What's happening
The bill limits courts' ability to reduce or overturn jury awards in employment discrimination cases unless strict criteria are met.
Why it matters
Raises the bar for reducing jury awards in employment discrimination cases. Courts would only be able to overturn or lower jury awards if there is clear evidence that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake, or corruption, and that failing to adjust the award would result in a complete miscarriage of justice. This makes it much harder for courts to change what juries decide.
Prioritizes the goals of anti-discrimination laws. When reviewing jury awards, courts must give primary weight to the remedial purpose of laws protecting against employment discrimination, rather than relying on comparisons to past awards or a judge’s personal knowledge from other cases. This approach underscores the unique and corrective intent of these laws.
Removes reliance on “material deviation” standard. The bill eliminates the previous guideline that allowed awards to be changed if they “materially deviate” from reasonable compensation, reducing judicial discretion to substitute their own judgment for that of the jury in discrimination cases.
Applies retroactively to ongoing cases. The new rules would affect not just future lawsuits, but also any current cases where a verdict has not yet been reached, potentially impacting pending litigation strategies and outcomes for both plaintiffs and defendants.
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Who cares
Headline styles
Protect Jury Awards for Discrimination
Plain English, a few words. Used as the page title.
Sponsors
History
- Referred to judiciary
- Delivered to assembly
- Passed senateVote 40–22
- Advanced to third reading
- 2nd report cal.
- 1st report cal.474
- Referred to judiciary
- Returned to senate
- Died in assembly
- Referred to judiciary
- Delivered to assembly
- Passed senateVote 38–21
Show 4 earlier actions
- Advanced to third reading
- 2nd report cal.
- 1st report cal.183
- Referred to judiciary
Full text
4 pagesUnderlined is new[Struck] is removedOfficial text on nysenate.gov ↗
STATE OF NEW YORK
410
2025-2026 Regular Sessions
IN SENATE (Prefiled)
January 8, 2025
Introduced by Sens. GOUNARDES, COMRIE, GIANARIS, GONZALEZ, HOYLMAN-SI- GAL, JACKSON, MYRIE, RAMOS, RIVERA, SALAZAR, SEPULVEDA -- read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Judiciary
AN ACT to amend the civil practice law and rules and the executive law, in relation to jury awards for unlawful discriminatory practices relating to employment
The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Section 1. Subdivision (a) of rule 4404 of the civil practice law and rules, such rule as renumbered by chapter 315 of the laws of 1962, is amended to read as follows:
(a) Motion after trial where jury required. After a trial of a cause of action or issue triable of right by a jury, upon the motion of any party or on its own initiative, the court may set aside a verdict or any judgment entered thereon and direct that judgment be entered in favor of a party entitled to judgment as a matter of law or it may order a new trial of a cause of action or separable issue where the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, in the interest of justice or where the jury cannot agree after being kept together for as long as is deemed reasonable by the court. No court shall order a new trial on the ground that the jury award was excessive, or otherwise act to reduce the jury's award in a case involving an unlawful discriminatory practice under section two hundred ninety-six of the executive law relating to employment, including a claim by a non-employee under section two hundred ninety-six-d of the executive law, or under any analogous local or municipal human rights law, if applicable, without fully satisfying the pertinent standards set forth in paragraph two of subdivision (c) of section fifty-five hundred one of this chapter and paragraph (b) of
EXPLANATION--Matter in italics (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
[ ] is old law to be omitted.
LBD00984-01-5
subdivision nine of section two hundred ninety-seven of the executive law.
§ 2. Subdivision (c) of section 5501 of the civil practice law and rules, as amended by chapter 474 of the laws of 1997, is amended to read as follows:
(c) Appellate division. 1. The appellate division shall review questions of law and questions of fact on an appeal from a judgment or order of a court of original instance and on an appeal from an order of the supreme court, a county court or an appellate term determining an appeal. The notice of appeal from an order directing summary judgment, or directing judgment on a motion addressed to the pleadings, shall be deemed to specify a judgment upon said order entered after service of the notice of appeal and before entry of the order of the appellate court upon such appeal, without however affecting the taxation of costs upon the appeal. In reviewing a money judgment in an action in which an itemized verdict is required by rule forty-one hundred eleven of this chapter in which it is contended that the award is excessive or inadequate and that a new trial should have been granted unless a stipulation is entered to a different award, the appellate division shall determine that an award is excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation.
2. Where an award is made by a jury for any damages in a case involving an unlawful discriminatory practice under section two hundred ninety-six of the executive law relating to employment, or under any analogous local or municipal human rights law, including a claim by a non-employee under section two hundred ninety-six-d of the executive law, the jury's verdict is presumed to be correct. Any such jury award shall not be disturbed unless the court finds, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, exceptional circumstances which compel the conclusion that (i) the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption, and (ii) remittitur or additur is necessary to avoid a complete miscarriage of justice. In making such determination, the court shall give primary weight to the remedial purpose of the law, and shall not limit any award by using any characterizations of other damage awards. In any such case, the court shall not be bound by any precedent which utilized the concept of material deviation from what would be reasonable compensation, or a judge's personal knowledge or experiences from prior cases.
§ 3. Subdivision 9 of section 297 of the executive law, as amended by chapter 140 of the laws of 2022, is amended to read as follows:
9. (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice shall have a cause of action in any court of appropriate jurisdiction for damages, including, in cases of employment discrimination related to private employers and housing discrimination only, punitive damages, and such other remedies as may be appropriate, including any civil fines and penalties provided in subdivision four of this section, unless such person had filed a complaint hereunder or with any local commission on human rights, or with the superintendent pursuant to the provisions of section two hundred ninety-six-a of this article, provided that, where the division has dismissed such complaint on the grounds of administrative convenience, on the grounds of untimeliness, or on the grounds that the election of remedies is annulled, such person shall maintain all rights to bring suit as if no complaint had been filed with the division. At any time prior to a hearing before a hearing examiner, a person who has a complaint pending at the division may request that the division dismiss the complaint and annul his or her election of remedies so that the human rights law claim may be pursued in court, and the division may, upon such request, dismiss the complaint on the grounds that such person's election of an administrative remedy is annulled. Notwithstanding subdivision (a) of section two hundred four of the civil practice law and rules, if a complaint is so annulled by the division, upon the request of the party bringing such complaint before the division, such party's rights to bring such cause of action before a court of appropriate jurisdiction shall be limited by the statute of limitations in effect in such court at the time the complaint was initially filed with the division. Any party to a housing discrimination complaint shall have the right within twenty days following a determination of probable cause pursuant to subdivision two of this section to elect to have an action commenced in a civil court, and an attorney representing the division of human rights will be appointed to present the complaint in court, or, with the consent of the division, the case may be presented by complainant's attorney. A complaint filed by the equal employment opportunity commission to comply with the requirements of 42 USC 2000e-5(c) and 42 USC 12117(a) and 29 USC 633(b) shall not constitute the filing of a complaint within the meaning of this subdivision. No person who has initiated any action in a court of competent jurisdiction or who has an action pending before any administrative agency under any other law of the state based upon an act which would be an unlawful discriminatory practice under this article, may file a complaint with respect to the same grievance under this section or under section two hundred ninety-six-a of this article. In cases of housing discrimination only, a person whose complaint has been dismissed by the division after investigation for lack of jurisdiction or lack of probable cause may file the same cause of action in a court of appropriate jurisdiction pursuant to this section, unless judicial review of such dismissal has been sought pursuant to section two hundred ninety-eight of this article. The attorney general shall have the power to commence an action or proceeding in the supreme court of the state of New York, if, upon information or belief, the attorney general is of the opinion that an employer has been, is, or is about to violate the provisions regarding unlawful discriminatory retaliation pursuant to subdivision seven of section two hundred ninety-six of this article. Nothing in this section shall in any way limit rights or remedies which are otherwise available under law to the attorney general or any other person authorized to bring an action under this section.
(b) A verdict involving an unlawful discriminatory practice under section two hundred ninety-six of this article relating to employment, including a claim by a non-employee under section two hundred ninetysix-d of this article, or under any analogous local or human rights law, if applicable, shall not be subject to remittitur or additur, or granting of a motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict was excessive or inadequate, or otherwise reduced or increased, unless the court finds, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, exceptional circumstances which compel the conclusion that (i) the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption and (ii) that remittitur or additur is necessary to avoid a complete miscarriage of justice. In making such determination, the court shall give primary weight to the remedial purpose of the law, and shall not limit any award by using any characterizations of other damage awards. In any such case, the court shall not be bound by any precedent which utilized the concept of material deviation from what would be reasonable compensation. This provision is substantive in nature, as opposed to procedural, and shall be so applied in any employment discrimination action under this article, regardless of forum.
§ 4. This act shall take effect immediately and shall apply to all pending cases where a verdict has not yet been reached as of such effective date, as well as all claims filed on or after such effective date.
Reflowed for reading: line numbers and page breaks removed. Cite the official text.
Sponsor's memo
Title of bill
An act to amend the civil practice law and rules and the executive law, in relation to jury awards for unlawful discriminatory practices relat- ing to employment
Purpose or general idea of bill
To limit the circumstances in which a judge can significantly alter jury awards in civil employment discrimination cases
Summary of provisions
Section one of this bill amends subdivision (a) of Rule 4404 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), which provides the circumstances and process by which a judge may set aside a jury's verdict or order a new trial in civil judicial proceedings. Section one provides that a judge may not order a new trial or otherwise act to reduce a jury award in employment discrimination cases under Executive Law § 296, or any analogous local or municipal human rights law, without fully satisfying the standards set forth in sections two and three of the bill.
Read the full memo (1,052 words)
Section two of this bill amends subdivision c of Section 5501 of CPLR which describes the scope and jurisdiction of the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division. Section two provides that an appellate court may not deviate from a jury verdict unless it can find exceptional circumstances which compel the conclusion that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption and that remittitur or additur is necessary to avoid a complete miscarriage of justice. The court shall give primary weight to the remedial purpose of the law and shall not limit an award using characterizations of other damage awards. The court shall not be bound by precedent or a judge's personal know- ledge or experience from prior cases.
Section three of this bill amends subdivision 9 of section 297 of the Executive Law which provides a cause of action for employees suffering discrimination under the state's Human Rights Law (Article 15 of the Executive Law). Section three provides that a jury award of damages for employment discrimination shall not be subject to a remittitur or addi- tur unless the court finds exceptional circumstances which compel the conclusion that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake, or corrupter and that remittitur or additur is necessary to avoid a complete miscarriage of justice. The court shall give primary weight to the remedial purpose of the law and shall not limit an award using characterizations of other damage awards. The court shall not be bound by precedent or a judge's personal knowledge or experience from prior cases. The last sentence of this paragraph says that this provision is substantive in nature, as opposed to procedural, meaning that it should apply in both state-level courts and federal courts which may decide certain employment discrimination cases based on diversity jurisdiction. When this happens, federal judges are asked to reduce verdicts based on state law causes of action, so this language is meant to clarify that this higher standard for remittiturs/additurs should be substantively applied to all courts and is not a mere procedural matter, which can be easily disregarded in favor of federal law.
Section four of this bill sets the effective date.
Justification
Judges in civil judicial proceedings in New York state are empowered to overrule and reduce jury awards (known as a remittitur) or increase them (known as an additur) if they believe that the jury has erred in any way in its estimation of what a plaintiff is owed. In cases of employment discrimination brought under Executive Law § 296 (the Human Rights Law), these awards frequently take the form of emotional distress and punitive damages which will deter defendants and other employers from allowing harassment in the workplace to go unchecked.
Judges in New York have begun to generically sort claims under § 296, however, into certain categories based on details about the case and defendant, relying heavily on prior case law. A case in which a plain- tiff has not received medical treatment might be labeled as "garden variety" and assigned a value of $125,000 or less, no matter what the jury awarded the plaintiff, where a case involving an "intermediate" level of emotional distress gets more. These categories, which have no basis in medical or sociological fact, are simply a result of judges looking at prior damages of "similar" cases of employment discrimi- nation. Routinely resulting in reductions of tens if not hundreds of thousands of dollars, these decisions serve to undermine juries and public confidence in the civil court system by overturning jury verdicts for seemingly no valid reason.
New York stands alone in the degree to which judges disregard workplace harassment jury verdicts in what are frequently highly sensitive and nuanced cases. In surrounding states such as New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, jury verdicts are entitled to substan- tial deference and presumed to be correct absent a clear miscarriage of justice.
This bill establishes a higher standard for remittiturs and additurs in cases involving unlawful discrimination relating to employment under Executive Law § 296, better aligning New York with other states. It provides that a court may not overturn a jury's verdict unless it finds that a proponent has the court finds exceptional circumstances which compel the conclusion that the jury was influenced by impartiality, prejudice, mistake, or corruption, and that a remittitur or additur is necessary to avoid a complete miscarriage of justice. The court may not categorize awards based on similar characteristics of other damage awards or be bound by judicial precedent when considering whether or not to alter a jury award. The court must give primary consideration to the remedial purpose of the law.
It is the sponsor's hope that these reforms will curb the arbitrary categorization and reduction of emotional distress and punitive damages for victims of workplace harassment so that perpetrators of this abusive behavior are held fully accountable for their actions and victims receive the justice they deserve.
Prior legislative history
2024: S17A - Died on Third Reading
2023: S17 - Referred to Judiciary 2022: S5493 - Referred to Judiciary
2021: S5493 - Referred to Judiciary
Fiscal implications
None
Effective date
This act shall take effect immediately and shall apply to all pending cases where a verdict has not yet been reached as of the effective date as well as all claims filed on or after the effective date.
Summaries, headlines and scores are AI-generated from the official bill text. How we score bills. Source: NYS Open Legislation.