What's happening
This bill, known as "Andrew's Law," increases penalties and reclassifies certain vehicular crimes, including assault, manslaughter, and homicide, as violent felonies in New York.
Why it matters
Significantly increases legal consequences for dangerous driving. By reclassifying vehicular assault, manslaughter, and homicide as violent felonies, the bill ensures that those convicted face longer sentences, stricter parole rules, and other severe penalties—putting these crimes on par with other violent offenses in the eyes of the law.
Allows for consecutive sentencing in cases with multiple victims. The bill empowers courts to impose consecutive (rather than concurrent) prison sentences when a single act of reckless driving causes harm to multiple people, meaning offenders could serve much longer total sentences if several victims are involved.
Expands and tightens procedures for suspected impaired drivers. The legislation clarifies and strengthens police authority to require chemical or field sobriety tests, especially when drug impairment is suspected, and mandates automatic license suspension for those charged with drug-impaired driving while awaiting prosecution.
Broadens the reach of felony status and criminal records. By including vehicular offenses under laws covering repeat offenders and fingerprinting for misdemeanors, the bill ensures that convictions for these crimes carry the same lasting consequences as other felonies, impacting future sentencing and criminal records.
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Headline styles
Toughen Drunk Driving Penalties
Plain English, a few words. Used as the page title.
Sponsors
1 Co-sponsor
History
- Referred to codes
- Referred to codes
Companion bill
The same bill in the other chamber. A bill becomes law when one version passes both houses and the governor signs it, so either number can carry it.
Toughen Drunk Driving Penalties
In Assembly Committee · Codes · Sponsor Jodi Giglio
Full text
6 pagesUnderlined is new[Struck] is removedOfficial text on nysenate.gov ↗
STATE OF NEW YORK
6608
2023-2024 Regular Sessions
IN SENATE
April 28, 2023
Introduced by Sen. PALUMBO -- read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Codes
AN ACT to amend the penal law, the vehicle and traffic law and the criminal procedure law, in relation to arrest, prosecution, sentencing and penalties for offenses involving vehicular assault, manslaughter and homicide and operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol
The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as "Andrew's law".
§ 2. Subdivision 1 of section 70.02 of the penal law, as separately amended by chapters 764 and 765 of the laws of 2005, paragraph (a) as amended by chapter 189 of the laws of 2018, paragraph (b) as amended by chapter 94 of the laws of 2020, paragraph (c) as amended by chapter 134 of the laws of 2019, and paragraph (d) as amended by chapter 7 of the laws of 2007, is amended to read as follows:
1. Definition of a violent felony offense. A violent felony offense is a class B violent felony offense, a class C violent felony offense, a class D violent felony offense, or a class E violent felony offense, defined as follows:
(a) Class B violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit the class A-I felonies of murder in the second degree as defined in section 125.25, kidnapping in the first degree as defined in section 135.25, and arson in the first degree as defined in section 150.20; aggravated vehicular homicide as defined in section 125.14, manslaughter in the first degree as defined in section 125.20, aggravated manslaughter in the first degree as defined in section 125.22, rape in the first degree as defined in section 130.35, criminal sexual act in the first degree as defined in section 130.50, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree as defined in section 130.70, course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree as defined in section 130.75; assault in the first
EXPLANATION--Matter in italics (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
[ ] is old law to be omitted.
LBD11071-01-3
degree as defined in section 120.10, kidnapping in the second degree as defined in section 135.20, burglary in the first degree as defined in section 140.30, arson in the second degree as defined in section 150.15, robbery in the first degree as defined in section 160.15, sex trafficking as defined in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subdivision five of section 230.34, sex trafficking of a child as defined in section 230.34-a, incest in the first degree as defined in section 255.27, criminal possession of a weapon in the first degree as defined in section 265.04, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree as defined in section 265.09, criminal sale of a firearm in the first degree as defined in section 265.13, aggravated assault upon a police officer or a peace officer as defined in section 120.11, gang assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.07, intimidating a victim or witness in the first degree as defined in section 215.17, hindering prosecution of terrorism in the first degree as defined in section 490.35, criminal possession of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the second degree as defined in section 490.40, and criminal use of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the third degree as defined in section 490.47.
(b) Class C violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit any of the class B felonies set forth in paragraph (a) of this subdivision; aggravated criminally negligent homicide as defined in section 125.11, vehicular manslaughter in the first degree as defined in section 125.13, aggravated manslaughter in the second degree as defined in section 125.21, aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree as defined in section 130.67, aggravated vehicular assault as defined in section 120.04-a, assault on a peace officer, police officer, firefighter or emergency medical services professional as defined in section 120.08, assault on a judge as defined in section 120.09, gang assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.06, strangulation in the first degree as defined in section 121.13, aggravated strangulation as defined in section 121.13-a, burglary in the second degree as defined in section 140.25, robbery in the second degree as defined in section 160.10, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree as defined in section 265.03, criminal use of a firearm in the second degree as defined in section 265.08, criminal sale of a firearm in the second degree as defined in section 265.12, criminal sale of a firearm with the aid of a minor as defined in section 265.14, aggravated criminal possession of a weapon as defined in section 265.19, soliciting or providing support for an act of terrorism in the first degree as defined in section 490.15, hindering prosecution of terrorism in the second degree as defined in section 490.30, and criminal possession of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the third degree as defined in section 490.37.
(c) Class D violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit any of the class C felonies set forth in paragraph (b) of this subdivision; reckless assault of a child as defined in section 120.02, vehicular assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.04, assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.05, menacing a police officer or peace officer as defined in section 120.18, stalking in the first degree[,] as defined in subdivision one of section 120.60, strangulation in the second degree as defined in section 121.12, vehicular manslaughter in the second degree as defined in section 125.12, rape in the second degree as defined in section 130.30, criminal sexual act in the second degree as defined in section 130.45, sexual abuse in the first degree as defined in section 130.65, course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree as defined in section 130.80, aggravated sexual abuse in the third degree as defined in section 130.66, facilitating a sex offense with a controlled substance as defined in section 130.90, labor trafficking as defined in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subdivision three of section 135.35, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision five, six, seven, eight, nine or ten of section 265.02, criminal sale of a firearm in the third degree as defined in section 265.11, intimidating a victim or witness in the second degree as defined in section 215.16, soliciting or providing support for an act of terrorism in the second degree as defined in section 490.10, and making a terroristic threat as defined in section 490.20, falsely reporting an incident in the first degree as defined in section 240.60, placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the first degree as defined in section 240.62, placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in a sports stadium or arena, mass transportation facility or enclosed shopping mall as defined in section 240.63, aggravated unpermitted use of indoor pyrotechnics in the first degree as defined in section 405.18, and criminal manufacture, sale, or transport of an undetectable firearm, rifle or shotgun as defined in section 265.50.
(d) Class E violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit any of the felonies of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision five, six, seven or eight of section 265.02 as a lesser included offense of that section as defined in section 220.20 of the criminal procedure law, vehicular assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.03, persistent sexual abuse as defined in section 130.53, aggravated sexual abuse in the fourth degree as defined in section 130.65-a, falsely reporting an incident in the second degree as defined in section 240.55 and placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the second degree as defined in section 240.61.
§ 3. Subdivision 2 of section 70.25 of the penal law, as amended by chapter 56 of the laws of 1984, is amended to read as follows:
2. (a) When more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed on a person for two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other, the sentences, except if one or more of such sentences is for a violation of section 270.20 of this chapter, must run concurrently.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subdivision, the court may impose consecutive sentences where: (i) more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed on a person for two or more counts of section 120.03, 120.04, 120.04-a, subdivisions three and four of section 120.05, 120.10, 120.11, 125.10, 125.11, 125.12, 125.13, 125.14, 125.15, 125.20, 125.21, 125.22, 125.25; and (ii) such multiple counts were charged based upon multiple victims suffering physical injury, serious physical injury or death as a result of a single act or omission of the defendant.
§ 4. Paragraph (a) of subdivision 2 of section 1194 of the vehicle and traffic law, as amended by chapter 196 of the laws of 1996, is amended to read as follows:
(a) When authorized. Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test of one or more of the following: breath, blood, urine, or saliva, for the purpose of determining the alcoholic and/or drug content of the blood provided that such test is administered by or at the direction of a police officer with respect to a chemical test of breath, urine or saliva or, with respect to a chemical test of blood, at the direction of a police officer:
(1) having reasonable grounds to believe such person to have been operating in violation of any subdivision of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this article and within two hours after such person has been placed under arrest for any such violation; or having reasonable grounds to believe such person to have been operating in violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two-a of this article and within two hours after the stop of such person for any such violation[,];
(2) [within two hours after a breath test, as provided in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of this section, indicates that alcohol has been consumed by such person and in accordance with the rules and regulations established by the police force of which the officer is a member;
(3)] for the purposes of this paragraph, "reasonable grounds" to believe that a person has been operating a motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol in violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two-a of this article shall be determined by viewing the totality of circumstances surrounding the incident which, when taken together, indicate that the operator was driving in violation of such subdivision. Such circumstances may include any visible or behavioral indication of alcohol consumption by the operator, the existence of an open container containing or having contained an alcoholic beverage in or around the vehicle driven by the operator, or any other evidence surrounding the circumstances of the incident which indicates that the operator has been operating a motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol at the time of the incident; or
[(4)] (3) notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, no person under the age of twenty-one shall be arrested for an alleged violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two-a of this article. However, a person under the age of twenty-one for whom a chemical test is authorized pursuant to this paragraph may be temporarily detained by the police solely for the purpose of requesting or administering such chemical test whenever arrest without a warrant for a petty offense would be authorized in accordance with the provisions of section 140.10 of the criminal procedure law or paragraph (a) of subdivision one of this section.
§ 5. Paragraph (b) of subdivision 3 of section 1194 of the vehicle and traffic law, as added by chapter 47 of the laws of 1988, is amended to read as follows:
(b) When authorized. Upon refusal by any person to submit to a chemical test or any portion thereof as described above, the test shall not be given unless a police officer or a district attorney, as defined in subdivision thirty-two of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law, requests and obtains a court order to compel a person to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcoholic or drug content of the person's blood upon a finding of reasonable cause to believe that:
(1) such person was the operator of a motor vehicle and in the course of such operation a person other than the operator was killed or suffered serious physical injury as defined in section 10.00 of the penal law; and
(2) a. either such person operated the vehicle in violation of any subdivision of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this article, or
b. a breath test administered by a police officer in accordance with paragraph (b) of subdivision one of this section indicates that alcohol has been consumed by such person; and
(3) [such person has been placed under lawful arrest; and
(4)] such person has refused to submit to a chemical test or field test or any portion thereof, requested in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (a) of subdivision two of this section or is unable to give consent to such a test.
§ 6. Paragraph (a) of subdivision 1 of section 70.06 of the penal law, as amended by chapter 410 of the laws of 1979, is amended to read as follows:
(a) A second felony offender is a person, other than a second violent felony offender as defined in section 70.04 of this article, who stands convicted of a felony defined in this chapter or in the vehicle and traffic law, other than a class A-I felony, after having previously been subjected to one or more predicate felony convictions as defined in paragraph (b) of this subdivision.
§ 7. Paragraph (b) of subdivision 1 of section 160.10 of the criminal procedure law, as amended by chapter 762 of the laws of 1971, is amended to read as follows:
(b) A misdemeanor defined in the penal law or the vehicle and traffic law; or
Reflowed for reading: line numbers and page breaks removed. Cite the official text.
Sponsor's memo
Title of bill
An act to amend the penal law, the vehicle and traffic law and the crim- inal procedure law, in relation to arrest, prosecution, sentencing and penalties for offenses involving vehicular assault, manslaughter and homicide and operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol
Purpose
To reclassify vehicular crimes that result in serious physical injury and/or death as violent crimes. Authorizes consecutive sentences for vehicular crimes that result in multiple victim or mass casualty inci- dents. Expedites the process for obtaining a warrant for a blood sample when a drunk driver or drugged driver seriously injures or kills another person.
Summary of provisions
Section 1. Cites this act as Andrew's Law
Read the full memo (665 words)
Sections 2, 3, 6 and 7 to bring equality and equity to serious vehicular crimes that result in serious physical injury and/or death under the v&t law and under the penal law
Sections 4, 5, 8 and 9 to remove barriers and antiquated standards that pose unnecessary challenges to achieving justice for vehicular crimes that result in serious physical injury and/or death.
Justification
On September 30, 2018, 12 year old Boy Scout Andrew McMorris, Thomas and Denis Lane, Kaden Lynch and other members of Boy Scout Troop 161 were hiking on the shoulder of David Terry Road in Suffolk County when a drunk driver veered his SUV into them, violently mowing down multiple members of the Troop.
Thomas Lane, 14, was hit first and suffered life-altering injuries that required immediate surgery and drilling into his skull to treat him and repair his severely fractured legs; his brother Denis Lane 16 was also struck to his and face; 15 year old Kaden Lynch was struck next and sustained injuries to his waist and abdomen.
Lastly, the force of the SUV catapulted 100 pound Andrew McMorris onto the hood then vaulted him into air where his friends saw him spin and land face down in the mud. Andrew's father was there and rushed to his child whose body was contorted, mangled and gravely injured by the violent strike from the several thousand pound SUV. Andrew would never regain consciousness to even say goodbye to his loved ones. He survived for only a short time before he succumbed to his grave injuries.
The driver had been drinking vodka all morning and refused a ride from a sober friend. He also refused a field test, which he can do under current law. This causes time to pass and benefits the drunk driver when testing blood alcohol concentration (BAC).
For 1 death, 1 serious injury, 1 head injury, 1 minor injury and trauma- tizing all men and boys for the rest of their lives the charges were aggravated vehicular homicide in the second degree, manslaughter in the second degree, assault in the second degree, assault in the third degree and reckless driving. Had the driver caused the death of more boys or multiple more children, he would have faced no additional sanction. Meaning, if the driver ran down all 12 boys causing death or serious injury to each of them, the result would have been the same as the above described tragic outcome. Vehicular assault and homicide victims are the only victims of violent crimes that are lumped together where a person who kills or mains multiple individuals can commit consequence free mass assaults or mass casualty homicides.
In an era where mass casualty incidents have been perpetrated by crimi- nal actors using vehicles as a weapon New York State must adapt. Crime victims should not be treated differently based on the weapon of choice used by their assailant. Equally, it is long overdue to resolve issues in the law that make it hard to successfully gather critical evidence in these cases, which also deprives victims of justice. It is time to bring equality and equity in the law for victims of violent vehicular crimes and mass casualty incidents.
Legislative history
New bill
Fiscal implications
EFFECTIVE DATE: Immediately.
Summaries, headlines and scores are AI-generated from the official bill text. How we score bills. Source: NYS Open Legislation.