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A11197Assembly2025-2026 SessionSame asS10424

Limit Utility Profit Rates

Official title

“Enacts the "fair authorized investment returns act"”

Sponsor Sarahana ShresthaAD-103+2 co-sponsorsAffects Economy
Status
In Assembly Committee
Corporations, Authorities And Commissions
Impact
9/10
Transformational
Passage
21%

Bill progress

Step 2 of 7

In committee · Corporations, Authorities And Commissions

What's happening

This bill limits how much profit utilities can earn and lets investors set fairer rates.

Why it matters

  1. Directly impacts New York utility bills and ratepayers statewide. By setting a statutory cap on the profit rate (“return on equity”) utilities can earn, this bill is likely to have a direct effect on electric, gas, and water bills for millions of households and businesses across New York, potentially reducing costs that are currently passed on to consumers.

  2. Shifts how utility profit rates are set and introduces market mechanisms. Replaces the traditional regulatory process (often criticized as opaque and influenced by industry) with a formula tied to the 10-Year Treasury yield plus 2%, and allows utilities or regulators to use competitive auctions to set higher rates—making the process more transparent and potentially more closely tied to actual market conditions.

  3. Increases transparency and oversight of utility finances. Requires annual public reporting to the Governor and Legislature on returns, auction results, customer rate impacts, and enforcement actions, while also mandating that utility investments (including work in progress) be included in the rate base—altering incentives for utility investment and providing new information to both regulators and the public.

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Who cares

  • Utility Ratepayers (Residential and Business Customers)

    This bill directly impacts the rates paid for electric, gas, and water service by capping the allowed return on equity for utilities, aiming to lower bills and prevent ratepayer overcharges.

  • Investor-Owned Utilities

    These companies are directly affected by new limits on the returns they can earn on capital investments, as well as requirements to conduct competitive equity auctions if they believe higher returns are warranted.

  • Institutional Investors and Financial Markets

    Pension funds, insurance companies, and other accredited investors who provide equity capital to utilities care about the new auction process, the structure of auction equity interests, and the potential for changes in risk and return profiles.

  • Public Service Commission and Regulatory Agencies

    The commission is tasked with new responsibilities, including overseeing the default return formula, conducting and certifying equity auctions, handling new reporting requirements, and ensuring the law’s effective implementation and enforcement.

Headline styles

Limit Utility Profit Rates

Plain English, a few words. Used as the page title.

Sponsors

Primary sponsor
Sarahana Shrestha

Assembly Member · Assembly District 103

History

  1. Referred to corporations, authorities and commissions

Companion bill

The same bill in the other chamber. A bill becomes law when one version passes both houses and the governor signs it, so either number can carry it.

S10424Senate

Limit Utility Investment Returns

In Senate Committee · Energy And Telecommunications · Sponsor Shelley Mayer

Impact 9 · Transformational26% to pass

Full text

18 pagesUnderlined is new[Struck] is removedOfficial text on nysenate.gov ↗

STATE OF NEW YORK

11197

IN ASSEMBLY

May 1, 2026

Introduced by M. of A. SHRESTHA -- read once and referred to the Committee on Corporations, Authorities and Commissions

AN ACT to amend the public service law, in relation to enacting the "fair authorized investment returns act"

The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

Section 1. Short title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "fair authorized investment returns act".

§ 2. Legislative findings. The legislature finds and declares all of the following:

1. Investor-owned electric, gas, and water utilities are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return on their invested capital, but ratepayers should not bear costs that exceed the level necessary to attract capital under prevailing market conditions. A return on equity authorized above the minimum rate of return necessary to attract capital investment results in charges to ratepayers that are unjust and unreasonable.

2. Authorized returns on equity over and above the minimum rate of return necessary to attract capital investment -- the cost of capital -- harm ratepayers in multiple ways, including the direct cost of excess returns passed on to ratepayers, the incremental corporate income taxes owed on those excess returns, and the further costs that flow from the well-documented Averch-Johnson effect, by which too-high rates of return on equity create incentives for utilities to over invest in capital assets.

3. The Capital Asset Pricing Model, applied to the low market beta of regulated utility equities relative to broad market indices, suggests that a premium to the 10-Year Treasury risk-free rate of less than two percent is warranted. Discounted cash flow analysis leads to a similar conclusion.

4. The significant premium to book value at which the holding companies of most utilities trade provides further evidence that authorized returns on equity are above utilities' cost of equity. As a matter of

EXPLANATION--Matter in italics (underscored) is new; matter in brackets

[ ] is old law to be omitted.

LBD15643-02-6

financial principle, a utility earning a return on equity equal to its cost of equity should trade at approximately book value.

5. That the return on equity awarded to regulated utilities in this state is broadly consistent with those awarded in other jurisdictions does not dispel these concerns. Rather, these consistently excessive returns reflect a rate-setting process in which regulators in each jurisdiction reference what other jurisdictions have awarded.

6. More broadly, these excessive returns and premium valuations are a predictable consequence of the well-documented phenomenon of regulatory capture and capital bias, as explored in the foundational work of George Stigler (Nobel Prize, 1982) and Jean Tirole (Nobel Prize, 2014). The regulated entities subject to commission oversight can devote substantial resources to influencing regulatory outcomes that determine their profitability -- including the hiring of experts to advance favorable interpretations of otherwise straightforward financial models, the maintenance of revolving-door employment relationships with former regulators, and extensive "educational" engagement with regulatory staff -- while ratepayer interests are represented by comparatively limited resources. Process enhancements such as mandating more sophisticated analytical models will not resolve this imbalance, because the problem is not which analytical tools are used but how their inputs are chosen.

7. These excessive returns translate to a substantial burden upon ratepayers. Across the country, utilities earn excess profits that go beyond their entitled reasonable returns, amounting to approximately five hundred dollars extra per household annually. Soaring rates place a growing share of households at risk of service disconnection. Businesses are also impacted, as high rates disadvantage them relative to competitors based elsewhere.

8. The current process by which the public service commission and regulated utilities set rates has historically been inaccessible and indecipherable to the public and often runs contrary to the stated goals of ensuring affordable, safe, secure, and reliable utility service for residential and business consumers.

9. The default authorized return established by this act -- equal to the 10-Year Treasury plus 200 basis points -- is set at a level the legislature finds to be at or above the cost of equity for most covered utilities under prevailing market conditions, based on the financial evidence described in subdivisions three and four of this section. At current treasury rates, this formula produces an authorized return above what financial models indicate is required to attract capital for regulated utility equity having the risk profile of a typical covered utility. The 200 basis point premium is designed to ensure that, for the large majority of covered utilities in ordinary circumstances, the default authorized return is not confiscatory, while still representing a significant reduction from the historically excessive returns that the current regulatory process has produced. The legislature recognizes that market conditions may change over time and that what constitutes an adequate return will vary accordingly; this act's annual reset mechanism ensures that the treasury component of the default authorized return tracks prevailing market conditions.

10. A competitive equity auction conducted pursuant to section twenty-eight-c of the public service law that produces an authorized return on equity above the default authorized return does not by itself establish that the default authorized return is confiscatory or below the constitutional minimum. In the early period following enactment, auction-clearing returns may exceed the default authorized return in part because investors are unfamiliar with these instruments and require a premium return to compensate for that unfamiliarity -- a premium that the legislature expects to decline as these instruments become established in the capital markets. Even in this transitional period, the availability of the auction mechanism ensures that no covered utility is required to operate under a return below what willing investors, in a competitive process, have determined to be adequate compensation for the associated risk. This act's true-up provisions further ensure that any covered utility that conducts an auction is made whole for the period during which the default authorized return was in effect, so that no covered utility suffers a permanent confiscatory outcome.

11. The default authorized return and the competitive equity auction mechanism, taken together, satisfy the constitutional standard articulated in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), and Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 262 U.S. 679 (1923), by ensuring that every covered utility has both a presumptively adequate default return and an opportunity to demonstrate, through competitive market evidence, that a higher return is required. Sealed-bid uniform-price auctions are widely used in capital markets, including for the issuance of U.S. Treasury securities, and the competitive pricing mechanism established by this act is functionally equivalent to processes that operate successfully in debt and equity markets worldwide. Sealed-bid uniform-price auctions are also the mechanism by which the Federal Communications Commission allocates electromagnetic spectrum and by which regional transmission organizations such as PJM Interconnection and ISO New England procure electric generation capacity. The application of this well-established mechanism to the determination of utility equity costs is novel, but the mechanism itself is proven across multiple regulated markets.

12. When competitive markets exist and function effectively, market prices can provide the information required to protect consumers from price gouging. Regulatory discretion is warranted when markets fail to function effectively. In the case of utility debt, commissions do not convene adjudicatory proceedings to determine a "reasonable" bond yield; they incorporate the market-determined coupon rate because a competitive debt market provides reliable evidence of the cost of debt. This act applies the same principle to equity: where a competitive auction can provide direct, transaction-level evidence of the return investors require to supply equity capital to a regulated utility, that evidence is superior to any estimate produced by expert testimony applying contested financial models. A covered utility is no more entitled to demand a judicially supervised determination of its equity cost than it is to demand such a determination of its debt cost. State legislatures routinely establish formulaic rate structures by statute, including avoided-cost requirements under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, net metering compensation rates, and feed-in tariff schedules. This act follows established precedent in codifying a formulaic approach that reduces regulatory discretion while preserving the public service commission's authority over implementation, auction administration, and ratemaking mechanics.

13. Covered utilities, as recipients of state-granted monopoly franchises serving the public, have accepted obligations of transparency and public accountability that are not imposed on ordinary private enterprises. The disclosure requirements that attend a securities offering conducted pursuant to this act serve the public interest by making the financial condition, operations, and risks of covered utilities more transparent to regulators, ratepayers, and the public at large. Such transparency is itself consistent with, and supportive of, effective cost-of-service regulation, and the legislature finds that the public benefit of enhanced utility disclosure is substantial. It is the intent of this act that all reasonable costs incurred by a covered utility in connection with a competitive equity auction, including any registration and offering costs, management time reasonably allocable to the auction process, and professional fees, be recoverable in rates as set forth in section twenty-eight-c of the public service law. The legislature further finds that such costs are expected to be substantially less than the expert testimony, legal, and other costs currently incurred by covered utilities and ratepayers in litigating return-on-equity determinations in administrative rate proceedings.

14. This act does not require covered utilities to issue equity. The competitive equity auction mechanism is initiated at the option of the covered utility, as a means of demonstrating that its cost of equity exceeds the default authorized return. Unless the covered utility elects otherwise, auction equity interests issued pursuant to this act do not carry voting rights with respect to the affairs of the covered utility or any regulated service corporation or regulated service LLC, and do not otherwise entitle holders to participate in the governance of the covered utility. Covered utilities are already routinely required to issue debt instruments on market-determined terms, the cost of which is incorporated into rates without a separate adjudicatory determination of "reasonable" debt cost. The competitive equity auction is the equitable equivalent for equity: it allows the market to determine the minimum return required by investors under competitive conditions, in precisely the same manner that bond markets determine the minimum return required by lenders. A covered utility that chooses not to petition for an auction retains the default authorized return, which the legislature has determined to be adequate for most covered utilities under prevailing conditions. The legislature further finds that the auction equity interest is economically similar to tracking stock -- an instrument familiar to institutional investors -- and that the predictability of regulated utility revenue streams makes this instrument well suited to certain investors, including pension funds and insurance companies.

15. Any impact of a lower authorized return on equity on credit ratings can, if necessary, be offset by adjusting the authorized debtto-equity ratio applicable to each regulated service. Under this act, the authorized capital structure is determined at the level of each regulated service rather than at the level of the covered utility as a whole, and it is the intent of this act that the public service commission set and adjust such capital structure as may be necessary to maintain financial soundness and continued access to capital markets. The legislature further finds that credit rating agencies evaluate regulated utilities on a multi-factor basis in which the authorized return on equity is one input among many, and that the entity structure established by this act -- including bankruptcy remoteness, ring-fencing, and dedicated revenue streams -- is designed to strengthen the credit profile of the regulated service relative to the covered utility's unsegregated balance sheet.

Reflowed for reading: line numbers and page breaks removed. Cite the official text.

Summaries, headlines and scores are AI-generated from the official bill text. How we score bills. Source: NYS Open Legislation.