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S313Senate2023-2024 Session

End Court Fees and Surcharges

Official title

“Eliminates court surcharges and fees; repealer”

Sponsor Julia SalazarSD-18+25 co-sponsorsAffects Legal
Status
In Senate Committee
Codes
Impact
8/10
Significant
Passage
0%

Bill progress

Step 2 of 7

In committee · Codes

What's happening

This bill eliminates mandatory court surcharges, fees, and minimum fines in New York, and vacates related outstanding warrants, judgments, and sentences.

Why it matters

  1. Reduces the financial impact of criminal and traffic cases on low-income and marginalized New Yorkers. By eliminating mandatory surcharges, fees, and minimum fines previously required by law, this bill seeks to address the disproportionate burden these costs place on people who are less able to pay, particularly impacting poor defendants and communities of color.

  2. Shifts the court system away from revenue generation at the expense of defendants. The legislation explicitly states an intent to stop using fines and fees as a means of funding government operations, a practice long criticized as regressive and counterproductive to justice, especially for those least able to pay.

  3. Mandates courts to assess an individual’s ability to pay before imposing fines and requires fair payment schedules. Courts must now consider a person’s financial circumstances, the impact on their dependents, and whether the fine is proportionate before imposing or collecting a fine—potentially reducing cycles of debt, poverty, and recidivism for people entangled in the justice system.

  4. Ends incarceration and legal jeopardy solely for unpaid fines and related fees, while providing retroactive relief. The bill not only prohibits jail as a consequence of nonpayment moving forward, but also vacates existing warrants, sentences, and civil judgments rooted solely in unpaid fines or fees—meaning many people will be freed from old legal entanglements and outstanding debts to the criminal justice system.

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End Court Fees and Surcharges

Plain English, a few words. Used as the page title.

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History

  1. Referred to codes
  2. Referred to codes

Full text

12 pagesUnderlined is new[Struck] is removedOfficial text on nysenate.gov ↗

STATE OF NEW YORK

313

2023-2024 Regular Sessions

IN SENATE (Prefiled)

January 4, 2023

Introduced by Sens. SALAZAR, BRISPORT, BROUK, CLEARE, COMRIE, COONEY, GIANARIS, GONZALEZ, GOUNARDES, HOYLMAN, JACKSON, KAVANAGH, KRUEGER, MAY, MYRIE, PARKER, PERSAUD, RAMOS, RIVERA, SEPULVEDA, SERRANO, STAVI- SKY -- read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Codes

AN ACT to amend the civil practice law and rules, the executive law, the correction law, the vehicle and traffic law, the village law and the state finance law, in relation to eliminating court surcharges and fees; and to repeal certain provisions of the… Show all

AN ACT to amend the civil practice law and rules, the executive law, the correction law, the vehicle and traffic law, the village law and the state finance law, in relation to eliminating court surcharges and fees; and to repeal certain provisions of the penal law, the vehicle and traffic law, the correction law, the parks, recreation and historic preservation law, the executive law and the environmental conservation law relating thereto (Part A); to amend the penal law and the vehicle and traffic law, in relation to prohibiting mandatory minimum fines for penal law and vehicle and traffic offenses (Part B); to amend the penal law and the vehicle and traffic law, in relation to mandating that courts engage in an individualized assessment of a person's financial ability to pay a fine prior to imposing a fine (Part C); to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to eliminating the availability of incarceration as a remedy for a failure to pay a fine, surcharge or fee, lifting and vacating all existing warrants issued solely based on a person's failure to timely pay a fine, surcharge or fee and ending all existing sentences of incarceration based on such failure; and to repeal certain provisions of the criminal procedure law relating thereto (Part D); in relation to vacating all existing unsatisfied civil judgments entered solely based on a person's failure to timely pay a surcharge or fee and to repeal certain provisions of the criminal procedure law relating thereto (Part E); to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to prohibiting the collection of a fine, restitution or reparation from the funds of an incarcerated person; and to amend the correction law, in relation to prohibiting the payment of court fines, mandatory surcharges, certain fees, restitution, reparation or forfeitures from the earnings of prisoners (Part F); and in relation to vacating all [ ] is old law to be omitted. existing unpaid surcharges, DNA databank fees, crime victim assistance fees, sexual offender registration fees, or supplemental sex offender victim fees (Part G)

The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

Section 1. This act enacts into law major components of legislation relating to ending the unfair financial burdens imposed on defendants in criminal, vehicle and traffic, or other types of criminal or quasi-criminal matters by the existence of mandatory court surcharges and fees, mandatory minimum fines and mandatory probation or parole fees. This act further enacts into law procedures by which courts would be required to engage in an individualized assessment of a person's financial ability to pay a fine prior to imposing a fine, eliminates the availability of incarceration as a remedy for a failure to pay a fine, and vacates all existing warrants or unsatisfied civil judgments issued solely based on a person's failure to timely pay a fine, surcharge, or fee. Each component is wholly contained within a Part identified as Parts A through G. The effective date for each particular provision contained within such Part is set forth in the last section of such Part. Any provision in any section contained within a Part, including the effective date of the Part, which makes reference to a section "of this act", when used in connection with that particular component, shall be deemed to mean and refer to the corresponding section of the Part in which it is found. Section four of this act sets forth the general effective date of this act.

§ 2. Legislative intent. The legislative intent of this act is to end the inequitable financial burdens placed on defendants by the previously enacted statutory provisions which have authorized or mandated the imposition of surcharges, fees, and/or mandatory minimum fines, which have had a disparate impact on poor defendants, people of color, and those who lack access to the significant financial resources necessary in order to satisfy the imposition of surcharges, fees, and fines, and which have also contributed to mass incarceration in New York state. The legislative intent is also to end New York's regressive reliance on generating governmental revenue by imposing surcharges, fees, and fines on those least able to pay.

PART A

Section 1. Section 60.35 of the penal law is REPEALED.

§ 2. Section 1809 of the vehicle and traffic law is REPEALED.

§ 3. Section 1809-a of the vehicle and traffic law is REPEALED.

§ 4. Section 1809-aa of the vehicle and traffic law is REPEALED.

§ 5. Section 1809-b of the vehicle and traffic law is REPEALED.

§ 6. Section 1809-c of the vehicle and traffic law is REPEALED.

§ 7. Section 1809-d of the vehicle and traffic law is REPEALED.

§ 8. Section 1809-e of the vehicle and traffic law is REPEALED.

§ 9. Section 71-0213 of the environmental conservation law is REPEALED.

§ 10. The opening paragraph of paragraph 2 of subdivision (f) of section 1101 of the civil practice law and rules, as amended by chapter 322 of the laws of 2021, is amended to read as follows:

If the court determines that the incarcerated individual has insufficient means to pay the full filing fee, the court may permit the incarcerated individual to pay a reduced filing fee, the minimum of which shall not be less than fifteen dollars and the maximum of which shall not be more than fifty dollars. The court shall require an initial payment of such portion of the reduced filing fee as the incarcerated individual can reasonably afford or shall authorize no initial payment of the fee if exceptional circumstances render the incarcerated individual unable to pay any fee; provided however, that the difference between the amount of the reduced filing fee and the amount paid by the incarcerated individual in the initial partial payment shall be assessed against the incarcerated individual as an outstanding obligation to be collected either by the superintendent or the municipal official of the facility at which the incarcerated individual is confined, as the case may be[, in the same manner that mandatory surcharges are collected as provided for in subdivision five of section 60.35 of the penal law]. The court shall notify the superintendent or the municipal official of the facility where the incarcerated individual is housed of the amount of the reduced filing fee that was not directed to be paid by the incarcerated individual. Thereafter, the superintendent or the municipal official shall forward to the court any fee obligations that have been collected, provided however, that:

§ 11. Paragraph (a) of subdivision 2 of section 259-i of the executive law, as amended by chapter 322 of the laws of 2021, subparagraph (i) as amended by chapter 486 of the laws of 2022, is amended to read as follows:

(a) (i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, at least one month prior to the date on which an incarcerated individual may be paroled pursuant to subdivision one of section 70.40 of the penal law, a member or members as determined by the rules of the board shall personally interview such incarcerated individual and determine whether he or she should be paroled in accordance with the guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article. If parole is not granted upon such review, the incarcerated individual shall be informed in writing within two weeks of such appearance of the factors and reasons for such denial of parole. Such reasons shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms. The board shall specify a date not more than twenty-four months from such determination for reconsideration, and the procedures to be followed upon reconsideration shall be the same. If the incarcerated individual is released, he or she shall be given a copy of the conditions of parole. Such conditions shall where appropriate, include a requirement that the parolee comply with any restitution order, [mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee and DNA databank fee] previously imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction that applies to the parolee. The conditions shall indicate which restitution collection agency established under subdivision eight of section 420.10 of the criminal procedure law, shall be responsible for collection of restitution[, mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fees and DNA databank fees as provided for in section 60.35 of the penal law and section eighteen hundred nine of the vehicle and traffic law]. If the incarcerated individual is released, he or she shall also be notified in writing that his or her voting rights will be restored upon release.

(ii) Any incarcerated individual who is scheduled for presumptive release pursuant to section eight hundred six of the correction law shall not appear before the board as provided in subparagraph (i) of this paragraph unless such incarcerated individual's scheduled presumptive release is forfeited, canceled, or rescinded subsequently as provided in such law. In such event, the incarcerated individual shall appear before the board for release consideration as provided in subparagraph (i) of this paragraph as soon thereafter as is practicable.

§ 12. Paragraph (a) of subdivision 2 of section 259-i of the executive law, as amended by chapter 486 of the laws of 2022, is amended to read as follows:

(a) At least one month prior to the expiration of the minimum period or periods of imprisonment fixed by the court or board, a member or members as determined by the rules of the board shall personally interview an incarcerated individual serving an indeterminate sentence and determine whether he or she should be paroled at the expiration of the minimum period or periods in accordance with the procedures adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article. If parole is not granted upon such review, the incarcerated individual shall be informed in writing within two weeks of such appearance of the factors and reasons for such denial of parole. Such reasons shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms. The board shall specify a date not more than twenty-four months from such determination for reconsideration, and the procedures to be followed upon reconsideration shall be the same. If the incarcerated individual is released, he or she shall be given a copy of the conditions of parole. Such conditions shall where appropriate, include a requirement that the parolee comply with any restitution order [and mandatory surcharge] previously imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction that applies to the parolee. The conditions shall indicate which restitution collection agency established under subdivision eight of section 420.10 of the criminal procedure law, shall be responsible for collection of restitution [and mandatory surcharge as provided for in section 60.35 of the penal law and section eighteen hundred nine of the vehicle and traffic law]. If the incarcerated individual is released, he or she shall also be notified in writing that his or her voting rights will be restored upon release.

§ 12-a. Section 257-c of the executive law is REPEALED and a new section 257-c is added to read as follows:

§ 257-c. Probation fees prohibited. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no county or city may require individuals currently serving or who shall be sentenced to a period of probation upon conviction of any crime to pay any fee, including but not limited to an administrative fee, supervision fee, monitoring fee, testing fee, or screening fee, to the local probation department with the responsibility of supervising the probationer. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the collection of restitution payments pursuant to sections 65.10 and 60.27 of the penal law and subdivision eight of section 420.10 of the criminal procedure law.

§ 12-b. Paragraph (a) of subdivision 2 of section 205 of the correction law, as amended by chapter 491 of the laws of 2021, is amended to read as follows:

(a) A merit termination granted by the department under this section shall constitute a termination of the sentence with respect to which it was granted. No such merit termination shall be granted unless the department is satisfied that termination of sentence from presumptive release, parole, conditional release or post-release supervision is in the best interest of society[, and that the parolee or releasee, otherwise financially able to comply with an order of restitution and the payment of any mandatory surcharge previously imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction, has made a good faith effort to comply therewith].

§ 12-c. Subdivisions 1 and 3 of section 259-j of the executive law, as amended by section 38-g of subpart A of part C of chapter 62 of the laws of 2011, are amended to read as follows:

1. Except where a determinate sentence was imposed for a felony other than a felony defined in article two hundred twenty [or article two hundred twenty-one] of the penal law, if the board of parole is satisfied that an absolute discharge from presumptive release, parole, conditional release or release to a period of post-release supervision is in the best interests of society, the board may grant such a discharge prior to the expiration of the full term or maximum term to any person who has been on unrevoked community supervision for at least three consecutive years. A discharge granted under this section shall constitute a termination of the sentence with respect to which it was granted. [No such discharge shall be granted unless the board is satisfied that the parolee or releasee, otherwise financially able to comply with an order of restitution and the payment of any mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee or DNA databank fee previously imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction, has made a good faith effort to comply therewith.]

3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, where a term of post-release supervision in excess of five years has been imposed on a person convicted of a crime defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law, including a sexually motivated felony, the board of parole may grant a discharge from post-release supervision prior to the expiration of the maximum term of post-release supervision. Such a discharge may be granted only after the person has served at least five years of post-release supervision, and only to a person who has been on unrevoked post-release supervision for at least three consecutive years. No such discharge shall be granted unless the board of parole or the department acting pursuant to its responsibility under subdivision one of section two hundred one of the correction law consults with any licensed psychologist, qualified psychiatrist, or other mental health professional who is providing care or treatment to the supervisee; and the board[: (a)] determines that a discharge from post-release supervision is in the best interests of society[; and (b) is satisfied that the supervisee, otherwise financially able to comply with an order of restitution and the payment of any mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee, or DNA data bank fee previously imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction, has made a good faith effort to comply therewith]. Before making a determination to discharge a person from a period of post-release supervision, the board of parole may request that the commissioner of the office of mental health arrange a psychiatric evaluation of the supervisee. A discharge granted under this section shall constitute a termination of the sentence with respect to which it was granted.

§ 13. Subdivision 5 of section 27.12 of the parks, recreation and historic preservation law is REPEALED and subdivision 6 is renumbered subdivision 5.

§ 14. Subdivision 4 of section 60.02 of the penal law is renumbered subdivision 3.

Reflowed for reading: line numbers and page breaks removed. Cite the official text.

Sponsor's memo

Title of bill

An act to amend the civil practice law and rules, the executive law, the correction law, the vehicle and traffic law, the village law and the state finance law, in relation to eliminating court surcharges and fees; and to repeal certain provisions of the penal law, the vehicle and traf- fic law, the correction law, the parks, recreation and historic preser- vation law, the executive law and the environmental conservation law relating thereto (Part A); to amend the penal law and the vehicle and traffic law, in relation to prohibiting mandatory minimum fines for penal law and vehicle and traffic offenses (Part B); to amend the penal law and the vehicle and traffic law, in relation to mandating that courts engage in an individualized assessment of a person's financial ability to pay a fine prior to imposing a fine (Part C); to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to eliminating the availability of incarceration as a remedy for a failure to pay a fine, surcharge or fee, lifting and vacating all existing warrants issued solely based on a person's failure to timely pay a fine, surcharge or fee and ending all existing sentences of incarceration based on such failure; and to repeal certain provisions of the criminal procedure law relating thereto (Part D); in relation to vacating all existing unsatisfied civil judgments entered solely based on a person's failure to timely pay a surcharge or fee and to repeal certain provisions of the criminal procedure law relating thereto (Part E); to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to prohibiting the collection of a fine, restitution or repara- tion from the funds of an incarcerated person; and to amend the correction law, in relation to prohibiting the payment of court fines, mandatory surcharges, certain fees, restitution, reparation or forfei- tures from the earnings of prisoners (Part F); and in relation to vacat- ing all existing unpaid surcharges, DNA databank fees, crime victim assistance fees, sexual offender registration fees, or supplemental sex offender victim fees (Part G)

Purpose

To remove all detrimental financial penalties from the criminal legal system which have a placed an improper price on justice and have created undue and disproportionate burdens on people of color, low income indi- viduals, and their families. This bill eliminates the use of fees and surcharges imposed on those convicted of offenses under the penal and vehicle and traffic laws and penal provisions of other statutes, elimi- nates mandatory minimum fines, requires an individualized assessment by the court of an individual's ability to pay a fine, vacates existing judgments and warrant arising out of the imposition of court fees and surcharges, and eliminates the use of the funds of an incarcerated person to pay such fees, surcharges, fines or other monetary penalties.

Summary of provisions

Section one states the purpose of this legislation, to end the unfair financial burdens imposed on defendants in criminal, vehicle and traf- fic, or other criminal or quasi-criminal matters by mandatory surcharges and fees and mandatory minimum fines.

Read the full memo (2,291 words)

Section two sets forth the legislative intent, noting that the existing system of surcharges, fees, and minimum fines has had a disparate impact on poor defendants, people of color, and those who lack financial resources, and affirmatively states the intent of the legislation, which is to end New York's regressive reliance on generating governmental revenue by imposing surcharges, fees, and fines on those least able to pay. This section then contains parts A-G.

PART A repeals each provision of the penal law, vehicle and traffic law, executive law and environmental conservation law which creates a manda- tory surcharge or fee to be paid by those convicted of offenses under these laws. These fees and surcharges imposed include mandatory court surcharges, DNA databank fees, crime victim assistance fees, probation fees and sex offender registration fees. This Part also eliminates the possibility of a driver's license suspension due to failure to pay a mandatory surcharge or fee. This Part further makes conforming changes to other sections of law that are required due to the repeal of the sections relating to mandatory surcharges or fees.

PART B eliminates all mandatory minimum fines under the penal law and the vehicle and traffic law, by adding a new section 80.20 to the penal law and amending vehicle and traffic law 1800 by adding a new subdivi- sion (j).

PART C requires, in regard to fines under the penal law or the vehicle and traffic law, that courts engage in an individualized assessment of an individual's ability to pay a fine prior to imposing a fine, by amending penal law 80.05 by adding a subdivision (7) and by adding a new section, 1811, to the vehicle and traffic law. The provisions set forth factors courts must consider to make an individualized assessment of a defendant's financial situation to be used when determining the amount of any fine imposed. This Part further requires courts to gather and report data relating to fines.

PART D ends the practice of incarcerating individuals due to non-payment of a surcharge, fee, fine or restitution and establishes a procedure by which defendants may apply for re-sentencing if they are unable to pay a financial obligation imposed by the court. This Part further renders null and void any existing warrants or sentences of incarceration imposed solely due to the alleged failure of a defendant to pay a fine, restitution, reparation, surcharge, DNA databank fee, crime victim assistance fee, sexual offender registration fee, or supplemental sex offender victim fee.

PART E vacates all existing civil judgements based solely on failure to timely pay and/or failure to appear at a court date set solely for the purpose of payment of a surcharge or fee.

PART F ends the existing practice of taking money from the funds of an incarcerated person in order to pay a fine, restitution, or reparation requirement imposed by a court.

PART G provides for the vacatur of all existing unpaid surcharges, DNA databank fees, crime victim assistance fees, sex offender registration fees, and supplemental sex offender victim fees.

Section 3 contains a severability clause.

Section 4 provides that the provisions of this act shall take effect immediately.

Justification

In New York State there are numerous fees and surcharges that must be imposed on individuals convicted of offenses under the penal law, vehi- cle and traffic law, and environmental conservation law. Generally, these are mandatory and are imposed regardless of ability to pay or any other factor. The sole exception is contained in the Laws of 2020, chap- ter 144, which provides Courts with authority to waive fees and surcharges for defendants under the age of 21 under certain circum- stances.

Fines, while not standard, are currently determined by the court. Some offenses have mandatory minimum fines, others have a range of permissi- ble fines. There is no requirement in current law that a Courts can inquire into or consider a defendant's ability to pay, financial resources, other financial obligations, or any other factor. While some defendants may be able to pay these costs without difficulty, the conse- quences for those in poverty can be devastating. Working class and poor defendants are routinely driven into debt as a result of these costs and face greater barriers to providing food and shelter for their families.

There is currently no mechanism by which fees and surcharges may be waived by the sentencing court - other than the limited exception enacted in the Laws of 2020, chapter 144 for persons under 21 - even in cases where the costs would exacerbate financial hardship. Courts may defer payment, ,but with that deferral comes a civil judgment against the defendant. These judgements can appear on credit reportS and prevent defendants from getting loans, buying homes, or, in some cases, securing employment. In cases where initial crimes were motivated by economic instability, a defendant's inability to find a job will often lead to further contact with the criminal justice system.

If a defendant is sentenced to incarceration as a penalty for the under- lying conviction, funds will be withheld from their inmate funds account and the wages for any work they do will be garnished. This creates significant hardships for many incarcerated individuals and their fami- lies.

Additional penalties faced for nonpayment can include suspension of the defendant's driver's license and even incarceration. There is widespread recognition of the detrimental, racially disparate, and counterproduc- tive nature of the current system of mandatory fees and surcharges. The New York City Bar, for example, issued a report noting the inappropriate use of fees and fines to raise government revenue and the burdens this causes to many defendants and families and calling on the legislature to eliminate surcharges and fees: New York should be a leader in justice and fairness. Tying convictions to revenue raising is inherently prob- lematic, conflating the purpose of the system, justice, with revenue raising. Fines imposed by criminal courts should be imposed only when they are tied directly to the criminal act, such as for restitution or to defer future crimes.

Thus, the Bar Association recommends simply eliminating mandatory surcharges and fees. (1)

Similarly, a 2019 study issued by the Brennan Center for Justice concluded: A wealth of evidence has already shown that this system of fees and fines works against the goal of rehabilitation and creates a major barrier to people reentering society after a conviction. They are often unable to pay hundreds or thousands of dollars in accumulated court debt. When debt leads to incarceration or license suspension, it becomes even harder to find a job or housing or pay child support. There's also little evidence that imposing onerous fees and fines improves public safety. 2

These issues were also one focus of the investigation by the US Depart- ment of Justice Civil Rights Division into law enforcement practices in Ferguson, Missouri after Michael Brown was killed by a Ferguson police officer in 2014.

1 NYC Bar, "New York Should Re-Examine Mandatory Court Fees Imposed on Individuals Convicted of Criminal Offenses and Violations", May 2019, https://www.nycbarorg/member- and-career-services/committees/ reportslisting/reports/detai/new-york-should-re-examine- mandatoryc- ourt-fees

2 Brennan Center for Justice, "The Steep Cost of Criminal Justice Fees and Fines", 2019, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/ researchreports/steepcosts-criminal-justice-fees-and-fines

In the comprehensive report issued in 2015 by the Justice Department, they noted, with findings specific to Ferguson, but not significantly different from what is found in cities and states across the'country, including New York:

Ferguson's law enforcement practices are shaped by the City's focus on revenue rather than by public safety needs. This emphasis on revenue has compromised the institutional character of Ferguson's police department, contributing to a pattern of unconstitutional policing, and has also shaped its municipal court, leading to procedures that raise due process concerns and inflict unnecessary harm on members of the Ferguson commu- nity. Further, Ferguson's police and municipal court practices both reflect and exacerbate existing racial bias, including racial stere- otypes. Ferguson's own data establish clear racial disparities that adversely impact African Americans. The evidence shows that discrimina- tory intent is part of the reason for these disparities. Over time, Ferguson's police and municipal court practices have sown deep mistrust between parts of the community and the police department, undermining law enforcement legitimacy among African Americans in particular. 3

A 2019 study and report by the NYC Comptroller's Office, focused on NYC, but the findings have state-wide applicability. The report characterized fees and surcharges as:

An all-but-hidden, secondary form of punishment with impacts that often last years beyond a formal prison term.(4)

And, as noted in a 2020 report by the Fees & Fines Justice Center: State and loal jurisdictions are relying on fines and fees to balance their budgets effectively turning police into revenue generators and tax collectors. And because of over-policing in low-income communities of color, those budgets are being balanced on the backs of the people who can least afford it. When policymakers rely on mass criminalization to balance their budgets, it corrupts local governments, perverts law enforcement incentives, and undermines police-community relations. 4

RACIAL JUSTICE IMPACT

Fines and fees only further racial disparities and punish low-income communities, as these fines and fees disproportionately impact communi- ties of color. Traffic stops, arrests, convictions, and sentencing are major contributors, to collecting fines and fees, all of which are unequivocally impacting communities of color. This is exhibited in traf- fic stop data from 2017- in four of the seven New York counties that were surveyed, the

3 US DOJ Civil Rights Division, Investigation of Ferguson Police Depart- ment, full report maybe accessed via https://www.justice. gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-findings-two-civil- rights-in- vestigations-ferguson-missouri

4 https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/ 2020/06/16/the-other-america-howfines-and-fees-perpetuate-injustice/

percentage of traffic stops involving Black drivers was double the percentage of Black drivers in the county. Additionally, in 2018, despite representing 14% of the population, black people made up 38% of arrests and 48% of prison sentences. 5

Senate

2021: S3979C (Salazar)- Referred to Codes

2022: Amend, referred to Codes

Assembly

2020: A11083 (Niou)- Referred to Codes

2021-2022: A2348 (Niou)- Referred to Codes

Fiscal implications

This bill will reduce certain revenue to the state, however, these loss- es are likely to be more than made up by reduced costs as individuals will no longer be incarcerated for failure to pay fees or surcharges, the significant administrative and financial burden stemming from proc- essing civil judgments, license suspensions, and other collateral impacts of fees and surcharges will be eliminated. And, more individuals will have an open path towards meaningful employment, which, in turn, brings economic benefits to the state.

Effective date

This act shall take effect immediately. 5 New York's Ferguson Problem- How the state's racist fee system punishes poverty, lacks transparency, and is overdue for reform. Fines and Fees Justice Center. (2020, September). Retrieved from https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.orgiarticles/new-yorks-ferguson-proble m/

Summaries, headlines and scores are AI-generated from the official bill text. How we score bills. Source: NYS Open Legislation.