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S2385Senate2023-2024 Session

Require Paper Ballots for Voting

Official title

“Relates to construction of voting machines and systems”

Status
In Senate Committee
Elections
Impact
7/10
Significant
Passage
0%

Bill progress

Step 2 of 7

In committee · Elections

What's happening

This bill requires New York voting machines to use durable paper ballots, prohibits certain electronic functions, and mandates hand-markable or accessible paper ballot options at all polling places.

Why it matters

  1. Mandates use of highly durable paper ballots. , ensuring ballots can withstand multiple hand or machine counts and remain legible for the legally required retention period. This can help prevent disputes over ballot damage or illegibility in close or contested elections.

  2. Strengthens voter privacy and ballot security. by requiring that voting machines and ballot marking devices are constructed to protect voter anonymity, prevent post-casting ballot alterations, and prohibit machines from encoding votes in ways (like barcodes or QR codes) that voters can't directly verify.

  3. Reduces vulnerability to hacking and errors. by explicitly banning any voting system that includes both ballot-marking and vote-tabulating or transmitting functions in the same device, and requiring that machines cannot transmit or receive data wirelessly or over the internet.

  4. Expands accessible voting options for all voters. , requiring every polling place to offer both hand-marked paper ballots and nontabulating ballot marking devices (which are essential for voters with disabilities), ensuring equal access and a verifiable paper trail for every vote.

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Headline styles

Require Paper Ballots for Voting

Plain English, a few words. Used as the page title.

Sponsors

History

  1. Referred to elections
  2. Referred to elections

Full text

3 pagesUnderlined is new[Struck] is removedOfficial text on nysenate.gov ↗

STATE OF NEW YORK

2385

2023-2024 Regular Sessions

IN SENATE

January 20, 2023

Introduced by Sens. MYRIE, ADDABBO, BAILEY, BRESLIN, BROUK, CLEARE, COMRIE, COONEY, GIANARIS, HARCKHAM, HINCHEY, HOYLMAN-SIGAL, JACKSON, KAVANAGH, KRUEGER, MAY, MAYER, PARKER, RIVERA, SALAZAR, SKOUFIS, STAVISKY -- read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Elections

AN ACT to amend the election law, in relation to construction of and requirements for voting machines and systems

The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

Section 1. Section 7-104 of the election law is amended by adding a new subdivision 28 to read as follows:

28. The ballot shall be marked or printed on durable paper. For purposes of this section, "durable paper" is defined as paper capable of withstanding multiple counts and recounts by hand or machine without compromising the fundamental integrity of the ballots, and capable of retaining the information marked or printed on such paper for the full duration of a retention and preservation period set forth in section 3-222 of this chapter.

§ 2. Subdivision 1 of section 7-200 of the election law, as amended by chapter 181 of the laws of 2005, is amended to read as follows:

1. The board of elections of the city of New York and other county boards of elections may adopt any kind of voting machine or system approved by the state board of elections, or the use of which has been specifically authorized by law; and thereupon such voting machine or system may be used at any or all elections and shall be used at all general or special elections held by such boards in such city, town or village and in every contested primary election in the city of New York and in every contested primary election outside the city of New York in which there are one thousand or more enrolled voters qualified to vote. [No more than two types of voting machines or systems may be used by any local board of elections at a single election.] Notwithstanding the

EXPLANATION--Matter in italics (underscored) is new; matter in brackets

[ ] is old law to be omitted.

LBD04070-01-3

other provisions of this subdivision, any local board of elections may borrow or lease for use on an experimental basis for a period of not more than one year each, voting machines or systems of any type approved by the state board of elections.

§ 3. Paragraphs b, e, j, s and t of subdivision 1 of section 7-202 of the election law, as added by chapter 181 of the laws of 2005, are amended and three new paragraphs u, v and w are added to read as follows:

b. permit a voter to vote for any person for any office, whether or not nominated as a candidate by any party or independent body [without the ballot, or any part thereof, being removed from the machine at any time];

e. provide the voter an opportunity to privately and independently mark and verify votes selected [and the] on an individual, voter-verifiable paper ballot and the ability to privately and independently change such votes or correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted, including by offering the voter a new paper ballot as many times as is allowed by statute or regulation. For the purposes of this subdivision, the term "individual, voter-verifiable paper ballot" means either: (i) a paper ballot marked by the voter by hand; or (ii) a paper ballot marked through the use of a nontabulating ballot marking device or system. For the purposes of this title, a "ballot marking device" is a device that provides voters, including voters with disabilities, the ability to mark votes on physical, paper ballots privately and independently. For the purposes of this title, a "nontabulating ballot marking device" is a ballot marking device that does not tabulate or transmit votes or retain any record of a voter's selections, other than the original paper ballot, after the voter has finished marking the paper ballot and using the device to review selections;

j. [retain all paper ballots cast or produce and retain a voter verified permanent paper record which shall be presented to the voter from behind a window or other device before the ballot is cast,] for ballot scanners, retain paper ballots in a manner intended and designed to protect the privacy of the voter; for nontabulating ballot marking devices, produce or process paper ballots in a manner intended and designed to protect the privacy of the voter; such ballots [or record] shall allow a manual audit and shall be preserved in accordance with the provisions of section 3-222 of this chapter;

s. permit alternative language accessibility pursuant to the requirements of section 203 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973aa-1a) such that it must have the capacity to display the full ballot in the alternative languages required by the federal Voting Rights Act if such voting machine or system is to be used where such alternative languages are required or where the local board deems such feature necessary; [and]

t. not include any device or functionality potentially capable of externally transmitting or receiving data via the internet or via radio waves or via other wireless means[.];

u. be constructed so that, after the paper ballot is cast by the voter, the voting machine or system never passes the cast ballot under a printer that can print votes onto the ballot, including as a result of unauthorized, malicious or faulty software or firmware;

v. be constructed so the configuration or functionality of a voting machine or system does not include, within the same physical device, both (i) ballot marking and (ii) tabulating or transmitting a voter's selections at any time or retaining any record of a voter's selections, other than the original paper ballot, after the voter has finished marking the paper ballot and using the device to review selections; and

w. not encode votes on a ballot, whether as a barcode, QR code or any kind of recording code that cannot be verified by the voter without using a code-reading device. For the purposes of this paragraph, a "code reading device" is a device that reads and translates coded marks like QR codes or barcodes into language that can be understood without any kind of device.

§ 4. Subdivision 4 of section 7-202 of the election law, as added by chapter 181 of the laws of 2005, is amended and a new subdivision 5 is added to read as follows:

4. Local boards of elections which obtain voting machines pursuant to this chapter [may determine to] shall purchase [direct recording electronic machines or optical scan machines] ballot scanners and nontabulating ballot marking devices in conformance with the requirements of this chapter.

5. Local boards of elections must provide every voter, at every polling place, both of the following options: (a) to hand mark a paper ballot; or (b) to use a nontabulating ballot marking device or system to mark a paper ballot. All paper ballots must be printed, scannable, and include all relevant contests and candidates.

§ 5. This act shall take effect immediately; provided, however, that any local board of elections that purchased voting machines or systems prior to such date which are not in compliance with the requirements of paragraph u or v of subdivision 1 and subdivision 4 of section 7-202 of the election law, may continue to use, maintain and replace such voting machines and systems, but may replace them only with identical model voting machines or systems made by the same manufacturer, or identical model voting machines or systems with de minimis changes in such voting machines' or systems' hardware, software, technical data package, or data, the nature of which will not materially alter the voting machines' or systems' reliability, functionality, capability, or operation; any de minimis changes shall be approved by the state board of elections.

Reflowed for reading: line numbers and page breaks removed. Cite the official text.

Sponsor's memo

Title of bill

An act to amend the election law, in relation to construction of and requirements for voting machines and systems

Purpose

To amend the requirements for voting machines and systems to ensure that the most secure and reliable voting machines and systems possible are being purchased and utilized throughout the state; that ballots are printed on durable paper; to outlaw direct electronic voting machines that do not utilize paper ballots; to give boards of election the flexi- bility to use more than two types of voting machines per election; and to give voters the option, at every polling place, to mark a paper ballot by hand or with a nontabulating ballot marking device.

Summary of provisions

Section 1 amends section 7-104 of the election law by adding a new subdivision 28, which will require ballots to be printed on durable paper and sets forth a definition of durable paper.

Read the full memo (1,229 words)

Section 2 amends subdivision 1 of section 7-200 of the election law as amended by chapter 181 of the laws of 2005 which eliminates the rule that local boards of election can only use two types of voting machines at a single election and allows for the use of any kind of voting machine or system approved by the state board of elections.

Section 3 amends paragraphs b, e, j, s, and t of subdivision 1 of section 7-202 of the election law as added by chapter 181 of the laws of 2005 which grants voters the right to vote independently and privately on an individually marked, voter verifiable paper ballot that is either hand-marked or marked using a nontabulating marking device, an provides for the retention of paper ballots to protect voter privacy. It also prohibits all in one voting machines that combine a printer and a scan- ner, voting machines that could add votes to the ballot when passed under the printer unauthorized by the voter to the ballot after after completion, and voting machines or systems from encoding votes with barcodes, QR codes and other recording codes that cannot be verified by the voter without a code-reading device.

Section 4 amends subdivision 4 of section 7-202 of the election law as added by chapter 18 of the laws of 2005, and amended a new subdivision 5 which requires local boards of election to purchase ballot scanners and nontabulating ballot marking devices and eliminates the option to purchase direct recording electronic voting machines, which do not produce paper ballots for use in audits. It also requires local boards of election to provide voters at every polling place with the option to either hand mark a paper ballot or use a nontabulating ballot marking device or system to mark a paper ballot.

Section 5 provides the effective date.

Justification

The threat of the hacking of the machines relied on for free, fair, and democratic elections is real and highlights the necessity of taking reasonable precautions to protect the right to vote. A United States Senate Intelligence Committee report released in July 2019 detailed that hackers had likely targeted election systems and machines in all 50 states both in 2016 and in the midterm elections of 2018. Many of those attempts at unauthorized access in at least two states were successful.

To provide New York State voters with confidence that their cast ballot will accurately reflect their preference, New York has instituted common sense reforms, including insistence on individual, durable, voter-veri- fied paper ballots as a backup to electronic voting through a machine. However, there are different types of machines that provide secure elec- tronic voting that also have a paper backup, and questions have been raised specifically about the security and potential physical flaws of hybrid voting machines, which combine a scanner and a ballot-marking device.

The intent of using a hybrid machine is to provide additional opportu- nities for the voter to verify his or her vote. A voter makes their selection on a screen, and then can either cast the vote 4s1S or print out a copy of their ballot to visually inspect it before running it through a scanner. For one such hybrid, the Dominion Imagecast Evolution ("Dominion ICE"), a potential flaw in its physical design has raised the specter that a hacked machine could be programmed to add marks to a cast ballot after it has been inspected by the voter, thereby changing the ballot contrary to the will of the voter. Andrew W. Appel, the Eugene Higgins Professor of Computer Science in the Department of Computer Science at Princeton University, published an online description of the flaw, specifically that in being scanned, the paper ballot passes a second time under the print heads. His concern was shared by Richard A. DeMillo, Charlotte B. and Roger C. Warren Distinguished Professor of Computing in the Department of Computer Science at the Georgia Institute of Technology, who wrote "absent a thorough and convincing design and code review-there is no way to be confident that the system is immune from the ballot stuffing attack he describes." Based on these published concerns, Douglas A. Kellner Co-Chair NYS Board of Elections requested that the Election Operations Unit of the State Board examine again the ImageCast Evolution to consider the vulnerability of the voting system because the printer could be programmed to add marks to ballots without verification by the voter. Dominion sent a letter touting the benefits of its hybrid machines, but did not specifically explain what they had already or would in the future do to make it physically impossible for an election fraud scenario as described by the professors to occur.

In New York State, 14 counties have purchased these specific hybrid machine models. There are approximately 1.3 million eligible voters who potentially could use these hybrid machines.

This bill would add the requirement to Election Law that any voting machine certified by State Board of Elections that utilizes a hybrid function should be constructed so that the paper path into the ballot box is physically separate from the printer path, so that it would be physically impossible for a ballot to go underneath a printer head after it has been cast by a voter.

Since the risk that an electronic voting machine could be hacked through malware or some other means can never be eliminated entirely, the least we can do is guarantee the physical security of paper ballots by ensur- ing it cannot physically be altered once cast by the voter.

Legislative history

S309-B of 2021-22: Passed Senate.

S6733 of 2019-20: Referred to Elections.

Fiscal implications

None.

Effective date

Immediately; provided, however, that any local board of elections that purchased voting machines or systems prior to such date which are not in compliance with the requirements of paragraph u or v of subdivision 1 and subdivision 4 of section 7-202 of the election law, may continue to use, maintain and replace such voting machines and systems, but may replace them only with identical model voting machines or systems made by the same manufacturer, or identical model voting machines or systems with de minimis changes in such voting machines' or systems' hardware, software, technical data package, or data, the nature of which will not materially alter the voting machines' or systems' reliability, function- ality, capability, or operation; any de minimis changes shall be approved by the state board of elections.

Summaries, headlines and scores are AI-generated from the official bill text. How we score bills. Source: NYS Open Legislation.