Abolish Court Fees and Surcharges

Section 1. This act enacts into law major components of legislation relating to ending the unfair financial burdens imposed on defendants in criminal, vehicle and traffic, or other types of criminal or quasi-criminal matters by the existence of mandatory court surcharges and fees, mandatory minimum fines and mandatory probation or parole fees. This act further enacts into law procedures by which courts would be required to engage in an individualized assessment of a person's financial ability to pay a fine prior to imposing a fine, eliminates the availability of incarceration as a remedy for a failure to pay a fine, and vacates all existing warrants or unsatisfied civil judgments issued solely based on a person's failure to timely pay a fine, surcharge, or fee. Each component is wholly contained within a Part identified as Parts A through F. The effective date for each particular provision contained within such Part is set forth in the last section of such Part. Any provision in any section contained within a Part, including the effective date of the Part, which makes reference to a section "of this act", when used in connection with that particular component, shall be deemed to mean and refer to the corresponding section of the Part in which it is found. Section four of this act sets forth the general effective date of this act.

§ 2. Legislative intent. The legislative intent of this act is to end the inequitable financial burdens placed on defendants by the previously enacted statutory provisions which have authorized or mandated the imposition of surcharges, fees, and/or mandatory minimum fines, which have had a disparate impact on poor defendants, people of color, and those who lack access to the significant financial resources necessary in order to satisfy the imposition of surcharges, fees, and fines, and which have also contributed to mass incarceration in New York state. The legislative intent is also to end New York's regressive reliance on generating governmental revenue by imposing surcharges, fees, and fines on those least able to pay.

PART A

Section 1. Section 60.35 of the penal law is REPEALED.

§ 2. Section 1809 of the vehicle and traffic law is REPEALED.

§ 3. Section 1809-c of the vehicle and traffic law is REPEALED.

§ 4. Section 1809-d of the vehicle and traffic law is REPEALED.

§ 5. Section 1809-e of the vehicle and traffic law is REPEALED.

§ 6. Section 71-0213 of the environmental conservation law is REPEALED.

§ 7. The opening paragraph of paragraph 2 of subdivision (f) of section 1101 of the civil practice law and rules, as amended by chapter 322 of the laws of 2021, is amended to read as follows:

If the court determines that the incarcerated individual has insufficient means to pay the full filing fee, the court may permit the incarcerated individual to pay a reduced filing fee, the minimum of which shall not be less than fifteen dollars and the maximum of which shall not be more than fifty dollars. The court shall require an initial payment of such portion of the reduced filing fee as the incarcerated individual can reasonably afford or shall authorize no initial payment of the fee if exceptional circumstances render the incarcerated individual unable to pay any fee; provided however, that the difference between the amount of the reduced filing fee and the amount paid by the incarcerated individual in the initial partial payment shall be assessed against the incarcerated individual as an outstanding obligation to be collected either by the superintendent or the municipal official of the facility at which the incarcerated individual is confined, as the case may be[, in the same manner that mandatory surcharges are collected as provided for in subdivision five of section 60.35 of the penal law]. The court shall notify the superintendent or the municipal official of the facility where the incarcerated individual is housed of the amount of the reduced filing fee that was not directed to be paid by the incarcerated individual. Thereafter, the superintendent or the municipal official shall forward to the court any fee obligations that have been collected, provided however, that:

§ 8. Paragraph (a) of subdivision 2 of section 259-i of the executive law, as amended by chapter 322 of the laws of 2021, subparagraph (i) as amended by chapter 486 of the laws of 2022, is amended to read as follows:

(a) (i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, at least one month prior to the date on which an incarcerated individual may be paroled pursuant to subdivision one of section 70.40 of the penal law, a member or members as determined by the rules of the board shall personally interview such incarcerated individual and determine whether [he or she] such individual should be paroled in accordance with the guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article. If parole is not granted upon such review, the incarcerated individual shall be informed in writing within two weeks of such appearance of the factors and reasons for such denial of parole. Such reasons shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms. The board shall specify a date not more than twenty-four months from such determination for reconsideration, and the procedures to be followed upon reconsideration shall be the same. If the incarcerated individual is released, [he or she] such individual shall be given a copy of the conditions of parole. Such conditions shall where appropriate, include a requirement that the parolee comply with any restitution order, [mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee and DNA databank fee] previously imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction that applies to the parolee. The conditions shall indicate which restitution collection agency established under subdivision eight of section 420.10 of the criminal procedure law, shall be responsible for collection of restitution[, mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fees and DNA databank fees as provided for in section 60.35 of the penal law and section eighteen hundred nine of the vehicle and traffic law]. If the incarcerated individual is released, [he or she] such individual shall also be notified in writing that [his or her] such individual's voting rights will be restored upon release.

(ii) Any incarcerated individual who is scheduled for presumptive release pursuant to section eight hundred six of the correction law shall not appear before the board as provided in subparagraph (i) of this paragraph unless such incarcerated individual's scheduled presumptive release is forfeited, canceled, or rescinded subsequently as provided in such law. In such event, the incarcerated individual shall appear before the board for release consideration as provided in subparagraph (i) of this paragraph as soon thereafter as is practicable.

§ 9. Paragraph (a) of subdivision 2 of section 259-i of the executive law, as amended by chapter 486 of the laws of 2022, is amended to read as follows:

(a) At least one month prior to the expiration of the minimum period or periods of imprisonment fixed by the court or board, a member or members as determined by the rules of the board shall personally interview an incarcerated individual serving an indeterminate sentence and determine whether [he or she] such individual should be paroled at the expiration of the minimum period or periods in accordance with the procedures adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article. If parole is not granted upon such review, the incarcerated individual shall be informed in writing within two weeks of such appearance of the factors and reasons for such denial of parole. Such reasons shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms. The board shall specify a date not more than twenty-four months from such determination for reconsideration, and the procedures to be followed upon reconsideration shall be the same. If the incarcerated individual is released, [he or she] such individual shall be given a copy of the conditions of parole. Such conditions shall where appropriate, include a requirement that the parolee comply with any restitution order [and mandatory surcharge] previously imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction that applies to the parolee. The conditions shall indicate which restitution collection agency established under subdivision eight of section 420.10 of the criminal procedure law, shall be responsible for collection of restitution [and mandatory surcharge as provided for in section 60.35 of the penal law and section eighteen hundred nine of the vehicle and traffic law]. If the incarcerated individual is released, [he or she] such individual shall also be notified in writing that [his or her] such individual's voting rights will be restored upon release.

§ 10. Section 257-c of the executive law is REPEALED and a new section 257-c is added to read as follows:

§ 257-c. Probation fees prohibited. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no county or city may require individuals currently serving or who shall be sentenced to a period of probation upon conviction of any crime to pay any fee, including but not limited to an administrative fee, supervision fee, monitoring fee, testing fee, or screening fee, to the local probation department with the responsibility of supervising the probationer. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the collection of restitution payments pursuant to sections 65.10 and 60.27 of the penal law and subdivision eight of section 420.10 of the criminal procedure law.

§ 11. Paragraph (a) of subdivision 2 of section 205 of the correction law, as amended by chapter 491 of the laws of 2021, is amended to read as follows:

(a) A merit termination granted by the department under this section shall constitute a termination of the sentence with respect to which it was granted. No such merit termination shall be granted unless the department is satisfied that termination of sentence from presumptive release, parole, conditional release or post-release supervision is in the best interest of society[, and that the parolee or releasee, otherwise financially able to comply with an order of restitution and the payment of any mandatory surcharge previously imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction, has made a good faith effort to comply therewith].

§ 12. Subdivisions 1 and 3 of section 259-j of the executive law, as amended by section 38-g of subpart A of part C of chapter 62 of the laws of 2011, are amended to read as follows:

1. Except where a determinate sentence was imposed for a felony other than a felony defined in article two hundred twenty [or article two hundred twenty-one] of the penal law, if the board of parole is satisfied that an absolute discharge from presumptive release, parole, conditional release or release to a period of post-release supervision is in the best interests of society, the board may grant such a discharge prior to the expiration of the full term or maximum term to any person who has been on unrevoked community supervision for at least three consecutive years. A discharge granted under this section shall constitute a termination of the sentence with respect to which it was granted. [No such discharge shall be granted unless the board is satisfied that the parolee or releasee, otherwise financially able to comply with an order of restitution and the payment of any mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee or DNA databank fee previously imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction, has made a good faith effort to comply therewith.]

3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, where a term of post-release supervision in excess of five years has been imposed on a person convicted of a crime defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law, including a sexually motivated felony, the board of parole may grant a discharge from post-release supervision prior to the expiration of the maximum term of post-release supervision. Such a discharge may be granted only after the person has served at least five years of post-release supervision, and only to a person who has been on unrevoked post-release supervision for at least three consecutive years. No such discharge shall be granted unless the board of parole or the department acting pursuant to its responsibility under subdivision one of section two hundred one of the correction law consults with any licensed psychologist, qualified psychiatrist, or other mental health professional who is providing care or treatment to the supervisee; and the board[: (a)] determines that a discharge from post-release supervision is in the best interests of society[; and (b) is satisfied that the supervisee, otherwise financially able to comply with an order of restitution and the payment of any mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee, or DNA data bank fee previously imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction, has made a good faith effort to comply therewith]. Before making a determination to discharge a person from a period of post-release supervision, the board of parole may request that the commissioner of the office of mental health arrange a psychiatric evaluation of the supervisee. A discharge granted under this section shall constitute a termination of the sentence with respect to which it was granted.

§ 13. Subdivision 5 of section 27.12 of the parks, recreation and historic preservation law is REPEALED and subdivision 6 is renumbered subdivision 5.