What's happening
This bill requires New York elections to use risk-limiting audits with hand counts of at least 3% of ballots and authorizes pilot audits.
Why it matters
Increases election security and accuracy. by implementing statistically robust, risk-limiting audits designed to catch and correct incorrect election outcomes, which can help safeguard against errors or tampering.
Mandates a minimum hand-count review of 3% of all ballots. (not just machines), ensuring a significant sample size and greater transparency in verifying results, with the possibility for even more extensive checks as determined by new regulations.
Empowers the State Board of Elections to set detailed rules. for how these audits are conducted, including statistical methods, which may standardize and modernize election audit practices statewide.
Allows local boards to pilot advanced audit methods. and requires public reporting on their results, potentially setting the stage for broader future reforms and providing lawmakers, advocates, and the public with data on the effectiveness of these audits.
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Who cares
Local boards of elections
They or their appointed bipartisan committees would conduct risk-limiting audits with hand-to-eye review of at least three percent of ballots, alongside audits of records from three percent of voting machines or systems.
New York State Board of Elections
It would set statistical audit rules designed to limit the risk of certifying an incorrect outcome and report pilot audit findings to the legislature.
Candidates, political parties and independent bodies entitled to poll watchers
They would receive advance notice of risk-limiting audits and could appoint watchers to observe them.
County boards of elections
They could conduct pilot risk-limiting audits before the mandatory requirements take effect on January 1, 2026, and would have to notify the state board of any pilot.
Headline styles
Audit Paper Ballots for Accuracy
Plain English, a few words. Used as the page title.
Sponsors
Senator · Senate District 27
1 Co-sponsor
History
- Referred to elections
- Referred to elections
Companion bill
The same bill in the other chamber. A bill becomes law when one version passes both houses and the governor signs it, so either number can carry it.
Audit Ballots for Election Accuracy
In Assembly Committee · Election Law · Sponsor Harvey Epstein
Full text
2 pagesUnderlined is new[Struck] is removedOfficial text on nysenate.gov ↗
STATE OF NEW YORK
2961
2023-2024 Regular Sessions
IN SENATE
January 26, 2023
Introduced by Sens. KAVANAGH, MAYER -- read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Elections
AN ACT to amend the election law, in relation to conducting risk-limiting audits
The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Section 1. Subdivision 1 of section 9-211 of the election law, as amended by chapter 763 of the laws of 2021, is amended to read as follows:
1. (a) Within fifteen days after each general or special election, within thirteen days after every primary election, and within seven days after every village election conducted by the board of elections, the board of elections or a bipartisan committee appointed by such board shall conduct a risk-limiting audit, which will include a hand-to-eye review of at least three percent of the voter verifiable [audit] paper records [from three percent of voting machines or systems within the jurisdiction of such board. Such audits may be performed manually or via the use of any automated tool authorized for such use by the state board of elections which is independent from the voting system it is being used to audit. Voting machines or systems shall be selected for audit through a random, manual process] in accordance with the regulations promulgated pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subdivision. In addition to such audit and in accordance with the same procedures the board of elections shall audit the voter verifiable audit records from three percent of voting machines or systems within the jurisdiction of such board. At least five days prior to the time fixed for such [selection] risk-limiting audit process, the board of elections shall send notice by first class mail to each candidate, political party and independent body entitled to have had watchers present at the polls in any election district in such board's jurisdiction. Such notice shall state the time and place fixed for such [random selection process] risk-limiting audit.
EXPLANATION--Matter in italics (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
[ ] is old law to be omitted.
LBD07209-01-3
The audit shall be conducted in the same manner, to the extent applicable, as a canvass of paper ballots. Each candidate, political party or independent body entitled to appoint watchers to attend at a polling place shall be entitled to appoint such number of watchers to observe the audit.
(b) The state board of elections shall promulgate regulations for the implementation of risk-limiting audits required by paragraph (a) of this subdivision. The number of voter verifiable audit records selected for such audits shall be determined pursuant to such regulations that make use of statistical methods and are designed to limit the risk of certifying an incorrect outcome, but shall be at least three percent of all ballots cast.
(c) As used in this section: (i) "Risk-limiting audit" means a post-election process such that, if the reported outcome of the contest is incorrect, there is at least a ninety percent chance that the audit will replace the incorrect outcome with the correct outcome as determined by a full, hand-to-eye tabulation of all votes validly cast in that election contest that ascertains voter intent manually and directly from voter-verifiable paper records.
(ii) "Reported outcome" means the outcome of an election contest which is determined according to the canvass and which will become the official, certified outcome unless it is revised by an audit, recount, or other legal process.
(iii) "Incorrect outcome" means an outcome that differs from the outcome that would be determined by a full tabulation of all votes validly cast in that election contest, determining voter intent manually, directly from voter-verifiable paper records.
(iv) "Outcome" means the winner or set of winners of an election contest, which might be candidates or positions.
§ 2. County boards of elections are authorized to conduct risk-limiting audit pilots. Any board conducting a pilot audit shall notify the New York state board of elections. The New York state board of elections must provide a report to the state legislature on June 30, 2025 with the findings from the risk-limiting audits conducted through March 31, 2025.
§ 3. This act shall take effect immediately; provided, however, that section one of this act shall take effect on January 1, 2026.
Reflowed for reading: line numbers and page breaks removed. Cite the official text.
Sponsor's memo
Title of bill
An act to amend the election law, in relation to conducting risk-limit- ing audits
Purpose
To require the State Board of Elections (BOE) to improve the reliability of post-election audits to limit the risk of certifying an incorrect outcome.
Summary of provisions
Election Law 9-211 is amended by requiring the New York State Board of Elections or a bipartisan committee to conduct a risk-limiting audit of at least three percent of voter verifiable audit records after elections. The BOE shall promulgate regulations for the use of risk-lim- iting audits and such regulations shall make use of statistical methods and be designed to limit the risk of certifying an incorrect outcome.
Justification
Post-election audits are intended to ensure the accuracy of results by checking a portion of the paper ballots against electronic vote tallies. Under current law, three percent of voting machines are audited in every race. However, this minimal standard is widely recognized to be too lax to verify results in close elections. The only other method for verify- ing results in close elections in current law is a full recount.
This bill provides flexibility to the the BOE or a committee appointed by such board to audit at least three percent to permit the BOE to veri- fy the outcome of elections with a high degree of reliability and limit- ed cost. Along with three percent standard, the number of voting records selected to be audited would be based on a formula determined by the bipartisan BOE before the election. In elections in which a small margin separated the apparent winner from the other candidates, more ballots would be audited; in elections with a wide margin fewer ballots would be audited.
This method, known as a "risk-limiting audit," has several major bene- fits. First, it decreases the chances of a candidate being declared the winner improperly. This both increases voters' confidence in election results and minimizes the probability of a candidate who should have lost an election assuming office due to voting machines being hacked, or otherwise tampered with, or malfunctioning. In addition to increasing accuracy, risk-limiting audits also improve efficiency by allocating resources where they are needed to ensure the integrity of the results and reducing wasteful spending on audits that have little or no chance of altering the result. Lastly, risk-limiting audits reduce post-elec- tion partisan fighting by ensuring that the vote tallies are thoroughly vetted automatically in races where the losing candidate might otherwise question the results or call for a recount.
Legislative history
2022: S2853 (Kavanagh) / A7348 (Galef) - ELECTIONS/election law 2021: S2853 (Kavanagh) / A7348 (Galef) - ELECTIONS/election law
2020: S2329A (Kavanagh) - ELECTIONS
2019: S2329A (Kavanagh) - ELECTIONS/REPORTED AND COMMITTED TO FINANCE
2018: S7144 (Kavanagh)/A10241 (Galef) - Elections/ Election Law
Fiscal impact on the state
Some costs associated with the development and implementation of the regulations required by this legislation.
Effective date
This act shall take effect immediately; provided, however, that section one of this act shall take effect on January 1, 2024.
Summaries, headlines and scores are AI-generated from the official bill text. How we score bills. Source: NYS Open Legislation.