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S7158Senate2023-2024 SessionSame asA7464

Let Appeals Reflect New Laws

Official title

“Authorizes renewals to the court of appeals based on a subsequent change in law”

Sponsor Brad Hoylman-SigalSD-47+1 co-sponsorAffects Legal
Status
In Senate Committee
Rules
Impact
7/10
Significant
Passage
0%

Bill progress

Step 2 of 7

In committee · Rules

What's happening

This bill allows parties to request a renewal of Court of Appeals decisions if new state laws contradict those decisions.

Why it matters

  1. Enables parties to challenge prior Court of Appeals decisions when new state laws contradict those decisions, even if their case is still pending or hasn’t reached a final, non-appealable judgment. This could allow litigants to benefit from legislative changes without restarting lengthy legal processes.

  2. Requires the Court of Appeals to revisit its earlier decisions if a party files a timely motion, unless the court finds the motion clearly lacks merit. This increases judicial responsiveness to legislative changes and may shift the balance of power between the judiciary and legislature.

  3. Allows the court to consider legal arguments that were previously dismissed as “unpreserved” (not raised properly in earlier proceedings) if the new law addresses those issues. This broadens the scope of review and could provide relief to parties who had procedural missteps in lower courts.

  4. Sets a strict 90-day deadline for filing these motions after a relevant legislative change or the law’s effective date, ensuring timely reconsideration but limiting prolonged uncertainty. This creates a clear window for action, giving both litigants and courts predictability about when cases can be reopened.

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Who cares

  • Parties aggrieved by Court of Appeals decisions

    The bill would let them seek renewal in cases not yet final when a subsequent state enactment appears applicable and contrary to the court’s decision.

  • Appellate attorneys

    The bill would set a filing deadline of 90 days after the subsequent enactment or the bill’s effective date, whichever is later.

  • New York Court of Appeals

    The court would have to permit full briefing and oral argument unless it finds no substantial basis for renewal, and consider legal questions addressed by the subsequent enactment even if unpreserved.

Headline styles

Let Appeals Reflect New Laws

Plain English, a few words. Used as the page title.

Sponsors

Primary sponsor
Brad Hoylman-Sigal

Senator · Senate District 47

Chair, Judiciary

1 Co-sponsor

History

  1. Committed to rules
  2. Advanced to third reading
  3. 2nd report cal.
  4. 1st report cal.944
  5. Referred to judiciary
  6. Print number 7158a
  7. Amend and recommit to judiciary
  8. Referred to judiciary

Companion bill

The same bill in the other chamber. A bill becomes law when one version passes both houses and the governor signs it, so either number can carry it.

A7464Assembly

Let Courts Revisit Decisions

In Senate Committee · Judiciary · Sponsor Helene Weinstein

Impact 7 · Significant0% to pass

Full text

2 pagesUnderlined is new[Struck] is removedOfficial text on nysenate.gov ↗

STATE OF NEW YORK

7158--A

2023-2024 Regular Sessions

IN SENATE

May 18, 2023

Introduced by Sens. HOYLMAN-SIGAL, RAMOS -- read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Judiciary -- committee discharged, bill amended, ordered reprinted as amended and recommitted to said committee

AN ACT to amend the civil practice law and rules, in relation to renewals based on a subsequent change in law

The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

Section 1. The civil practice law and rules is amended by adding a new section 5616 to read as follows:

§ 5616. Renewal based on subsequent change in law. (a) Grounds for motion. When the court of appeals has decided an issue of law and 1. the action or proceeding in which the court of appeals has rendered the decision has not been finally determined in an order or judgment not subject to appellate review or remains sub judice, and 2. a subsequent enactment by the legislature of the state appears to be applicable to the action or proceeding and contrary to the decision of the court of appeals, any party aggrieved by the court of appeals' decision may file a motion to renew with that court.

(b) Briefing and oral argument. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section, unless the court of appeals determines that there is no substantial basis for the motion, it shall grant the motion to the extent of permitting full briefing and oral argument, limited to the question of whether the court of appeals should change its decision in light of the subsequent change or clarification of the intent of the law by the legislature of the state.

(c) Preservation. In ruling on a motion pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section and in rendering a decision following the briefing and oral argument under subdivision (b) of this section, the court of appeals shall consider any questions of law that were addressed by the subse-

EXPLANATION--Matter in italics (underscored) is new; matter in brackets

[ ] is old law to be omitted.

LBD11330-05-3

quent enactment, even if the court of appeals previously did not reach that issue because it held it to be unpreserved or it was unpreserved.

(d) Time. A motion pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be filed not later than ninety days after 1. the enactment that is the basis of the motion, or 2. the effective date of this section, whichever is later.

§ 2. This act shall take effect immediately.

Reflowed for reading: line numbers and page breaks removed. Cite the official text.

Sponsor's memo

Title of bill

An act to amend the civil practice law and rules, in relation to renewals based on a subsequent change in law

Purpose and intent of bill

The Legislature finds that where the Court of Appeals has determined an issue of law and a subsequent change or clarification in the law is enacted, relevant to the Court's prior determination, and may have affected the outcome, numerous important public purposes would be advanced by a swift reconsideration by the Court of its prior determi- nation. Our trial and intermediate appellate courts benefit from the guidance which the jurisprudence of the Court of Appeals affords. Liti- gants benefit from the stability of precedent and clarity of our legis- lative scheme.

The clarity and stability which our decisional law strives to provide are not advanced by permitting to stand determinations of New York's highest court which may no longer represent an accurate statement of an issue of law in light of subsequent clarifications or changes made by the Legislature. The interests of judicial economy, conservation of judicial resources, and the preservation of the public fisc are thwarted by permitting actions affected by an intervening change or clarification in the law to, once again, weave their way through our trial and inter- mediate appellate courts.

Read the full memo (2,409 words)

Summary of provisions of bill

Section 1 of the bill provides that the CPLR be amended by adding a new section 5616, with subdivisions (a) through (d), collectively establish- ing the mechanism and governing rules for a motion for leave to renew based on a subsequent change in the law to be made directly to the Court of Appeals.

Section 2 of the bill contains the effective date and makes clear that this legislation will be immediately applicable and effective.

Justification

The New York State Constitution does not address-let alone prohibit-the Court of Appeals' power to entertain motions for leave to renew prior appeals determined by the Court (see NY Const., Art. 6, Sec. 3). Accordingly, consistent with the Legislature's power to enact legis- lation affecting the Court of Appeals where the Constitution is other- wise silent (e.g., L 2023, ch 123) it is the intent of the Legislature to hereby create a procedural mechanism for the Court of Appeals to decide motions for renewal, and to render a decision following briefing and oral argument, where an intervening change or clarification in the law is relevant to the Court of Appeals' prior determination (see gener- ally FHA v Darlington Inc., 358 US 84, 90-92 (1958)).

For example, in the wake of a determination of the Court of Appeals (and intermediate appellate courts), this body enacted the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (hereinafter "FAPA" (L 2022, ch 821)), which abrogates the holdings of the Court of Appeals on issues of law. Yet these legis- lative enactments have been undermined by lower court interpretations which deprive those intended to benefit from the legislation of the full protection thereof. As an illustration, FAPA § 10 provides that the act shall apply to "all actions" in which a judgment of foreclosure and sale has not been enforced. Notwithstanding this clear and unequivocal command of the will of the People, trial courts have refused to enter- tain motions made under FAPA's § 10 by defendants who defaulted in appearing in the action, on the basis that defaulting defendants may not seek relief under FAPA without first vacating their default (e.g., HSBC Bank USA NA v Melchner, Index No. 500309/2020, NYSCEF Doc No. 63 (Sup Ct, Putnam County Apr. 13, 2023)). Moreover, courts have ignored the plain language of FAPA § 7 by holding that a prior dismissal for lack of standing is tantamount to "an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the (mort gage loan) was not validly accelerated" (CPLR 213(4)(a); see Wilmington Say. Fund Socy., FSB v Madden, Misc 3d, 2023 NY Slip Op 23044, *1, 2, 4 (Sup Ct, Putnam County 2023); Reinman v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co.,AD3d, 2023 NY Slip Op 01813, *1 (2d Dept 2023)). Courts have additionally refused to afford FAPA its intended retroactive) effect (see L 2022, ch 821, § 10) by reasoning that to do so would destroy "vested rights" (e.g., RTGLQ Invs., L.P. v Gross, Misc 3d, 2023 NY Slip Op 23082 (Sup Ct, Westchester County 2023)).2 Interpretations such as these violate our canons of statutory construction by placing mortgagee-friendly limitations and extensions to the scope of FAPA, which the Legislature did not see fit to include (see Matter of Tucker v Bd. Of Educ., Community School Dist. No. 10, 82 NY2d 274, 278 (1993); see generally People v Roberts, 31 NY3d 406, 418 (2018); see also Ditech Fin. LLC v Naidu, 2023 NY Slip Op 23370, 4 (Sup Ct, Queens Cty Oct. 18, 2023) (Correctly interpreting our intent: "FAPA did not disturb...") citing US Bank N.A. v Williams, 2023 NY Slip Op 23208, 4-5 (Sup Ct, Putnam Cty Jun. 23, 2023)). Hence, the trial and intermediate appellate courts, the bar, litigants, and taxpay- ers at large would benefit from prompt and direct review by our highest court of the impact of these intervening changes or clarifications in law.

Under CPLR 5616 (a), a renewal motion may be made to the Court of Appeals, by any party aggrieved,3 where the action has not been finally determined or where the action remains "sub judice." The phrase "has not been finally determined" is intended to be read consistently with cas law construing CPLR 5011, which provides that an action remains pending until entry of a final judgment (see e.g. Nationstar Mtge. LLC v Lett- man, 2023 NY Slip Op 33319(U) (Sup Ct, Nassau Cty Sep. 18, 2023)). The phrase "sub judice" contemplates the broader circumstance where, notwithstanding the entry of a final non-appealable order or judgment, further judicial intervention or supervision of the order or judgment or the enforcement thereof, is contemplated (see Tegreh Realty Corp. v Joyce, 88 AD2d 820 (1st Dept 1982)). For instance, a judgment of fore- closure and sale may become final after the time to appeal expires, yet the action remains "sub judice" until such time as the judicial sale directed thereby (see Nutt v Cuming, 155 NY 309, 313 (1898)), given that the court conducts the sale (see Batchelar v Batchelar, 244 NY 274, 277 (1927); quoting People v NY Bldg.-Loan Banking Co., 189 NY 233, 237 (1907)), and, for example, must vacate the judgment and dismiss the action upon a motion demonstrating a failure to strictly comply with the judgment's limitation period (see RPAPL 1351(1)).4

Under CPLR 5616 (b), upon the granting of a motion for renewal under subsection (a), the Court shall permit the litigants full briefing and oral argument on the question of whether the intervening change or clar- ification of the intent of the law would have affected the outcome of the prior determination. To afford litigants, the bar, and the trial and intermediate courts the full benefit of the Court of Appeals' analysis on issues of law, subsection (c) provides that the Court shall, both in ruling on the motion under subsection (a), and determining the matter following the briefing and oral argument under subdivision (b), consider any questions of law, even if the issue was not preserved for appellate review or it was previously determined by the Court not to be preserved for appellate review, provided that the questions of law are relevant to the intervening change or a clarification of the law. Indeed, the Court of Appeals is obligated to apply the law as it exists at the time it decides an appeal, not the controlling law as of the time of the deter- mination under review (e.g., Asman v Ambach, 64 NY2d 989, 990 (1985); Matter of Alscot Inv. Corp. v Inc. Vil. of Rockville Ctr., 64 NY2d 921, 922 (1985)).

Under CPLR 5616 (c), arguments based on a change or clarification in law shall be entertained by the Court of Appeals (see e.g., Post v 120 East End Ave. Corp. 62 NY2d 19, 29 (1984)). Were the Court precluded from entertaining questions of law concerning clarification or change in the law, the motion under subsection (a) and the briefing and oral argument under subsection (b) would be illusory. By definition, an intervening change or clarification in the law is what would give rise to a motion under subsection (a) and briefing and oral argument under subsection (b), given that the legislative enactment of clarifying law to correct erroneous misinterpretations of existing law could not have been fairly anticipated by litigants at the time of their arguments before the enactment (see generally CPLR 2221(e); see e.g., Dinallo v. DAL Elec., 60 AD3d 620 (2d Dept 2009)). Insofar as subsection (c) relates to CPLR 5501 (b) and the Court's "preservation" jurisprudence, "unpreserved" legal issues relating to the enactment of new law are properly addressed and determined by the Court (see e.g., Boardwalk & Seashore Corp. v Murdock, 286 NY 494, 498-499 (1941); accord Strauss v Univ. of State of NY, 2 NY2d 464, 467 (1957)), as they constitute "questions of law" with- in the meaning of CPLR 5501 (b) (see Hecker v State, 20 NY3d 1087, 1088-1089 (2013) (Smith, J., concurring); Misciki, 12 NY3d at 524526 (Smith, J., dissenting); People v Riley, 19 NY3d 944, 947-949 (2012) (Pigott, J. dissenting). Our Court of Appeals has a constitutional and statutory duty to declare what is New York law. The performance of that sacrosanct duty is frustrated by an overly narrow interpretation of what questions of law - even if unpreserved - the Court of Appeals may review. Accordingly, subsection (c) is intended to codify a fair - and not unduly restrictive - conception of that review power: questions of law which could not have been "obviated or cured by factual showings or legal counter steps" before the courts below, shall be considered by the Court of Appeals (Telaro v Telaro, 25 NY2d 433, 439 (1969)). And more particularly, subsection

(c) is intended to codify Post's holding that "new questions of law may be raised for the first time on appeal" (62 NY2d at 28-29 (applying statute which had not been enacted at the time of submission of motion before the trial court); accord Murdock, 286 NY at 498-499; Strauss, 2 NY2d at 467).

Legislative history

New Bill, 2023.

Fiscal implications for state and local governments

Possible reduction in overall judicial administrative expenses.

Effective date

This legislation shall be effective and applicable immediately, within the meaning of Post, given that it is procedural in nature (62 NY2d at 24). 1 We note FAPA's intentional omission of the artful word "retroactive," as, rather than implement a substantive change in the law, same merely clarified our intent with respect to existing statutes, meaning that FAPA was not retroactive in the constitutional sense, despite applying to cases that remain "sub judice.- Moreover, even if FAPA is held to be retroactive in the constitutional sense, same did not offend any right subject to protection under any specific constitutional clause (see generally, Regina Metro. Co., LLC v New York State Div. of Nous. and Community Renewal, 35 NY3d 332, 364-66 (2020)). 2 The Court of Appeals has recognized that the concept of "vested rights," as a means to avoid applying legislation retroactively, is a "fiction" (Hodes v Axelrod, 70 NY2d 364, 370 (1987); accord Campbell v Holt, 115 US 620, 628629 (1885); see generally Brearley Sch., Ltd. v Ward, 201 NY 358,373-375 (1911); Northern Pacific Ry, Co. v Puget Sound, 250 US 332, 335 (1919); Middleton v Texas Power & Light Co., 249 US, 152, 163 (1919); Mondou v New York, 223 US 1, 50 (1912); Hawkins v Bleakly, 243 US, 210, 213-214 (1917); Forti v New York State Ethics Com'n , 75 NY2d 596, 615 (1990) citing Cook v City of Binghamton, 48 NY2d 323, 330 (1979)). 3 The phrase "any party aggrieved" is intended in the broadest possible sense, so to include, for example, any patty to a pending appeal, absent expiration or exhaustion of the right to appeal from a final judgment dismissing or discontinuing against that party. 4 We note that CPLR 2004 does not apply to "specific" statutory dead- lines established by, for instance, the RPAPL, which does not permit judicial discretion for good cause (see generally Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg, 86 AD3d 274,283 (2d Dept 2011) r(T)he law must not yield to expediency and the convenience of lending institutions. Proper proce- dures must be followed to .. . assure the enforcement of the rules that govern real property")), nor is it applicable to a "judgment- (see CPLR 2004; contra CPLR 2003). In the same vein, CPLR 5019 cannot apply to excuse noncompliance with such a statute of limitations, as, for instance, the inclusion of the ninety -day statutory period (see RPAPL 1351 (I)) was not a "mistake, defect, or irregularity," and therefore not subject to "correction" (CPLR 5019(a) compare Lennar Northeast v. Gifaldi, 258 AD2d 240, 242 (4th Dept 1999) (finding 90-day period under RPAPL 1371(2) to be a statute of limitations); and L 2016, ch 73, § 8 (Part Q) (added "within ninety days of the date of the judgment" statute of limitation to RPAPL 1351(1)); with id. at § 9 (adding the a va ilability of a "good cause" extension to the 90-day period set forth under RPAPL 1353(1)); and En dara-Caicedo v New York State Dept. of M otor Vehicles, 38 NY3d 20,33 (2022) ("The Legislature is presumed to be aware of the law in existence at the time of an enactment"); cf. INS v Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421,432 (1987) (where the legislature "includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that the legislature acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclu- sion") (internal quotation marks & citations omitted; see Caprio v New York State Dept. of Taxation and Fin., 25 NY3d 744, 755 (2015) ("this Court has long stated that, "when the Legislature does tell us what it meant by a previous act, its subsequent statement of earlier intent is entitled to very great weight"(). To the extent the Appellate Division ha s held otherwise (e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v Cord, 214 AD3d 934 (2d Dept 2023)), such precedent should not be followed, as same is in direct conflict with the intent of the Legislature and principles of statutory construction.

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