an 12 answer, don't. 13 JOSEPH MADIGAN: No, I don't expect an 14 answer. 15 I just think it's, you know, something that 16 has to be discussed, and brought to a different 17 level, because we're, I think, one of the first 18 communities that are being approached with this. 19 And I think your constituents in all the 20 other villages and towns and cities are all going to 21 be facing the same problems. 22 There's just some substantial-damage 23 estimate, where they're mandated now, and they've 24 got bring the house into compliance within 25 four years of the date of the "substantial damage" 1 letter being sent out. 2 SENATOR MARCELLINO: The option you're giving 3 is, one, you waive the whole thing, and say, 4 Go ahead and rebuild. 5 You run the risk of losing your coverage, as 6 you described, but you also run the problem of, the 7 next storm, which could be next year, or next month, 8 knocks the building down again anyway. 9 JOSEPH MADIGAN: Right. 10 SENATOR MARCELLINO: So, it becomes a 11 never-ending cycle, until something is done. 12 Now, it's cold-hearted, I understand, but 13 some of these people are simply going to have to 14 leave those homes, because they're not going to be 15 able to do it. 16 JOSEPH MADIGAN: And I -- 17 SENATOR MARCELLINO: And you're not going to 18 be in a position of asking everyone else to foot the 19 bill, because that's what, basically, you're talking 20 about. 21 If you're talking about a State insurance 22 policy, that means all the taxpayers of the state 23 are going to pay. 24 We've got people upstate, where you have an 25 income that's significantly less than the income 1 down here, and they're not going to be too willing 2 to do that. 3 Just like you're seeing the debate at the 4 federal level. 5 For, you know, "Katrina," in ten days, they 6 got help. 7 Here, it's 80 days, and we're still talking. 8 And you see a big argument in the Senate as 9 to: 10 Well, do you really need this? 11 What are the offsets? 12 We don't have the money, because the economy 13 isn't what it once was. 14 So, you know, I mean, there's no good answer 15 here. 16 And there certainly is no immediate answer 17 that I can see coming, because the State of New York 18 is not in the position to pick this up at this time. 19 JOSEPH MADIGAN: No, I understand that. 20 SENATOR MARCELLINO: So it becomes a serious 21 problem for that. 22 People who gave it up, they were saving some 23 money. They thought they could save some money by 24 giving up their flood insurance, and they would have 25 a little more money in their pockets, I understand 1 that decision, but that was a decision that they pay 2 for now. 3 JOSEPH MADIGAN: Right. 4 SENATOR MARCELLINO: So it's -- again, 5 there's no easy answer here. 6 JOSEPH MADIGAN: No, I understand that. 7 And the State, and especially, you know, the 8 State of Office Emergency Management has always been 9 great for Freeport. 10 You know, like I said, we've received 11 considerable funding for elevations projects and/or 12 road-elevation projects. 13 I just -- 14 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Now you've got to 15 elevate your power plant, you've got to elevate your 16 sewage plant. You got to -- the city itself has 17 major problems -- 18 JOSEPH MADIGAN: Yes. 19 SENATOR MARCELLINO: -- from what I saw when 20 I was there recently. 21 Your city had serious problems. 22 You still don't have a village hall that's 23 functional. 24 They were working out of trailers, and that's 25 not the best thing in the world to do. 1 JOSEPH MADIGAN: Yes. 2 SENATOR MARCELLINO: So, you know, everybody 3 in the village has major problems. 4 And as you heard from Long Beach, he's got 5 serious problems. 6 And Nassau County has got serious problems. 7 So has Suffolk, and all the villages in 8 between, and also on the south shore. 9 So it's a -- there's no one big answer here, 10 but, something to talk about. 11 JOSEPH MADIGAN: Okay. 12 Thank you, Senator. 13 SENATOR MARCELLINO: Thank you for coming. 14 Appreciate it. 15 JOSEPH MADIGAN: Thank you. 16 SENATOR MARCELLINO: That ends the hearing at 17 this point in time. 18 I'd like to thank my Committee staff, 19 Debbie Peck Kelleher and Rob Barker, for their 20 efforts. 21 And I would also like to add my thanks, for 22 the record, to those first responders, who, in every 23 community, went out and did what I consider yeoman's 24 work, heroic work, in keeping people alive, and 25 keeping things going. 1 It was the fire department in the village of 2 Asharoken and Eatons Neck that kept that road open 3 so that the people from Eatons Neck could get in and 4 out, and emergency services could get in and out. 5 Those plows were out, moving sand, keeping 6 the road open, when it was closed and breached by 7 the water, during the storm. 8 Ambulances were moved during the storm, by 9 first responders, emergency-services systems, 10 police, and fire. 11 All of them were out there. 12 Municipal workers, out there working. 13 It was a tremendous effort put out by the 14 people of Nassau and Suffolk County, and the people 15 of New York State, who showed some really excellent, 16 excellent, excellent behavior in helping each other 17 out of a very, very difficult situation. 18 And as we've heard today in the testimony of 19 various people, it's still ongoing, and the recovery 20 is not complete, and not likely to be complete for 21 some significant time frame. 22 So, again, I want to thank all the first 23 responders, and thank everyone who testified. 24 And we will make a report, and that report 25 will be made public, and put online, and made 1 available for anybody who wants it. 2 Thank you. 3 The meeting is adjourned. 4 (Whereupon, at approximately 2:27 p.m., 5 the public hearing held before the New York State 6 Senate Standing Committee on Investigations and 7 Government Operations, concluded, and adjourned.) 8 9 ---oOo--- 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25