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S717Senate2021-2022 SessionSame asA1147

Toughen Reckless Driving Laws

Official title

“Redefines reckless driving to be dangerous driving”

Sponsor Andrew GounardesSD-22+3 co-sponsorsAffects Transportation
Status
In Senate Committee
Transportation
Impact
7/10
Significant
Passage
0%

Bill progress

Step 2 of 7

In committee · Transportation

What's happening

This bill redefines "reckless driving" as "dangerous driving," lowers the legal threshold for prosecution, and amends relevant laws accordingly.

Why it matters

  1. Lowers the bar for prosecution. The bill replaces the previous “reckless driving” standard—which, due to court interpretations, required proof of grossly blameworthy conduct or “aggravating factors”—with a broader “dangerous driving” standard. This makes it easier to prosecute drivers who operate vehicles in a way that unreasonably endangers others or fails to exercise ordinary due care, not just those who act with extreme recklessness.

  2. Expands criminal liability. Any person found guilty of dangerous driving who causes physical injury is automatically considered to have acted with criminal negligence and is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. This means that causing injury while driving dangerously now explicitly carries a more serious criminal consequence, even if the driver was not aware of the risk.

  3. Impacts insurance and employment. The definition change is incorporated into insurance and employment-related statutes. Drivers convicted under the new “dangerous driving” law may face higher insurance premiums, be disqualified from certain commercial driving positions, and have the offense considered in annual reviews by employers, making the consequences of violations more far-reaching in everyday life.

  4. Signals a shift in social and legal norms. By making it easier to charge and convict drivers for “dangerous driving,” the bill aims to deter a broader range of hazardous behaviors (like speeding or distracted driving) and elevate their seriousness in the public’s eyes—similar to the societal shift that made drunk driving socially unacceptable. This could lead to changes in driver behavior and, potentially, reductions in traffic injuries and fatalities.

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Who cares

  • Motorists and motorcyclists

    The bill would replace reckless driving with dangerous driving and make failure to exercise ordinary due care a misdemeanor.

  • Prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys

    The bill would eliminate any requirement to find that a driver perceived or created a risk of harm and would classify violations causing physical injury as criminal negligence and a class A misdemeanor.

  • Pedestrians and traffic safety advocates

    The bill seeks to deter dangerous driving by broadening the conduct covered by the offense and rejecting heightened culpability standards identified in prior court rulings.

  • Bus operators and bus drivers

    Motor carriers would have to consider dangerous driving, rather than reckless driving, in their annual reviews of bus drivers’ safety records.

Headline styles

Toughen Reckless Driving Laws

Plain English, a few words. Used as the page title.

Sponsors

Primary sponsor
Andrew Gounardes

Senator · Senate District 22

Chair, Budget And Revenue

History

  1. Referred to transportation
  2. Referred to transportation

Companion bill

The same bill in the other chamber. A bill becomes law when one version passes both houses and the governor signs it, so either number can carry it.

A1147Assembly

Redefine Reckless Driving Law

In Assembly Committee · Transportation · Sponsor Dan Quart

Impact 8 · Significant0% to pass

Full text

6 pagesUnderlined is new[Struck] is removedOfficial text on nysenate.gov ↗

STATE OF NEW YORK

717

2021-2022 Regular Sessions

IN SENATE (Prefiled)

January 6, 2021

Introduced by Sens. GOUNARDES, HARCKHAM, HOYLMAN, KAMINSKY -- read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Transportation

AN ACT to amend the vehicle and traffic law, the insurance law, the penal law, the uniform district court act, and the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to redefining reckless driving as dangerous driving

The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

Section 1. Legislative intent. The Legislature recognizes the heightened responsibility of operating a multi-ton car or truck and that such motor vehicle is a dangerous instrument under state law that, in an instant, can cause lethal physical harm. For example, when operating a car at 30 miles per hour the average risk of a pedestrian dying upon impact with such car is 40%, at 40 miles per hour the risk of death is 80%, and at speeds greater than 50 miles per hour the likelihood of death is near certain at nearly 100%.

When deaths resulting from alcohol-impaired driving were reduced from approximately 30,000 annually in the early 1980s across the United States to approximately 10,000 annually in recent years, that remarkable reduction was achieved in part by the certainty experienced by drivers that they would suffer legal consequences for driving impaired and risking the lives of themselves and others, resulting from changes in laws prohibiting impaired driving. However, that certainty does not exist for other types of dangerous driving. A 2016 survey by the National Safety Council showed that "[a]lthough 83% of drivers surveyed believe driving is a safety concern, a startling number say they are comfortable speeding (64%) [and] texting either manually or through voice controls (47%)," whereas far fewer (10%) say they are comfortable driving after they feel they've had too much alcohol. This shows that, while drunk

EXPLANATION--Matter in italics (underscored) is new; matter in brackets

[ ] is old law to be omitted.

LBD01696-01-1

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driving has become socially unacceptable, most other forms of dangerous driving have not, and New Yorkers are paying the price with lives lost and bodies and families shattered. Moreover, the New York City Department of Transportation estimated in 2010 that the annual cost of all traffic crashes just in New York City to be $4.29 billion annually, about 1% of the Gross City Product.

As evidenced by our country's experience combatting drunk driving, research has shown that perceived certainty of legal consequences is necessary to deter or prevent harmful acts, including dangerous driving. The original statutory language of the New York vehicle and traffic law section 1212 (VTL 1212), in and of itself, is favorable to a reasonable standard for reckless or dangerous driving, specifying that driving in a manner that "unreasonably interferes with" or "unreasonably endangers [others]" constitutes a violation of that section and is an unclassified misdemeanor. However, that reasonableness standard has subsequently been heightened, to an extreme level by New York judicial interpretations that require factors such as a finding of seriously blameworthy conduct (People v. Boutin and People v. Cabrera), an "affirmative act" by the driver (People v. Cabrera), a "gross deviation" from the standard of conduct a reasonable person would observe, and additional "aggravating factors" on behalf of the driver -- all judicial interpretations and elevated mens rea requirements not required by the original statutory text for vehicle and traffic law section 1212 Reckless Driving. This judicially imposed higher mens rea requirement fails to recognize the awesome responsibility that operating a multi-ton car or truck is and as a consequence, evidenced in part by the staggering injuries and deaths in our state, the statute has failed to achieve what it intended. Cars and trucks are dangerous instruments under state law and should be recognized as such when applying vehicle and traffic law section 1212. For these reasons the Legislature is disapproving of the holdings with regards to a motor vehicle operator's culpability and state of mind in People v. Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d 692 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y. 138, 183 N.E. 273 (N.Y. 1932); People v. Cabrera, 10 N.Y.3d 370 (N.Y. 2008) and People v. Goldblatt, 98 A.D.3.d 817 N.Y.S.2d 210 (3d Dept. 2012); and this legislation would correct the misapplication of vehicle and traffic law section 1212 in these rulings and restore the statute to its original intent, namely to deter and prevent dangerous operation of heavy motor vehicles that pose a daily threat to public health and risk the lives of New Yorkers throughout our state.

§ 2. Section 1212 of the vehicle and traffic law, as added by chapter 47 of the laws of 1988, is amended to read as follows:

§ 1212. [Reckless] Dangerous driving. [Reckless] Dangerous driving shall mean [driving] operating or using any motor vehicle, motorcycle or any other vehicle capable only of being propelled by any power other than muscular power or any appliance or accessory thereof in a manner which unreasonably interferes with the free and [proper] safe use of the public highway, [or] unreasonably endangers users of the public highway, or fails to exercise ordinary due care. [Reckless] Dangerous driving is prohibited. Every person violating this provision shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter or the penal law, every person violating this section and who causes physical injury to another person shall be found to have acted with criminal negligence under section 15.05 of the penal law and shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. A violation of this section does not require a finding of a minimum number of violations of law or a finding that a

S. 717 3

person was aware of, had perceived, or had created the risk of harm to another person.

§ 3. Section 509-e of the vehicle and traffic law, as amended by chapter 853 of the laws of 1975, is amended to read as follows:

§ 509-e. Annual review of driving record. Each motor carrier shall, at least once every twelve months, review the driving record of each bus driver it employs to determine whether that driver meets minimum requirements for safe driving and is qualified to drive a bus pursuant to section five hundred nine-b of this article. In reviewing a driving record, the motor carrier must consider any evidence that the bus driver has violated applicable provisions of the vehicle and traffic law. The motor carrier must also consider the driver's accident record and any evidence that the driver has violated laws governing the operation of motor vehicles, such as speeding, [reckless] dangerous driving, and operating while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, that indicate that the driver has exhibited a disregard for the safety of the public. Such information shall be recorded in the employer's record.

§ 4. Subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (a) of subdivision 4 of section 510-a of the vehicle and traffic law, as amended by section 1 of part C of chapter 58 of the laws of 2013, is amended to read as follows:

(ii) is defined as reckless or dangerous driving by state or local law or regulation;

§ 5. Paragraph 10 of subdivision (c) of section 516-b of the vehicle and traffic law, as added by chapter 731 of the laws of 1986 and as renumbered by chapter 298 of the laws of 1991, is amended to read as follows:

(10) [Reckless] Dangerous driving; and

§ 6. Subdivision 2 of section 530 of the vehicle and traffic law, as separately amended by chapters 571 and 732 of the laws of 2006, is amended to read as follows:

(2) Such license or privilege shall not be issued to a person who, within the four year period immediately preceding the date of application, has been convicted within or without the state of homicide or assault arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle, of criminally negligent homicide or criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle resulting in death, or has been convicted within the state of a violation of subdivision two of section six hundred of this chapter or of [reckless] dangerous driving. Such license or privilege shall not be issued to a person whose license or privilege, at the time of application, is revoked pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph (x) or (xi) of paragraph a of subdivision two of section five hundred ten of this chapter. Such license or privilege shall not be issued to a person whose license or privilege is suspended or revoked because of a conviction of a violation of subdivision one, two, two-a, three, four or four-a of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this chapter or a similar offense in another jurisdiction, or whose license or privilege is revoked by the commissioner for refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to subdivision two of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this chapter. Such license or privilege shall not be issued to a person who within the five year period immediately preceding the date of application for such license or privilege has been convicted of a violation of subdivision one, two, two-a, three, four or four-a of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this chapter or a similar alcohol-related offense in another jurisdiction, or whose license or privilege has been revoked by the commissioner for refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to subdivision two of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this chapter, except

S. 717 4

that such a license or privilege may be issued to such a person if, after such conviction or revocation, such person successfully completed an alcohol and drug rehabilitation program established pursuant to article thirty-one of this chapter in conjunction with such conviction or revocation. Provided, however, that nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting an operator from being issued a limited or conditional license or privilege pursuant to any alcohol rehabilitation program established pursuant to this chapter.

§ 7. Item (B) of subparagraph (i) of paragraph (d) of subdivision 1 of section 1696 of the vehicle and traffic law, as added by section 2 of part AAA of chapter 59 of the laws of 2017, is amended to read as follows:

(B) [reckless] dangerous driving in violation of section one thousand two hundred twelve of this chapter;

§ 8. Subparagraph (i) of paragraph (b) of subdivision 2 of section 1699 of the vehicle and traffic law, as amended by chapter 60 of the laws of 2017, is amended to read as follows:

(i) stands convicted in the last three years of: unlawful fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in violation of sections 270.35, 270.30 or 270.25 of the penal law, [reckless] dangerous driving in violation of section twelve hundred twelve of this chapter, operating while license or privilege is suspended or revoked in violation of section five hundred eleven of this chapter, excluding subdivision seven of such section, a misdemeanor offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this chapter, or leaving the scene of an accident in violation of subdivision two of section six hundred of this chapter. In calculating the three year period under this subparagraph, any period of time during which the person was incarcerated after the commission of such offense shall be excluded and such three year period shall be extended by a period or periods equal to the time spent incarcerated;

§ 9. Section 1810 of the vehicle and traffic law, as added by chapter 47 of the laws of 1988, is amended to read as follows:

§ 1810. Compensation of officers shall not depend upon apprehension or arrests. (a) No city or village shall employ any officer, agent or person whose compensation shall in any way depend upon the apprehension or arrest of any person or persons for violating any ordinance adopted pursuant to section sixteen hundred four of this chapter or for [reckless] dangerous driving as defined in section twelve hundred twelve of this chapter. If any person be apprehended or arrested or haled before a magistrate for a violation of a local ordinance adopted pursuant to section sixteen hundred four or for [reckless] dangerous driving as defined by section twelve hundred twelve of this chapter by any officer, agent or employee of any city or village who is so employed, the fact of such employment at the time shall be a defense to any charge made for violation of such ordinance or for [reckless] dangerous driving.

(b) No county or town shall employ any officer, agent or person, whether such employee be elected or appointed, whose compensation shall in any way depend upon the apprehension or arrest of any person for [reckless] dangerous driving as defined in section twelve hundred twelve of this chapter. If any person be apprehended or arrested or haled before a magistrate for [reckless] dangerous driving as so defined, by any officer, agent or employee of any county or town who is so employed, the fact of such employment at the time shall be a defense to any charge

S. 717 5

made for [reckless] dangerous driving as defined in section twelve hundred twelve of this chapter.

§ 10. Paragraph 3 of subsection (b) of section 2335 of the insurance law, as amended by chapter 277 of the laws of 2010, is amended to read as follows:

(3) operating a motor vehicle in excess of the speed limit, or [reckless] dangerous driving, or any combination thereof, on three or more occasions;

§ 11. Item (v) of subparagraph (A) of paragraph 3 of subsection (m) of section 3425 of the insurance law is amended to read as follows:

(v) operating a motor vehicle in excess of the speed limit, or [reckless] dangerous driving, or any combination thereof, on three or more occasions; or

Reflowed for reading: line numbers and page breaks removed. Cite the official text.

Sponsor's memo

Title of bill

An act to amend the vehicle and traffic law, the insurance law, the penal law, the uniform district court act, and the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to redefining reckless driving as dangerous driving

Purpose or general idea of bill

This bill will allow for the easier prosecution of dangerous driving by removing the burden of proving intent on the part of the driver from prosecutors.

Summary of provisions

Section one is a statement of legislative intent that acknowledges that the public perception of what is acceptable driving behavior has changed in the wake of "vision zero" initiatives. Section two amends Section 1212 of Vehicle Traffic Law to change the word "reckless" to "dangerous" which is more objective and tied to specific acts that cause physical harm. The final sentence, is meant to nullify the case law that has established the "rule of two" and required that drivers operate with "seriously blameworthy" conduct in ways that "grossly deviate" from the conduct a "reasonable" person would, creating an elevated recklessness mens rea standard that should not apply to this offense.

Read the full memo (898 words)

Section two of the bill amends Section 1212 of the Vehicle and Traffic law by changing the title of the Section from "reckless driving" to "dangerous driving." It further adds that drivers can be found to have driven dangerously if they failed to exercise ordinary due care. Final- ly, the Section explains that anyone found to have met the standard of dangerous driving as found in this section of the bill, shall be found to have acted with criminal negligence and shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. A violation of the section will not require a finding of a minimum number of violations of law or a finding that a person was aware of, had perceived, or had created the risk of harm to another person.

Section three of the bill amends Section 509-e of the Vehicle and Traf- fic Law to replace the word "reckless" with the word "dangerous."

Section four of the bill amends Subparagraph (ii) of Paragraph (a) of Subdivision 4 of Section 510-a of the Vehicle and Traffic Law to add the words "or dangerous."

Section 5 of the bill amends paragraph 10 of Subdivision (c) of

Section 516-b of the Vehicle and Traffic Law to replace the word "reck- less" with the word "dangerous."

Section 6 of the bill amends Subdivision 2 of Section 530 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law to replace the word "reckless" with the word "danger- ous."

Section 7 of the bill amends item (B) of Subparagraph (I) of Paragraph (d) of Subdivision *I of Section 1696 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law to replace the word "reckless" with the word "dangerous." Section 8 of the bill amends Subparagraph (i) or Paragraph (b) of Subdi- vision 2 of Section 1699 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law to replace the word "reckless" with the word "dangerous".

Section 9 of the bill amends Section 1810 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law to replace the word "reckless" with the word "dangerous".

Section 10 of the bill amends Paragraph 3 of Subsection (b) of Section 2335 of the Insurance Law to replace the word "reckless" with the word "dangerous."

Section 11 of the bill amends Item (v) of Subparagraph (A) of Paragraph 3 of Subsection (m) of Section 3425 of the Insurance Law to replace the word "reckless" with the word "dangerous."

Section 12 of the bill amends the opening Paragraph of Section 120.04-a of the Penal Law to replace the world "reckless" with the word "danger- ous."

Section 13 of the bill amends the opening Paragraph of Section 125.14 of the Penal Law to replace the word "reckless" with the word "dangerous."

Section 14 of the bill amends Section 270.25 of the Penal Law to replace the word "reckless" with the word "dangerous."

Section 15 of the bill amends Subdivision 1 of Section 2408 of the Uniform District Court Act to replace the word "reckless" with the word "dangerous."

Section 16 of the bill amends Subdivision 1 of Section 2411 of the Uniform District Court Act to replace the word "reckless" with the word "dangerous."

Section 17 of the bill amends Subdivision 1 of Section 19-506 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York to replace the word "reck- less" with the word "dangerous."

Section 18 sets the effective date.

Justification

This bill seeks to reverse decades of case history that has made the prosecution of dangerous driving nearly impossible due to the require- ment of prosecutors to not only prove that a motorist engaged in behav- ior that could cause physical harm but also to prove that a driver knew the behavior they were engaged in posed a threat and still acted danger- ously. This is the so called "rule of two which makes prosecution of dangerous driving behavior nearly impossible to prosecute. This bill will remove the burden on prosecutors to prove what a driver knew or their intent. This will apply a uniform standard to what is considered 'dangerous driving' and ensure that we have a criminal Class A misdemea- nor that can be applied to the majority of serious injury and fatal crashes resulting from such driving.

Prior legislative history

2020: S7894 - Referred to Transportation

Fiscal implications

None

Effective date

Immediate

Summaries, headlines and scores are AI-generated from the official bill text. How we score bills. Source: NYS Open Legislation.