What's happening
This bill limits the profits that electric, gas, and water utilities can charge customers by capping returns on equity and establishing a competitive auction process to set those returns.
Why it matters
Impacts Downstate and Upstate Ratepayers and Businesses. By capping how much profit investor-owned electric, gas, and water utilities can earn, the bill aims to reduce customer bills for millions of New Yorkers—especially in areas with high utility costs like New York City, Long Island, and parts of Upstate. Lower rates could help households at risk of shutoff and make local businesses more competitive compared to other states.
Major Shift in Utility Rate-Setting Process. The bill moves away from traditional negotiated or regulator-set profit rates and introduces a formula (10-Year Treasury rate + 2%) as the new default, plus a novel competitive auction system to let the market set higher returns if needed. This fundamentally changes how returns for utilities are set in New York, reducing reliance on expert testimony and regulatory discretion, and making the process more transparent and less susceptible to industry influence.
New Transparency, Reporting, and Structural Requirements. Utilities will face new mandates for financial transparency, annual public reporting, and, over time, structural changes such as creating separate “regulated service” entities to ring-fence their monopoly businesses. These changes are designed to make utility finances clearer to the public and regulators, ensure profits more closely match actual investor needs, and remove incentives for utilities to over-invest in infrastructure just to boost returns.
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Who cares
New York Utility Ratepayers
Residential and business customers who pay electric, gas, or water bills will be directly affected by changes to how utility investment returns are set, potentially resulting in lower utility rates.
Investor-Owned Utilities
Companies that own and operate electric, gas, or water utilities in New York will be subject to new limits and processes for setting their allowed returns on equity, impacting their profitability and capital-raising strategies.
Utility Investors & Financial Markets
Institutional investors, pension funds, insurance companies, and others who invest in utility equities will care about the shift from administrative to competitive, auction-based determination of equity returns, as it changes risk profiles and expected returns.
Public Service Commission & NYS Regulatory Bodies
The PSC and related regulatory agencies will see major changes in their procedures for rate setting, oversight responsibilities, and reporting, including new mandates to implement and supervise competitive equity auctions and expanded annual reporting requirements.
Headline styles
Limit Utility Investment Returns
Plain English, a few words. Used as the page title.
Sponsors
Senator · Senate District 37
1 Co-sponsor
History
- Referred to energy and telecommunications
Companion bill
The same bill in the other chamber. A bill becomes law when one version passes both houses and the governor signs it, so either number can carry it.
Limit Utility Profit Rates
In Assembly Committee · Corporations, Authorities And Commissions · Sponsor Sarahana Shrestha
Full text
18 pagesUnderlined is new[Struck] is removedOfficial text on nysenate.gov ↗
STATE OF NEW YORK
10424
IN SENATE
May 15, 2026
Introduced by Sen. MAYER -- read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Energy and Telecommunications
AN ACT to amend the public service law, in relation to enacting the "fair authorized investment returns act"
The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Section 1. Short title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "fair authorized investment returns act".
§ 2. Legislative findings. The legislature finds and declares all of the following:
1. Investor-owned electric, gas, and water utilities are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return on their invested capital, but ratepayers should not bear costs that exceed the level necessary to attract capital under prevailing market conditions. A return on equity authorized above the minimum rate of return necessary to attract capital investment results in charges to ratepayers that are unjust and unreasonable.
2. Authorized returns on equity over and above the minimum rate of return necessary to attract capital investment -- the cost of capital -- harm ratepayers in multiple ways, including the direct cost of excess returns passed on to ratepayers, the incremental corporate income taxes owed on those excess returns, and the further costs that flow from the well-documented Averch-Johnson effect, by which too-high rates of return on equity create incentives for utilities to over invest in capital assets.
3. The Capital Asset Pricing Model, applied to the low market beta of regulated utility equities relative to broad market indices, suggests that a premium to the 10-Year Treasury risk-free rate of less than two percent is warranted. Discounted cash flow analysis leads to a similar conclusion.
4. The significant premium to book value at which the holding companies of most utilities trade provides further evidence that authorized returns on equity are above utilities' cost of equity. As a matter of
EXPLANATION--Matter in italics (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
[ ] is old law to be omitted.
LBD15643-02-6
financial principle, a utility earning a return on equity equal to its cost of equity should trade at approximately book value.
5. That the return on equity awarded to regulated utilities in this state is broadly consistent with those awarded in other jurisdictions does not dispel these concerns. Rather, these consistently excessive returns reflect a rate-setting process in which regulators in each jurisdiction reference what other jurisdictions have awarded.
6. More broadly, these excessive returns and premium valuations are a predictable consequence of the well-documented phenomenon of regulatory capture and capital bias, as explored in the foundational work of George Stigler (Nobel Prize, 1982) and Jean Tirole (Nobel Prize, 2014). The regulated entities subject to commission oversight can devote substantial resources to influencing regulatory outcomes that determine their profitability -- including the hiring of experts to advance favorable interpretations of otherwise straightforward financial models, the maintenance of revolving-door employment relationships with former regulators, and extensive "educational" engagement with regulatory staff -- while ratepayer interests are represented by comparatively limited resources. Process enhancements such as mandating more sophisticated analytical models will not resolve this imbalance, because the problem is not which analytical tools are used but how their inputs are chosen.
7. These excessive returns translate to a substantial burden upon ratepayers. Across the country, utilities earn excess profits that go beyond their entitled reasonable returns, amounting to approximately five hundred dollars extra per household annually. Soaring rates place a growing share of households at risk of service disconnection. Businesses are also impacted, as high rates disadvantage them relative to competitors based elsewhere.
8. The current process by which the public service commission and regulated utilities set rates has historically been inaccessible and indecipherable to the public and often runs contrary to the stated goals of ensuring affordable, safe, secure, and reliable utility service for residential and business consumers.
9. The default authorized return established by this act -- equal to the 10-Year Treasury plus 200 basis points -- is set at a level the legislature finds to be at or above the cost of equity for most covered utilities under prevailing market conditions, based on the financial evidence described in subdivisions three and four of this section. At current treasury rates, this formula produces an authorized return above what financial models indicate is required to attract capital for regulated utility equity having the risk profile of a typical covered utility. The 200 basis point premium is designed to ensure that, for the large majority of covered utilities in ordinary circumstances, the default authorized return is not confiscatory, while still representing a significant reduction from the historically excessive returns that the current regulatory process has produced. The legislature recognizes that market conditions may change over time and that what constitutes an adequate return will vary accordingly; this act's annual reset mechanism ensures that the treasury component of the default authorized return tracks prevailing market conditions.
10. A competitive equity auction conducted pursuant to section twenty-eight-c of the public service law that produces an authorized return on equity above the default authorized return does not by itself establish that the default authorized return is confiscatory or below the constitutional minimum. In the early period following enactment, auction-clearing returns may exceed the default authorized return in part because investors are unfamiliar with these instruments and require a premium return to compensate for that unfamiliarity -- a premium that the legislature expects to decline as these instruments become established in the capital markets. Even in this transitional period, the availability of the auction mechanism ensures that no covered utility is required to operate under a return below what willing investors, in a competitive process, have determined to be adequate compensation for the associated risk. This act's true-up provisions further ensure that any covered utility that conducts an auction is made whole for the period during which the default authorized return was in effect, so that no covered utility suffers a permanent confiscatory outcome.
11. The default authorized return and the competitive equity auction mechanism, taken together, satisfy the constitutional standard articulated in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), and Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 262 U.S. 679 (1923), by ensuring that every covered utility has both a presumptively adequate default return and an opportunity to demonstrate, through competitive market evidence, that a higher return is required. Sealed-bid uniform-price auctions are widely used in capital markets, including for the issuance of U.S. Treasury securities, and the competitive pricing mechanism established by this act is functionally equivalent to processes that operate successfully in debt and equity markets worldwide. Sealed-bid uniform-price auctions are also the mechanism by which the Federal Communications Commission allocates electromagnetic spectrum and by which regional transmission organizations such as PJM Interconnection and ISO New England procure electric generation capacity. The application of this well-established mechanism to the determination of utility equity costs is novel, but the mechanism itself is proven across multiple regulated markets.
12. When competitive markets exist and function effectively, market prices can provide the information required to protect consumers from price gouging. Regulatory discretion is warranted when markets fail to function effectively. In the case of utility debt, commissions do not convene adjudicatory proceedings to determine a "reasonable" bond yield; they incorporate the market-determined coupon rate because a competitive debt market provides reliable evidence of the cost of debt. This act applies the same principle to equity: where a competitive auction can provide direct, transaction-level evidence of the return investors require to supply equity capital to a regulated utility, that evidence is superior to any estimate produced by expert testimony applying contested financial models. A covered utility is no more entitled to demand a judicially supervised determination of its equity cost than it is to demand such a determination of its debt cost. State legislatures routinely establish formulaic rate structures by statute, including avoided-cost requirements under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, net metering compensation rates, and feed-in tariff schedules. This act follows established precedent in codifying a formulaic approach that reduces regulatory discretion while preserving the public service commission's authority over implementation, auction administration, and ratemaking mechanics.
13. Covered utilities, as recipients of state-granted monopoly franchises serving the public, have accepted obligations of transparency and public accountability that are not imposed on ordinary private enterprises. The disclosure requirements that attend a securities offering conducted pursuant to this act serve the public interest by making the financial condition, operations, and risks of covered utilities more transparent to regulators, ratepayers, and the public at large. Such transparency is itself consistent with, and supportive of, effective cost-of-service regulation, and the legislature finds that the public benefit of enhanced utility disclosure is substantial. It is the intent of this act that all reasonable costs incurred by a covered utility in connection with a competitive equity auction, including any registration and offering costs, management time reasonably allocable to the auction process, and professional fees, be recoverable in rates as set forth in section twenty-eight-c of the public service law. The legislature further finds that such costs are expected to be substantially less than the expert testimony, legal, and other costs currently incurred by covered utilities and ratepayers in litigating return-on-equity determinations in administrative rate proceedings.
14. This act does not require covered utilities to issue equity. The competitive equity auction mechanism is initiated at the option of the covered utility, as a means of demonstrating that its cost of equity exceeds the default authorized return. Unless the covered utility elects otherwise, auction equity interests issued pursuant to this act do not carry voting rights with respect to the affairs of the covered utility or any regulated service corporation or regulated service LLC, and do not otherwise entitle holders to participate in the governance of the covered utility. Covered utilities are already routinely required to issue debt instruments on market-determined terms, the cost of which is incorporated into rates without a separate adjudicatory determination of "reasonable" debt cost. The competitive equity auction is the equitable equivalent for equity: it allows the market to determine the minimum return required by investors under competitive conditions, in precisely the same manner that bond markets determine the minimum return required by lenders. A covered utility that chooses not to petition for an auction retains the default authorized return, which the legislature has determined to be adequate for most covered utilities under prevailing conditions. The legislature further finds that the auction equity interest is economically similar to tracking stock -- an instrument familiar to institutional investors -- and that the predictability of regulated utility revenue streams makes this instrument well suited to certain investors, including pension funds and insurance companies.
15. Any impact of a lower authorized return on equity on credit ratings can, if necessary, be offset by adjusting the authorized debtto-equity ratio applicable to each regulated service. Under this act, the authorized capital structure is determined at the level of each regulated service rather than at the level of the covered utility as a whole, and it is the intent of this act that the public service commission set and adjust such capital structure as may be necessary to maintain financial soundness and continued access to capital markets. The legislature further finds that credit rating agencies evaluate regulated utilities on a multi-factor basis in which the authorized return on equity is one input among many, and that the entity structure established by this act -- including bankruptcy remoteness, ring-fencing, and dedicated revenue streams -- is designed to strengthen the credit profile of the regulated service relative to the covered utility's unsegregated balance sheet.
Reflowed for reading: line numbers and page breaks removed. Cite the official text.
Sponsor's memo
Title of bill
An act to amend the public service law, in relation to enacting the "fair authorized investment returns act"
Purpose of bill
The FAIR Act establishes a transparent, formula-derived default return on equity for investor-owned utilities that is anchored to the 10-Year U.S. Treasury rate plus a fixed spread, with an annual reset mechanism. It also provides utilities that believe this default understates their true cost of equity with a single avenue of recourse: a competitive equity auction that produces a market-based determination of the cost of equity. This approach minimizes regulatory discretion, reduces the scope for regulatory capture, and ensures that ratepayers pay no more than what is necessary to attract capital.
Summary of specific provisions
Section 1 provides that the act shall be known as the Fair Authorized Investment Returns (FAIR) Act.
Read the full memo (1,436 words)
Section 2 shares legislative findings about the shortcomings of the Public Service Commission's current process for setting investor-owned utilities' authorized returns on equity and the increase in accuracy and benefits to be derived from use of the process outlined in this legis- lation.
Section 3 adds Article 1-A, the Fair Authorized Investment Returns Act, to the Public Service Law.
*Section 28-a of Article 1-A establishes definitions applicable to the Act, including definitions for the regulated service corporation and regulated service LLC that together form the two-tier entity structure through which auction equity interests are issued.
*Section 28-b sets a default authorized return on equity equal to the 10-Year U.S. Treasury rate plus two percent, reset annually. This default formula eliminates the need for contested rate-of-return proceedings in the ordinary course and anchors the authorized return to observable market data. This section also permits a covered utility to procure third-party insurance to hedge material idiosyncratic risks, with the cost recoverable in rates subject to the Public Service Commis- sion's determination of prudence. This section further requires that, for the purposes of applying the authorized return on equity, the rate base should reflect the full value of prudently invested capital includ- ing construction work in progress - with the only exclusions being for capital not supplied by investors.
*Section 28-c establishes a competitive equity auction process through which the cost of equity for a covered utility may be determined on a market basis, whether initiated by the utility or ordered by the Commis- sion. In the absence of an auction, the default return applies. The auction-clearing return - whether higher or lower than the default - determines the authorized return on equity for the regulated service. This section also establishes structural provisions to facilitate the auction process and ensure that auction-determined rates properly reflect the risk of the regulated service. These include the regulated service corporation and regulated service LLC structure, through which auction equity interests are issued and regulated service assets are held in a bankruptcy-remote entity; provisions for the assumption of allocated debt by the regulated service LLC at formation, with a transi- tional covered utility guaranty; and a requirement that rate base reflect the full value of prudently invested capital - including construction work in progress - to ensure alignment between rate base and actual invested equity.
*Section 28-d directs the Public Service Commission to report annually to the legislature on authorized and actual returns on equity, auction results, and the impact on customer rates.
Section 4 clarifies that the statute applies only to that portion of a covered utility's rate base that is subject to state jurisdiction.
Section 5 includes a severability clause.
Section 6 sets the effective date.
Justification
The American utility market rests on a social contract. State govern- ments sanction private, for-profit monopolies to provide the bulk of electricity and natural gas service. In return, these investor-owned utilities (IOUs) agree to deliver universal service and submit to cost- of-service regulation of their customer rates by state utility commis- sions. For IOUs, the cost of service includes a reasonable profit, expressed as a return on the equity capital invested in the utility.
In principle, a utility's authorized rate of return must be "just and reasonable," sufficient to recover only the actual and prudent costs of providing service - including a fair return on invested capital. The constitutional standard, set forth in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), and Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 262 U.S. 679 (1923), entitles utilities to a return sufficient to attract capital under prevailing market conditions, i.e., the market-based cost of capi- tal - but no more.
There is a persistent tension in this model. As investor-owned busi- nesses, IOUs seek to maximize profits, which conflicts with regulators' obligation to achieve just and reasonable rates. Moreover, the ratemak- ing process is shaped by structural asymmetries in resources, informa- tion, and institutional position that favor utilities, a phenomenon well documented in the academic literature on regulatory capture and capital bias. As a result, authorized returns on equity have for decades substantially exceeded utilities' actual market-based cost of equity. Those excessive returns not only increase rates directly, but also encourage excessive rate base growth by rewarding additional capital investment at above-market returns.
The current energy affordability crisis is perhaps the clearest illus- tration of this dynamic. Over the last three years, investor-owned util- ity residential electricity rates have increased nearly 50 percent more than inflation, while publicly-owned utility rates have increased well below inflation. Approximately one quarter of U.S. households have been unable to pay their utility bill in full at least once over the past twelve months. Meanwhile, IOUs requested a record $31 billion in rate increases during 2025 alone - double the prior year.
Multiple lines of evidence indicate that authorized returns on equity systematically exceed utilities' actual cost of equity:
*Market signals. Publicly traded utility holding companies typically trade at 2.0-2.3 times book value. As a matter of financial principle, a utility earning a return on equity equal to its cost of equity should trade at approximately book value. The persistent and substantial premi- um to book value is powerful evidence that authorized returns exceed what investors require.
*Financial models. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), applied to the low market beta of utility equities relative to broad market indices, suggests that a premium to the 10-Year Treasury risk-free rate of less than two percent is warranted. Discounted Cash Flow analysis leads to a similar conclusion. At a market equity risk premium of approximately 5.0 percent and a utility equity beta of approximately 0.35, the Capital Asset Pricing Model implies a utility equity risk premium of approximately 1.75 percent above the risk-free rate, support- ing the 2.00 percentage point spread established by this Act.
*Wall Street forecasts. Major asset managers project long-term returns for U.S. equities of approximately 6-7 percent. Utilities are lower risk than the market as a whole, implying a cost of equity at the lower end of, or below, that range.
*Academic consensus. Multiple peer-reviewed studies confirm that returns authorized by state utility commissions are substantially higher than utilities' actual cost of equity.
That the return on equity awarded to utilities in any one jurisdiction is broadly consistent with those in other jurisdictions does not dispel these concerns - it confirms them. Consistently excessive returns reflect a rate-setting process in which regulators in each jurisdiction reference what other jurisdictions have awarded, producing a self-rein- forcing cycle untethered from market fundamentals.
Market mechanisms already determine the cost of utility debt. When util- ities issue bonds, regulators do not independently determine a "reason- able" yield-underwriters solicit bids, investors compete, and the utili- ty accepts the lowest-cost terms available. Regulators then incorporate the embedded cost of that issuance into rates. The cost of equity should be discovered in the same way.
This Act establishes a transparent, formula-derived default return on equity anchored to the 10-Year U.S. Treasury rate plus a fixed spread, with an annual reset mechanism. It then provides utilities that believe this default understates their true cost of equity with a single avenue of recourse: a competitive equity auction that produces a market-based determination of the cost of equity. This approach minimizes regulatory discretion, reduces the scope for regulatory capture, and ensures that ratepayers pay no more than what is necessary to attract capital.
Prior legislative history
New bill.
Fiscal implications
This bill will lead to significant to-be-determined savings for energy consumers, including state and local governments.
Effective date
This act shall take effect on the one hundred twentieth day after it shall have become a law and shall apply to any rate proceeding initiated on or after such effective date.
Summaries, headlines and scores are AI-generated from the official bill text. How we score bills. Source: NYS Open Legislation.