STATE OF NEW YORK ________________________________________________________________________ 1910 2017-2018 Regular Sessions IN ASSEMBLY January 17, 2017 ___________ Introduced by M. of A. PAULIN, COLTON, SKOUFIS, MONTESANO, GOTTFRIED, OTIS, GRAF, CROUCH, SCHIMMINGER, BLAKE, HOOPER -- Multi-Sponsored by -- M. of A. ABBATE, ENGLEBRIGHT, GARBARINO, LUPARDO, MAGEE, RIVERA, THIELE -- read once and referred to the Committee on Codes AN ACT to amend the penal law, in relation to murder in the first degree The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assem- bly, do enact as follows: 1 Section 1. Section 10.00 of the penal law is amended by adding a new 2 subdivision 22 to read as follows: 3 22. "Member of the military or reserves" means (a) a member of the 4 United States army, navy, air force, marines, coast guard, army national 5 guard, air national guard and/or reserves thereof or (b) a member of the 6 New York guard or the New York naval militia. 7 § 2. Section 125.27 of the penal law, as added by chapter 367 of the 8 laws of 1974, subdivision 1 as amended by chapter 1 of the laws of 1995, 9 subparagraph (ii-a) of paragraph (a) of subdivision 1 as added by chap- 10 ter 1 of the laws of 2013, subparagraph (vii) of paragraph (a) of subdi- 11 vision 1 as amended by chapter 264 of the laws of 2003, subparagraph 12 (xii) of paragraph (a) of subdivision 1 as amended and subparagraph 13 (xiii) of paragraph (a) of subdivision 1 as added by chapter 300 of the 14 laws of 2001, is amended to read as follows: 15 § 125.27 Murder in the first degree. 16 A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when: 17 1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes 18 the death of such person or of a third person; and 19 (a) Either: 20 (i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision 21 [34] thirty-four of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was 22 at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his or 23 her official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have 24 known that the intended victim was a police officer; or EXPLANATION--Matter in italics (underscored) is new; matter in brackets [ ] is old law to be omitted. LBD02163-01-7

A. 1910 2 1 (ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a 2 of subdivision twenty-one, subdivision twenty-three, twenty-four or 3 sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the 4 criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the 5 course of performing his or her official duties, and the defendant knew 6 or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such a 7 uniformed court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or employee 8 of the division for youth; or 9 (ii-a) the intended victim was a firefighter, emergency medical tech- 10 nician, ambulance driver, paramedic, physician or registered nurse 11 involved in a first response team, or any other individual who, in the 12 course of official duties, performs emergency response activities and 13 was engaged in such activities at the time of killing and the defendant 14 knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such 15 firefighter, emergency medical technician, ambulance driver, paramedic, 16 physician or registered nurse; or 17 (iii) the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional 18 institution or was an employee of a local correctional facility as 19 defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, who 20 was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his 21 or her official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have 22 known that the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional 23 institution or a local correctional facility; or 24 (iv) at the time of the commission of the killing, the defendant was 25 confined in a state correctional institution or was otherwise in custody 26 upon a sentence for the term of his or her natural life, or upon a 27 sentence commuted to one of natural life, or upon a sentence for an 28 indeterminate term the minimum of which was at least fifteen years and 29 the maximum of which was natural life, or at the time of the commission 30 of the killing, the defendant had escaped from such confinement or 31 custody while serving such a sentence and had not yet been returned to 32 such confinement or custody; or 33 (v) the intended victim was a witness to a crime committed on a prior 34 occasion and the death was caused for the purpose of preventing the 35 intended victim's testimony in any criminal action or proceeding whether 36 or not such action or proceeding had been commenced, or the intended 37 victim had previously testified in a criminal action or proceeding and 38 the killing was committed for the purpose of exacting retribution for 39 such prior testimony, or the intended victim was an immediate family 40 member of a witness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and the 41 killing was committed for the purpose of preventing or influencing the 42 testimony of such witness, or the intended victim was an immediate fami- 43 ly member of a witness who had previously testified in a criminal action 44 or proceeding and the killing was committed for the purpose of exacting 45 retribution upon such witness for such prior testimony. As used in this 46 subparagraph "immediate family member" means a husband, wife, father, 47 mother, daughter, son, brother, sister, stepparent, grandparent, step- 48 child or grandchild; or 49 (vi) the defendant committed the killing or procured commission of the 50 killing pursuant to an agreement with a person other than the intended 51 victim to commit the same for the receipt, or in expectation of the 52 receipt, of anything of pecuniary value from a party to the agreement or 53 from a person other than the intended victim acting at the direction of 54 a party to such agreement; or 55 (vii) the victim was killed while the defendant was in the course of 56 committing or attempting to commit and in furtherance of robbery,

A. 1910 3 1 burglary in the first degree or second degree, kidnapping in the first 2 degree, arson in the first degree or second degree, rape in the first 3 degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the 4 first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree or escape in 5 the first degree, or in the course of and furtherance of immediate 6 flight after committing or attempting to commit any such crime or in the 7 course of and furtherance of immediate flight after attempting to commit 8 the crime of murder in the second degree; provided however, the victim 9 is not a participant in one of the aforementioned crimes and, provided 10 further that, unless the defendant's criminal liability under this 11 subparagraph is based upon the defendant having commanded another person 12 to cause the death of the victim or intended victim pursuant to section 13 20.00 of this chapter, this subparagraph shall not apply where the 14 defendant's criminal liability is based upon the conduct of another 15 pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter; or 16 (viii) as part of the same criminal transaction, the defendant, with 17 intent to cause serious physical injury to or the death of an additional 18 person or persons, causes the death of an additional person or persons; 19 provided, however, the victim is not a participant in the criminal tran- 20 saction; or 21 (ix) prior to committing the killing, the defendant had been convicted 22 of murder as defined in this section or section 125.25 of this article, 23 or had been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense which, if 24 committed in this state, would constitute a violation of either of such 25 sections; or 26 (x) the defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner 27 pursuant to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting 28 torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death. As used in this 29 subparagraph, "torture" means the intentional and depraved infliction of 30 extreme physical pain; "depraved" means the defendant relished the 31 infliction of extreme physical pain upon the victim evidencing debase- 32 ment or perversion or that the defendant evidenced a sense of pleasure 33 in the infliction of extreme physical pain; or 34 (xi) the defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more addi- 35 tional persons within the state in separate criminal transactions within 36 a period of twenty-four months when committed in a similar fashion or 37 pursuant to a common scheme or plan; or 38 (xii) the intended victim was a judge as defined in subdivision twen- 39 ty-three of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law and the defendant 40 killed such victim because such victim was, at the time of the killing, 41 a judge; or 42 (xiii) the victim was killed in furtherance of an act of terrorism, as 43 defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 490.05 of this 44 chapter; [~~and~~] or 45 (xiv) the intended victim was a member of the military or reserves who 46 was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his 47 or her official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have 48 known that the intended victim was a member of the military or reserves; 49 and 50 (b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the 51 commission of the crime. 52 2. In any prosecution under subdivision one, it is an affirmative 53 defense that: 54 (a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional 55 disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the 56 reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a

A. 1910 4 1 person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the 2 defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall 3 constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, 4 manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the 5 second degree; or 6 (b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without 7 the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide. Noth- 8 ing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prose- 9 cution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second 10 degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree. 11 Murder in the first degree is a class A-I felony. 12 § 3. This act shall take effect immediately.

Relates to murder in the first degree

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