What's happening
This bill prohibits New York law enforcement from using biometric surveillance technology and establishes a task force to study its regulation.
Why it matters
Protects against wrongful law enforcement actions by banning police use of biometric surveillance technologies prone to inaccuracy. especially those with documented higher error rates for women, young people, and people of color—which could otherwise lead to unjust targeting, arrests, or convictions.
Establishes enforceable rights for individuals. by allowing people to bring lawsuits for violations of the ban, giving the public a legal tool to hold law enforcement accountable if biometric surveillance is used unlawfully.
Carves out exceptions for traditional identification methods (like fingerprinting and DNA matching). in specific, legally-defined contexts, ensuring that core law enforcement identification procedures can continue without enabling broader biometric surveillance.
Creates a diverse task force to rigorously study the technology and its societal impacts. with a mandate to assess not only technical accuracy but also civil liberties, privacy, and equity concerns—ensuring that any future regulation or potential reauthorization is informed by public input, demographic analysis, and best practices.
Albany, before your first meeting.
Every bill that moved yesterday, summarized in a sentence and ranked by impact. The Albany Scorecard follows on Sundays.
Free. Unsubscribe in one click. Want alerts on specific bills? Create an account.
Who cares
Headline styles
Ban Police Biometric Surveillance
Plain English, a few words. Used as the page title.
Sponsors
History
- Recommit, enacting clause stricken
- Referred to internet and technology
Companion bill
The same bill in the other chamber. A bill becomes law when one version passes both houses and the governor signs it, so either number can carry it.
Ban Police Biometric Surveillance
In Assembly Committee · Governmental Operations · Sponsor Deborah Glick
Full text
7 pagesUnderlined is new[Struck] is removedOfficial text on nysenate.gov ↗
STATE OF NEW YORK
1033
2025-2026 Regular Sessions
IN SENATE (Prefiled)
January 8, 2025
Introduced by Sens. HOYLMAN-SIGAL, BAILEY, BRISPORT, JACKSON, KRUEGER, SALAZAR, SEPULVEDA -- read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Internet and Technology
AN ACT to amend the executive law, in relation to prohibiting the use of biometric surveillance technology by law enforcement; to establish the biometric surveillance regulation task force; and providing for the repeal of certain provisions upon expiration thereof
The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Section 1. Legislative intent. The legislature finds and declares the following:
(a) The use of biometric surveillance technology has been largely unregulated by all levels of government in the United States to date, allowing its unfettered use by private entities, government, and law enforcement with little to no requirements or restrictions relating to use, data retention, privacy protections, and use of information derived from such systems in law enforcement investigations. In New York, this lack of regulation and oversight has led to concerning practices by law enforcement, such as including sealed mugshots and arrest photos of juveniles in facial recognition databases and running photos of celebrity lookalikes through facial recognition software to attempt to identify potential suspects.
(b) Studies of currently available biometric surveillance technology demonstrate that such technology's consistency and accuracy can vary widely based on age, gender, sex, race, and other factors, and has been found to be particularly inaccurate when used on women, young people, and people of color.
(c) These accuracy concerns are particularly troubling in the context of this technology's ongoing and increasing use by law enforcement. New York's law enforcement should not rely on technology that has demon-
EXPLANATION--Matter in italics (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
[ ] is old law to be omitted.
LBD02656-01-5
strated accuracy issues, as such practice risks the wrongful targeting, interrogation, detention, or even conviction of an innocent person based on erroneous data.
(d) The largest U.S. supplier of police body cameras has publicly stated that this technology "is not currently reliable enough to ethically justify its use," and other major companies working on this technology have chosen not to offer it for general use until concerns about the technology's accuracy are resolved.
(e) In addition to accuracy concerns, the continuous use of this technology for broad, untargeted surveillance purposes constitutes an unacceptable mass violation of privacy and could chill New Yorkers' right to free speech and freedom of assembly.
(f) In order to protect the personal data, civil rights, civil liberties, and due process rights of all New Yorkers, the use of this technology by law enforcement should not currently be permitted, and more study and research should be conducted into the impacts of this technology before determining whether it should be authorized for use, and under what circumstances such use should be permitted.
§ 2. The executive law is amended by adding a new section 837-y to read as follows:
§ 837-y. Use of biometric surveillance systems prohibited. 1. Definitions. For the purposes of this section, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
(a) "Biometric information" means any measurable physiological, biological or behavioral characteristics that are attributable to an individual person, including facial characteristics, fingerprint characteristics, hand characteristics, eye characteristics, vocal characteristics, and any other physical characteristics that can be used, singly or in combination with each other or with other information, to establish individual identity. Examples of biometric information include, but are not limited to, fingerprints, handprints, retina and iris patterns, DNA sequence, voice, gait, and facial geometry.
(b)(i) "Biometric surveillance" means either of the following, alone or in combination:
(1) An automated or semi-automated process by which a person is identified or attempted to be identified based on their biometric information, including identification of known or unknown individuals or groups; and/or
(2) An automated or semi-automated process that generates, or assists in generating, surveillance information about an individual based on their biometric information.
(ii) "Biometric surveillance" shall not include the use of an automated or semi-automated process for the purposes of:
(1) redacting a recording for release or disclosure outside a police agency to protect the privacy of a subject depicted in the recording, if the process does not generate or result in the retention of any biometric information or surveillance information;
(2) the state DNA identification index in accordance with the provisions of section nine hundred ninety-five-c of this chapter; or
(3) the taking, submission, and processing of fingerprints for the state identification bureau, provided that such taking, submission and processing is explicitly authorized by law.
(c) "Biometric surveillance system" means any computer software or application that performs biometric surveillance, but does not include the state DNA identification index or the fingerprint identification portion of the state automated biometric identification system.
(d) "Police agency", "police officer" and "peace officer" shall have the same meanings as defined under section eight hundred thirty-five of this article.
(e) "Surveillance information" means either of the following, alone or in combination:
(i) Any information about a known or unknown individual, including but not limited to, a person's name, date of birth, gender, aggregated location data, or criminal background; and/or
(ii) Any information derived from biometric information, including but not limited to, assessments about an individual's sentiment, state of mind or level of dangerousness.
(f) "Use" means either of the following, alone or in combination:
(i) The direct use of a biometric surveillance system by a police agency, police officer or peace officer; and/or
(ii) A request by a police officer or peace officer that a police agency or other third party use a biometric surveillance system on behalf of the requesting entity.
2. No police agency, police officer or peace officer shall acquire, possess, access, install, activate or use any biometric surveillance system, or any biometric information or surveillance information derived from the use of a biometric surveillance system by any other entity, while in the course of their job duties or with regard to any information obtained, processed, or accessed in the course of those duties.
3. In addition to any other sanctions, penalties or remedies provided by law, a person may bring an action for equitable or declaratory relief in a court of competent jurisdiction against a police agency, police officer or peace officer that violates this section.
4. This section does not preclude a police agency, police officer or peace officer from:
(a) lawfully using a mobile fingerprint scanning device during a lawful detention to identify a person who does not have proof of identification if a police officer or peace officer has reasonable cause to arrest such person or to issue to and serve upon such person an appearance ticket, provided that any biometric or surveillance information retained through the use of such device may be used solely for the purposes permitted in this paragraph or other purposes explicitly authorized by law;
(b) accessing DNA comparisons between forensic evidence and designated offenders, as defined in subdivision seven of section nine hundred ninety-five of this chapter, through the state DNA identification index pursuant to section nine hundred ninety-five-c of this chapter;
(c) accessing fingerprint comparisons using the statewide automated biometric identification system for the purpose of routine booking or crime scene comparisons; or
(d) using any lawfully installed security system that processes biometric information solely for the purpose of verifying the identity of members, officers, employees, agents, or other affiliated staff of the police agency in order to determine whether such persons are permitted to access information, goods, materials, areas, or other possessions or property belonging to or under the custody of the police agency.
§ 3. The executive law is amended by adding a new section 236 to read as follows:
§ 236. Use of biometric surveillance systems prohibited. 1. Definitions. For the purposes of this section, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
(a) "Biometric information" means any measurable physiological, biological or behavioral characteristics that are attributable to an individual person, including facial characteristics, fingerprint characteristics, hand characteristics, eye characteristics, vocal characteristics, and any other physical characteristics that can be used, singly or in combination with each other or with other information, to establish individual identity. Examples of biometric information include, but are not limited to, fingerprints, handprints, retina and iris patterns, DNA sequence, voice, gait, and facial geometry.
(b) (i) "Biometric surveillance" means either of the following, alone or in combination:
(1) An automated or semi-automated process by which a person is identified or attempted to be identified based on their biometric information, including identification of known or unknown individuals or groups; and/or
(2) An automated or semi-automated process that generates, or assists in generating, surveillance information about an individual based on their biometric information.
(ii) "Biometric surveillance" shall not include the use of an automated or semi-automated process for the purposes of:
(1) redacting a recording for release or disclosure outside the state police to protect the privacy of a subject depicted in the recording, if the process does not generate or result in the retention of any biometric information or surveillance information;
(2) the state DNA identification index in accordance with the provisions of section nine hundred ninety-five-c of this chapter; or
(3) the taking, submission, and processing of fingerprints for the state identification bureau, provided that such taking, submission and processing is explicitly authorized by law.
(c) "Biometric surveillance system" means any computer software or application that performs biometric surveillance.
(d) "Surveillance information" means either of the following, alone or in combination:
(i) Any information about a known or unknown individual, including but not limited to, a person's name, date of birth, gender, aggregated location data, or criminal background; and/or
(ii) Any information derived from biometric information, including but not limited to, assessments about an individual's sentiment, state of mind or level of dangerousness.
(e) "Use" means either of the following, alone or in combination:
(i) The direct use of a biometric surveillance system by a member of the state police; and/or
(ii) A request by a member of the state police that a police agency or other third party use a biometric surveillance system on behalf of the requesting entity.
2. No member of the state police shall acquire, possess, access, install, activate or use any biometric surveillance system, or any biometric information or surveillance information derived from the use of a biometric surveillance system by any other entity, while in the course of their job duties or with regard to any information obtained, processed, or accessed in the course of those duties.
3. In addition to any other sanctions, penalties or remedies provided by law, a person may bring an action for equitable or declaratory relief in a court of competent jurisdiction against a member of the state police that violates this section.
4. This section does not preclude a member of the state police from:
(a) lawfully using a mobile fingerprint scanning device during a lawful detention to identify a person who does not have proof of identification if a member of the state police has reasonable cause to arrest such person or to issue to and serve upon such person an appearance ticket, provided that any biometric or surveillance information retained through the use of such device may be used solely for the purposes permitted in this paragraph or other purposes explicitly authorized by law;
(b) accessing DNA comparisons between forensic evidence and designated offenders, as defined in subdivision seven of section nine hundred ninety-five of this chapter, through the state DNA identification index pursuant to section nine hundred ninety-five-c of this chapter;
(c) accessing fingerprint comparisons using the statewide automated biometric identification system for the purpose of routine booking or crime scene comparisons; or
(d) using any lawfully installed security system that processes biometric information solely for the purpose of verifying the identity of members, officers, employees, agents, or other affiliated staff of the state police in order to determine whether such persons are permitted to access information, goods, materials, areas, or other possessions or property belonging to or under the custody of the state police.
§ 4. Biometric surveillance regulation task force. 1. (a) There is hereby established the task force on the regulation of biometric surveillance, which shall consist of twelve members as follows:
(a) the commissioner of the division of criminal justice services or such commissioner's designee;
(b) the superintendent of state police or such superintendent's designee;
(c) the commissioner of the New York city police department or such commissioner's designee; and
Reflowed for reading: line numbers and page breaks removed. Cite the official text.
Sponsor's memo
Title of bill
An act to amend the executive law, in relation to prohibiting the use of biometric surveillance technology by law enforcement; to establish the biometric surveillance regulation task force; and providing for the repeal of certain provisions upon expiration thereof
Purpose or general idea of bill
To prohibit the use of biometric surveillance technology by law enforce- ment and establish a task force to examine the issue, determine whether the use of such technology should be allowed, and if so, propose a comprehensive set of standards for use of such technology.
Summary of provisions
Section 1 of the bill sets forth legislative intent.
Read the full memo (1,051 words)
Section 2 of the bill creates a new Section 837-u of the Executive Law to prohibit the use of biometric surveillance systems by police offi- cers, peace officers, and police agencies, with certain exceptions for lawful and authorized DNA comparison, fingerprinting, internal security systems, and other purposes. The new section 837-u defines the terms "biometric information", "biometric surveillance", "biometric surveil- lance system", "surveillance information", and "use".
Section 3 of the bill creates a new Section 234 of the Executive Law to enact statutory provisions consistent with the provisions of
Section 837-u that would apply to members of the State Police.
Section 4 of the bill establishes the Task Force on the Regulation of Biometric Surveillance, consisting of twelve members including represen- tatives from the State Police, the Division of Criminal Justice Services, the NYPD, and members appointed by the Governor and Legisla- ture with expertise in data security, civil rights and liberties, biome- tric surveillance, legal representation, and/or criminal defense.
The Task Force would be directed to study the current and proposed use of biometric surveillance systems by governments and/or law enforcement, and current laws, rules, regulations, and policies governing their use. It would also be directed to evaluate the effectiveness, efficacy, and accuracy of such systems, as well as their potential harms, taking into account the impact of such systems on certain vulnerable or protected populations.
The Task Force would also be directed to evaluate whether the use of such systems by law enforcement should be permitted, and if so, the Task Force must propose a comprehensive framework of recommendations for legislation, regulations, and standards regarding the use of such systems. The bill specifies certain guidelines that the,Task Force must follow when developing that framework. The bill requires the Task Force to transmit a report of its findings to the Governor and Legislature no sooner than January 1, 2024 and no later than January 1, 2025.
Section 5 of the bill establishes the bill's effective date.
Justification
As the use of biometric surveillance technology becomes increasingly common, concerns have been raised by advocates for privacy and civil liberties relating to the effectiveness and ethical implications of such technology.
Significant evidence exists to suggest that facial recognition technolo- gy in particular is less accurate when analyzing faces of color than when analyzing white faces. A 2018 study from MIT and Stanford Universi- ty examining commercially available facial analysis programs created by three major companies found that the three programs' rates of error in determining the gender of light-skinned men were never worse than 0.8%, but the rates of error for dark-skinned women were significantly higher, with two of the programs showing an error rate of more than 34%.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) ran a test of another widely available facial recognition tool by comparing photos of members of Congress with a database of mugshots, and the software incorrectly matched 28 members of Congress with individuals who had been arrested for a crime. A disproportionate number of the incorrect matches were people of color.
This evidence of bias and inaccuracy is particularly troubling in the context of law enforcement, where an incorrect match has the potential to have devastating consequences.
In June of 2019, Axon (formerly Taser), a major manufacturer of body- worn cameras for police departments across the country including the NYPD, publicly stated that they "will not be commercializing face match- ing products" on their body cameras due to bias concerns, saying that "face recognition technology is not currently reliable enough to ethically justify its use on body-worn cameras." Axon added, "At the least, face recognition technology should not be deployed until the technology performs with far greater accuracy and performs equally well across races, ethnicities, genders, and other identity groups.
Despite these major concerns, police departments across the country continue to partner with major corporations actively marketing facial recognition software. Agreements with certain companies have given law enforcement access to home security cameras and other smart devices capable of either employing biometric surveillance technology or supply- ing footage or data to be run through biometric surveillance systems.
The harms of the overuse of this technology are not theoretical. For an example of how it can he misused, we need only look to China, which maintains a vast DNA database and has a massive network of surveillance cameras capable of using real-time automated facial recognition to moni- tor the movements of people within its borders. The technology has been used to monitor, track, and profile Uighurs, an ethnic Muslim minority within China.
Here in the United States, the use of this emerging technology is almost entirely unregulated, leaving weighty decisions regarding the ethical implications of its use solely in the hands of law enforcement. Given the serious concerns that have been raised about presently available biometric surveillance technology, New York's law enforcement should not
presently be permitted to deploy or rely on it as a policing tool that could potentially lead to wrongful targeting, arrest or imprisonment.
This bill would prohibit such practice and convene a state Task Force to examine the issue in depth and propose a comprehensive set of standards for use of such technology in the future if it is to be allowed.
Prior legislative history
S.1540 of 2023-2024 (Hoylman-Sigal): Died in Internet and Technology
A.1751 of 2023-2024 (Dinowitz): Died in Governmental Operations
S.0079 of 2021-2022 (Hoylman): Died in Internet and Technology
A.5492 of 2021-2022 (Gottfried): Died in Governmental Operations
S.7572 of 2019-2020 (Hoylman): Died in Internet and Technology
A.9767 of 2019-2020 (Glick): Died in Governmental Operations
Fiscal implications for state and local governments
To be determined.
Effective date
This act shall take effect immediately.
Summaries, headlines and scores are AI-generated from the official bill text. How we score bills. Source: NYS Open Legislation.